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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
Rationalization has thus far been successful because it has
not been completely successful.
— E D W A R D  S H I L S
When I graduated from college in the American bicentennial year of 1976
preparing to vote for Jimmy Carter, the most important geopolitical dis-
tinction on Earth was clear to everyone. It was the opposition between the
democratic, capitalist West (plus Japan) and the Soviet Union (with China
and other communist allies). Of course there was a “third world” and there
were “nonaligned” countries. From today’s standpoint those very terms were
a Eurocentric conceit expressing the priority that the developed North
granted itself over the concerns of the developing-and-undeveloped South
(or to be more precise, the Not-So-North, populations living entirely below
thirty-eight degrees north). But whatever its indigenous issues, the South
had always to be conscious of the third rail of international relations, that
bipolar Northern line, where every step toward/away from the “West”
meant a step away from/toward the “East.” The complexities of the Soviet-
China relationship and Richard Nixon’s deft manipulations had rendered
“monolithic” communism a fantasy, but had done nothing to defang 
the conflict of two globe-straddling political economies sporting globe-
annihilating nuclear overkill.As long as it dominated, this geopolitical para-
digm gave credence to the modern European philosophy of Economic
Man, common to the capitalist West and the communist East, for which
secular prosperity, privately held or publicly owned, unequally accumu-
lated or equally distributed, is the great determinant of social reality. After
all, nationalistic and racist mysticism, the assumed remnants of a premodern
world of superstition and jingoism, had been defeated on the battlefield in
1945. And if the greatest domestic struggle of postwar America was an
analogous fight against a “primitive” racism, its resolution was understood by
black activists, white liberals, and even its white opponents to be the tran-
scendence of race by political-economic equality. Power and prosperity were
the shared languages of the Cold War era, internationally and domestically;
any problem was caused by their absence, any solution by their provision.
INTRODUCTION:  THE RETURN OF 
THE REPRESSED
For progressives and economic conservatives, welfare state liberals and min-
imal state libertarians, John Rawls and Robert Nozick, money, jobs, taxes,
and economic opportunity were the coin of the political realm. On these
grounds, in 1976 Carter, who hedged toward the former, defeated Gerald
Ford, who hedged toward the latter.
But not so four years later, when Carter ran against Ronald Reagan, but
was defeated by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Ronald Reagan won the election,
of course, but it was arguably the Khomeini-led Iranian revolution, whose
Islamists painted America as “the Great Satan” and held American embassy
hostages in Teheran for more than a year that finished Carter’s chances. It
was the first major shock to the triumphant liberal paradigm. Suddenly it
appeared that some people were willing to trade economic development
for religious identity, to—in the paradigm’s terms—go backward. Still, the
modern economic framework’s greatest success was yet to come, for after
an intensification of the Cold War in the next decade, 1989 brought the fall
of the Berlin Wall, inspiring Francis Fukuyama’s famous essay,“The End of
History.” His argument that liberal democratic capitalism was the final and
universal form of world history captured the mood, and seemed confirmed
by the end of communism in Central Europe, the collapse of the USSR,
and China’s experiments with the free market. After the first war in the
Persian Gulf reshuffled the deck in the Middle East, setting the stage for
the Oslo Accords, and a possible Israeli-Palestinian settlement, it seemed
that without the prospect of Soviet backing a number of apparently intran-
sigent international and sectarian conflicts might simply burn out. Peace
seemed to be breaking out all over.
But the Pax Fukuyama didn’t last long. By the mid-1990s a general
renewal of nationalism and ethnic politics became apparent, most notably
in the Balkans, but most horribly in Rwanda. All over the world there
seemed to be a rebirth of tribal, ethnonationalist aspirations and intoler-
ance. Religious fundamentalism, or as Giles Keppel put it,“the revenge of
God,” was in full swing: Christian fundamentalism in domestic American
politics; Jewish, Buddhist, and Hindu fundamentalisms in Israel and south
Asia; and of course the ever widening hit-and-run conflict with Islamic
militancy (Keppel 1994). Samuel Huntington’s announcement of the com-
ing “clash of civilizations” in a 1993 essay gave a name to this dawning reality.
But in America under the Clinton administration the rising din of ethnic and
religious revivalism was drowned out by the louder sounds of happy cash
registers and less-than-happy presidential depositions. Meanwhile, officials
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and pundits seemed almost nostalgically to reimpose a bipolar world in
their concern over the fate of Russian missiles and the likelihood of China
as the threat of the new century, the latter encouraged by the Chinese holding
of an American military jet and crew, a “crisis” now barely remembered.
Roughly, this is how things stood at eight in the morning, EDT, on Sep-
tember 11, 2001.
But not an hour later.The events of that morning did not “change every-
thing.” Islamic fundamentalism, American terror casualties, even the at-
tempted destruction of the World Trade Center were already old hat. But
September 11 did complete the shift in our priorities, putting the final nail
in the coffin of the economistic paradigm. It was now apparent that global-
ization meant not the end of Old World politics but their magnification,
ancient rickety joints now greased by an open, technological, mass media
environment.The irony is deep. Precisely when the most advanced soci-
eties were rushing to trade in the Grand Narratives of history, and perhaps
even the nation-state, for an exploding network of information markets in
a borderless space of free trade—globalization meets the postmodern con-
dition—they came face to face with an apparently premodern fundamen-
talism as their main enemy, the thin edge of a world environment suddenly
brimming with fights over blood, soil, and God.Who would have thought
as Bill Gates and other computer cowboys rode their bulls down Wall Street
in the mid-1990s into the Brave New World of nonideological capital cir-
culating the world as electronic data, that in half a decade we would be
discussing the Crusades as a significant predisposing event for international
relations! Or that the most devastating military attack on American soil in
history, a security undented by two World Wars and a forty-year nuclear
stand-off, never breached by German planes, Japanese kamikazes, or Soviet
missiles, would be accomplished by nineteen religious zealots with plastic
box-cutters during “peacetime.”
For, as a recent book title has it, we have now to admit that culture mat-
ters. From our concern for toleration and diversity in an increasingly multi-
cultural America to the global rise in ethnic-cultural violence, from the
creation of new fields like “cultural studies” to the cultural-religious clash
of Islam with the West, the things labeled “cultural” seem to be at the fore-
front of our time.As Huntington argued, after being driven by political and
economic ideology for seventy years, international conflict now is re-form-
ing along civilizational or cultural axes. Not that economics has left center
stage; it is one of the perennial house players. But we no longer imagine
that all human motivation, all conflict, all serious debates, are ultimately
about money, or money-and-power. Man does not kill for bread alone.
Our world’s most deadly struggles are about blood and soil and language
and who your grandparents were.Along a series of political issues, identity
has trumped class. Today the furors of domestic politics are more likely to
concern the complaints of disenfranchised ethnic, sexual, and gender groups
than the poor. Cultures themselves are being rewritten because of the new
recognition of culture, long-standing historical narratives revised by the in-
corporation of indigenous and non-Western viewpoints: it is now a canon-
ical piece of grade school learning that Columbus did not discover America.
The left attacks cultural imperialism, the right attacks cultural relativism.
Clashing cultures, recognizing cultures, fearing cultures: these now take up
a large part of our attention.
The sea change goes beyond the task of dealing with the legacy of racism
or colonialism, beyond the issue of “inclusiveness.” It reveals a new notion
of self and equality. A half-century ago the equality sought by most dis-
enfranchised Americans was moral, civic, and economic, an equality that was
supposed to ignore ethnic or cultural differences in favor of the common
humanity beneath.The figure of the “melting pot” that Israel Zangwill used
to title his 1908 play was pleasantly warm, not oppressively hot, as long as
sameness meant educational, economic, and political opportunity. Minor-
ity Americans wanted to be recognized as equals despite their ethnicity.
Lyndon Johnson, champion of the welfare state, who did more for the civil
rights of African-Americans than any president since Lincoln, understood
himself to be voicing the ultimate respect for Martin Luther King Jr. by
saying that King “is a credit to his race—the human race.” In 1965 that saying
was progressive and liberal; now it is viewed as an unattractive compromise.
Minorities today want to be recognized as equals not despite but through their
distinctive identities, as fully encultured agents.They want admittance to the
forum and the market in their own skins and traditional clothing. During a
speech Colin Powell noted the tendency of some people to cease identify-
ing him as black once he became successful, to grant him a kind of ethnic-
racial neutrality.To which Powell rhetorically objected,“Don’t stop now!”
All this troubles the very heart of our understanding of the modern age
and its direction. From the 1950s through the early 1970s, despite the wide-
spread prejudices of the day, the “enlightened” or official progressive view
held that culture and religion are private matters, that public policy, domes-
tic and international, should focus on the pragmatic issues of economic
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development.The future would be one of mutually respectful individuals
pursuing the benefits of culture-neutral technology and science within a
framework of universally recognized political rights. If not now, then soon,
the world’s peoples would stop worrying about silly things like ethnic
conflicts and religious wars and recognize that deep down they are all mod-
ern liberal materialists at heart, primarily interested in education, economic
security, modern health care, and Colonel Sanders.This was not a bad or
amoral vision. Conflicts over money, taxes and welfare, unions and big busi-
ness, however troublesome and even bloody, do seem more tractable for
rational argument than questions over identity. If primordial issues of reli-
gion and ethnicity could be taken off the agenda, then, however ran-
corously, we could at least do business with each other.
A marvelous sample of our old thinking comes, again, from that Texan
who bestrode the 1960s like, well, a Texan. In April 1965 Johnson, who had
made his early political career fighting for rural electrification, tried to entice
the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table with a promise of American
help in building a hydroelectric grid for the Mekong Delta, modeled on
the Tennessee Valley Authority. LBJ wanted to build a TVA for the NLF.
We can almost hear him now:“If Ho Chi Minh wants to do some bargain-
ing, we’ll God damn well show him some bargaining!”As Bill Moyers later
commented,“If Ho had been [then AFL-CIO president] George Meaney,
Johnson would have had a deal.” But Ho wasn’t a jowly, clean-shaven union
leader, he was a thin Vietnamese nationalist and communist with a long
beard and a longer memory of grievances against the West.Whatever we
may think of him, he could not be bought off with light bulbs.
Today Johnson’s proposal may seem more lovable than loathsome, but in
either case, laughable.The list of sobering experiences we have graduated
from is long: Ho’s introductory course in Third World nationalism and ideo-
logical tenacity heads the list, of course, followed by the intermediate course
in Teheran, advanced study in the Persian Gulf, the never-ending Israeli-
Palestinian seminar, and finally our graduation exercises on September 11.
But even if we are less naive today, I suspect that deep down we contem-
porary Americans still find it no easier than did LBJ to understand people
who are willing to sacrifice their children’s lives to avenge their parents, or
to ensure that their rulers pray in the right language or with the right
book. But many are willing.“It’s the economy, stupid” may work in some
U.S. presidential elections, but it most emphatically has not worked in
Bosnia or Jerusalem or Rwanda or Afghanistan. Or lower Manhattan.
Philosophy and political theory have not ignored the new salience of
culture.Many writers have come to question the “classical” liberal theorists of
the 1970s—John Rawls, Robert Nozick,Thomas Nagel, Ronald Dworkin,
Bruce Ackerman, and others—for imagining systems of political rights
that hold universally regardless of cultural differences and which, although
concerned with social justice, allow no role whatsoever for cultural iden-
tity. In response, a new generation of political theorists has sought to find a
place for “group” identity and a “right to culture” within liberal democracy,
even if this requires that such will sometimes trump strict legal equality or
individual liberty. While echoing the critique of rights-based liberalism
developed by the communitarians in the 1980s and early 1990s, most of
these “new culturalists” follow the progressive-liberal tradition—famously
expressed by historian Richard Hofstadter—in fearing local community as
a source of jingoistic antipathy to minorities. Nor was this new cultural
turn limited to political theory. Recent ethicists have reacted against the
rationalist-theoretical project of establishing universal moral principles on
the basis of an individually accessed Reason. Stuart Hampshire, Alasdair
MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, and Martha Nussbaum have all argued that
the complexity of moral life, dependent as it is on the ethical significance
of manners, social customs, moral “luck,” and inherited cultural narratives,
cannot be reduced to a few abstract and universal principles.
A cultural turn can be identified in even the more abstruse areas of philo-
sophical thought. Recent attacks on realism, the claim that our knowledge
is made true by its relation to objective facts, have invoked the cognitive
role of culture, proposing “solidarity” rather than “objectivity” as the court
of last resort for the legitimation of belief (Rorty 1991b).The retreat from
transcendental and foundationalist theories of meaning, common to both
Anglo-American and European philosophy in the middle of the last century,
has in effect opened epistemology to culture. In Anglo-American philosophy the
early twentieth-century dominance of logical positivism had been eclipsed
in midcentury by Wittgenstein’s ordinary-language philosophy, which made
meaning emergent from social practice. “Social constructivism” became a
major contributor to, and problem in, the philosophy of science after the
ground-breaking work of Thomas Kuhn. Eventually Richard Rorty declared
that the commitment to rights and reason, lacking any noncircular justifi-
cation, should simply be accepted as the “frankly ethnocentric” orientation
of the West. Meanwhile, in European thought a parallel development took
place.The early and mid-twentieth-century “philosophies of the subject”—
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phenomenology, psychoanalysis, existentialism, and “Western” Marxism—
had shared the view that an inner self, alienated by the social forces of cap-
italism, religion, science, and mass culture, was the real source of meaning,
truth, and society.These philosophies were eclipsed in the century’s second
half by hermeneutics, structuralism, and eventually poststructuralism, for
which historicized networks of signs form the background from which
meaning and self emerge. On both sides of the North Atlantic, language,
understood now as social, contingent, and practical, became the dominant
topic of twentieth-century philosophy and, through a remarkable inver-
sion, came to be understood as the source of logic, truth, and the self, rather
than their product.
Unfortunately, all this attention to the trees failed to reveal the forest.
While ethics, epistemology, metaphilosophy, and political philosophy em-
braced intersubjectivity, dialogue, and signs, their authors rarely achieved
the revelation of Monsieur Jourdain in Molière’s The Bourgeois Gentleman,
who discovers that he has been speaking prose all his life.They failed to
recognize that the collective name for the diverse phenomena they were
examining is “culture.” So while social and political philosophy, philosophy
of language, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of
history sailed happily along, the philosophy of that domain of human exis-
tence that overlaps all of them, culture, remained a kind of backwater. Its
greatest twentieth-century practitioner, Ernst Cassirer, is a largely neglected
figure.When philosophers do speak of “culture,” they typically use it as a
synonym for “high culture,” that is to say, artistic and intellectual history.
And where they employ the adjective “cultural” to refer to something more
basic and distinctive, it mainly functions as a prefix to that feared but widely
courted term “relativism.”
Arguably this neglect of culture is an Enlightenment legacy, culture being
a casualty of the rising power of an ideal of knowledge that viewed contin-
gent, historical, socially specific ways of practice and thought as mere tra-
dition, the repository of myth and superstition, hence an obstacle to prog-
ress.What after all was the antonym of the Enlightenment ideal of Reason?
Not Nature, certainly. It was Culture, inherited social beliefs about God,
nature, authority, and inequality. For early twentieth-century philosophy, if
society was a superstructure covering up the infrastructure of authentic
subjectivity or objective reality or sense data, then, as Plato held of art’s
imitation of mere sensory appearances, culture seemed twice removed from
the real, a collection of self-deceptions promoted by a mendacious super-
structure. Even today, among thinkers who make the cultural turn away
from transcendentalism, foundationalism, and universalism, culture still
tends to appear as a background surd, the name of a dimension of reality in
terms of which any topic under discussion will be explained, but which
itself goes largely unexamined. Exotic cultural practices are cited to make a
point, a paragraph or page gives an uncritical definition of culture on the
way to hunt for bigger game. One searches in vain for a fundamental
philosophical exploration of what culture is.
But let’s not be too hard on contemporary philosophers, or on the
Enlightenment for that matter. Both have had good reason to fear or dismiss
culture. For once we decide to remedy their deficit, we discover the real
problem: culture is trouble. Defining it is first of all a complex and contro-
versial chore. Even once, or if, we can tentatively say what culture is, we are
faced with the even more daunting task of saying what a culture is, where
one ends and another begins.Then comes a succession of troubling terms
often attached to the social groups that have cultures: peoples, ethnicities,
nations, and races.What are they? In each case we struggle under the bur-
den of recognizing that their shifting meanings threaten to make historio-
graphical hash of the whole business.All of this comes before we even begin
to confront the philosophical problems that led us to investigate culture in
the first place: what is culture’s social and cognitive role? Are human living-
together and human knowing inherently cultural? If so, what happens to
our view of knowledge and political life, what happens to truth, knowl-
edge, reason, equality, universal rights, and freedom? Wouldn’t relativism
and historicism be unavoidable, and truth and right reduced to true and
right for some particular culture? The stakes are high. For if the Enlighten-
ment attempted to forge norms that transcend culture precisely in order to
defend science and rights and equality, then will the return to culture under-
mine our Enlightenment heritage? Dig far enough into the “postmodern
condition,” into contemporary worries about the meaning and legitimacy
of the intellectual scaffolding of the modern world, and there, in its now
fractured foundations, you find two old snakes, Reason and Culture, lying
coiled together in a hostile embrace. How did they get there, what are they
doing, and what should we do about them?
The theme of this book’s approach to these conundrums will be, not
around but through. I will argue that there is nothing we do or say that is
beyond or outside culture, including reason itself. Knowing, moral action,
and all human norms operate through culture. But the cultural embedded-
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ness of cognition does not imply a troubling relativism. Cultural differences
there are, but the complexity both of the cultures involved, and the cul-
tural relations among them, make the identification of incommensurable
cultures impossible. Reason can learn to live with culture. It had better, since
it has no choice in the matter. It is, after all, culture’s creation.
Modernity is in part about culture. For that collection of beliefs, prac-
tices, and institutions which set contemporary life apart from the rest of
human history defined itself by a new relation to culture. Not a new cul-
ture—although that is also true—but a new relation to culture per se. The
very idea of culture, as we understand it, is a product of the Enlightenment.
It had to be.We could only conceive culture at the point that we imagined
we could see beyond it, which is precisely what Western modernity claimed
to do. Modernity is the first age to constitute “culture” as a problem. Indeed, the
current problems of modern society that we call postmodern—here under-
stood as the advanced course in modernity, where modernity’s implications
are more completely revealed—largely hang on the role of culture in social
and cognitive life. Just as a new relation of reason and culture defined the
break of the modern from the premodern, so our postmodern present is
defined by a further change in the status of culture. Culture ain’t what it
used to be, for better and for worse. How we understand that is central to
how we understand ourselves.
At the same time, the seemingly antimodern character of the various
revivals of fundamentalism, ethnocentrism, and nationalism, conflicts among
and with which define global politics at the outset of our new century, is
an artifact of our vision, not fact. For these revivals are characteristically
modernist, not reversions to a primordial, premodern past. Their conflicts
with modernity are fought with weapons from modernity—and not only
weapons made of steel and silicon, but of ideas and practices too.This does
not gainsay the fact that we are entering an era of renewed cultural conflict
(which is true). Nor does it imply that we have reached the “end of his-
tory” where all ways are the West’s ways (which is false). It means rather
that we are forced to recognize that there are many ways to be modern.
Inevitably this discussion provokes the question: where is this train we
call modernization going? In a marvelous series of essays, each the basis for
a subsequent book, Huntington, Fukuyama, and Benjamin Barber set out
three hypotheses for our global future. As we saw, Fukuyama’s 1989 “The
End of History?” argued that liberal capitalist democracy is the final form
of political maturity, the only legitimate answer to the universal human
desire for recognition and freedom. Barber’s 1992 “Jihad vs. McWorld” saw
the Cold War bipolarity of capitalism and communism being replaced by a
new global dualism between a superficial postmodern consumer culture and
a reactionary primordial authoritarianism.And Huntington’s 1993“The Clash
of Civilizations” predicted a multipolar conflict of cultural families whose
modernization pushes them further apart, not closer together. Fukuyama’s
thesis may seem dated by the rise of cultural and nationalist conflicts of the
last decade, but it remains the case today that the most technically and eco-
nomically advanced countries on Earth are liberal capitalist democracies.
So which of these numerical hypotheses about the postmodern era is
right: will the world of our new century be One,Two, or Many?
There is no possibility of a systematic world tour of these issues.We must
be content with a tourist package of brief encounters with key locales.
Fortunately, we will not be completely alone on our journey. Some few
thinkers of the last century have shined their light into culture and its place
in knowledge and social life, most prominently Ernst Cassirer, but also
Edward Shils and Hans-Georg Gadamer. More recently, Elizabeth Baeten,
Samuel Fleischacker,Alasdair MacIntyre, Bhikhu Parekh, Lorenzo Simpson,
and the late Ernest Gellner have separately probed these depths, trying to
give an adequate account of the cultural nature of human thought while at
the same time avoiding relativism.The following chapters attempt merely to
push their frontier of exploration forward by a few kilometers.We will not
reach the pole. Culture is a realm that can be explored, but never exhausted.
We will lug our interrogative baggage through the following inquiry, to be
reorganized and repacked as we go, but never ditched. Our present aim is
not to reach a destination, so we can stop traveling, but to become better
travelers, to see more, experience more, and discriminate better than your
average tourist.We hope to develop a finer appreciation for culture’s role,
to get some sense of the vast terrain it implicates, by the time our strength
and money are used up. But as for completing our journey, that is out of
the question. For culture is not only endlessly complex, each whole exhibit-
ing parts that are themselves equally complex wholes, it is always changing
and growing. If not in the olden days, at least in our contemporary world,
we cannot step into the same culture twice. For the volcanic depths spew
ever more and expanding terrain as we walk.
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Liberalism has always distinguished the political sphere from the rest of
culture. John Locke’s attempt in the his 1689 Second Treatise on Government
to separate the magistrate-citizen relationship from all other social rela-
tions, and his simultaneous separation of “private” salvation from “public”
political matters in the Letter Concerning Toleration, inaugurated that strat-
egy. For only thus, liberals have ever since thought, can the public realm of
political coercion be kept away from matters of nonpolitical belief. But the
privacy to which nonpolitical culture was thereby banished often seemed a
rather public nuisance. By the mid-nineteenth century, J. S. Mill could refer
to “custom” as a “despot,” cultural tradition as the source of anti-individualist
conformity. Natural rights liberals sought rights not dependent on culture;
utilitarians and, by the twentieth century, progressives found inherited cul-
ture the chief obstacle to social progress.Whether the goal was individual
liberty or prosperity or egalitarian justice, custom stood in the way.Then
fascism, the Holocaust, and the American civil rights struggle provided lib-
erals a new lesson: culture kills! Cultural identity, in nationalism or racism or
anti-Semitism, is the greatest of evils. Fortunately, Cold War history seemed
to confirm the anachronism of cultural identity in a modernizing world
whose major issues revolved around political economy. Liberal theory then
evolved the view that government is to be “neutral” regarding substantive
accounts of the Good. Since whatever culture is, an individual culture can-
not be neutral with respect to what it considers good, it follows that gov-
ernment must be neutral with respect to culture.The pursuit of neutrality
reached its apotheosis in John Rawls’s Political Liberalism (1993) by denying
any political role to “comprehensive doctrines,” hence cultural narratives.
But today we can say that reports of the death of culture were greatly
exaggerated.Theoretically, neutralism has been under attack since the advent
of “communitarianism” in the 1980s; “perfectionist” liberals have arisen
who, like Stephen Macedo and William Galston, accept that liberalism
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intrinsically endorses a set of liberal “virtues” or “purposes.” Brian Barry
himself, a classical rights–based opponent of multiculturalism if ever there
was one, argued that liberal politics presupposes a liberal outlook, or as
Dewey long ago insisted, a liberal culture (Barry 1990; Dewey 1979).And
in the real world cultural membership has renewed its claim to political
legitimacy. Multiculturalism and the politics of “identity,”“recognition,” or
“presence” have arisen in liberal societies, condemning the “assimilationist
ideal” with its “melting pot” metaphor, aspiring to sighted, not blind, justice,
to recognition through, not despite, somatic-cultural particularity (“somatic”
referring not only to racial morphology but also to gender and sexual ori-
entation).Thus the neutralist and secular tendencies of recent liberal theory
today face, not only that global religious revival that Giles Keppel calls la
revanche de Dieu, the revenge of God, but also a broader la revanche de la culture.
In response, a number of liberal theorists have opened their political
anthropologies to cultural membership.We may call them the new cultur-
alists. Some include among liberal individual rights the right to culture. Others
eschew the foundational concern with individual rights for a “postliberal”
theory while still arguing for typically liberal institutions and practices. I
suggest that neither adequately conceptualizes a free society’s relation to
culture. Instead of weaving liberal republican values out of a culturally
embedded conception of self and politics, they cut culture to fit liberal
anthropology and egalitarian policy, thereby minimizing the problems cul-
ture causes liberalism. My aim will be, not to roll back the new cultural-
ism, nor to answer the important issues attendant on a culturally informed
liberalism (such as, for example, cultural rights, proportional representa-
tion, minority legal exemptions, and so on), but to address the conceptual
implications of a liberal recognition of culture. Ultimately, I believe, such
requires a rejection of dominant forms of liberal theory, although not of lib-
eralism, it being fully possible to endorse many liberal institutions, practices,
and values while objecting to their common justifications (Cahoone 2002a).
But here we can only recognize some of the complexities raised by open-
ing liberal theory to culture.
The New Culturalism
Not that all historical strains of liberalism have ignored or opposed cultural
identity.The political theorists Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka rightly point
out that nineteenth- and early twentieth-century liberalism was pleasantly
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disposed toward nationalism.Woodrow Wilson led the movement that in
the Treaty of Versailles made national determination a watchword of liberal
democracy. Recognition of the rights of culturally defined groups has long
been accepted in liberal states—e.g., Native American communities in the
United States and Canada. Indeed, liberalism covertly depends on nation-
alism and the recognition of culture, not only in the historical formation
of liberal states, but in the acquisition of citizenship by birth, both of which
liberals accept without comment. For Tamir and Kymlicka, only hegemonic
and “particularist” nationalism, the self-determination of one people at the
expense of others and of individual rights, is antiliberal.
In Liberal Nationalism Tamir agrees with mainstream liberals that nation-
alism defined by “blood and soil” is wrong and dangerous. But national
identity based in culture is not. Echoing Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Com-
munities, she stipulates that “nations are communities imagined though cul-
ture” (Tamir 1993: 64).Tamir gives communitarian justifications for the pri-
macy of national “associative obligations,” claiming that a polity requires a
sense of belonging rooted in “identity and relatedness.” Liberals must rec-
ognize a right to culture, a right to live in a “meaningful environment.”This
is an individual, not a group, right, and thus can fit into the liberal list of
individually borne rights, to be balanced with the others. She claims, how-
ever, that culture is something we choose, a “constitutive choice.” We are
“contextual individuals,” but every aspect of our cultural or contextual iden-
tification is subject to our free affirmation or disavowal. She cautions that
since culture is a personal choice, individuals may not only switch cultures
but reform their culture. Cultures have no immunity from internal critique.
Tamir rejects state prohibition of minority cultural expression. For “refus-
ing individuals the right to express their culture in the public sphere in
compliance with the ruling culture compels them to forgo their identity”
(Tamir 1993: 54). Liberal equality demands that the state not favor any cul-
ture over another. Every individual deserves an equal share of governmental
resources (“cultural vouchers”) for making possible his or her cultural life.
If its small numbers means that a minority’s cultural activities are in market
terms more expensive than others, then “we may wish to supplement the
funds granted to members of the [minority] community” (Tamir 1994: 55).
Since Tamir allows that what is claimed by the liberal state to be “neutral”
may in fact be a covert support of its dominant culture, her position implies
that all minority cultures may be actively and disproportionately supported
by tax dollars.
Tamir endorses national “self-determination” with two caveats.As noted,
choice, not genes, determines membership, and there are no rights to par-
ticular plots of turf. Presumably this is an anti-Zionist claim directed at
least partly to her fellow Israelis. Second, the institutional form taken by
self-determination rightly depends on circumstances.The right to culture
is not the right to a state. Because self-determination of one culture must
be compatible with the same right for others groups, a liberal nationalism
renounces the strict nationalist claim of “one people, one state.” Even on
prudential grounds the best way to preserve one’s culture is not always a
nation-state.Tamir’s aim is to dissociate cultural expression from political
self-rule; she hopes to strengthen borders between cultures while weaken-
ing those between states. For nations are only dangerous if combined with
states.What is often preferable, she suggests, are regional state-like associa-
tions, like the European Union, within which self-determining cultures can
have a home.
Will Kymlicka is distinctively concerned with national minorities, like
Native Americans, rather than immigrant minorities. In a series of books
he has argued that liberal freedom requires a “societal culture,” a meaning-
ful cultural environment in which members can make their choices. Cul-
tural membership is a “primary good” in the Rawlsian sense, hence must be
distributed justly, like income and opportunity.Applying Ronald Dworkin’s
concept of equality of resources to cultural traditions, he notes that cultural
majorities in liberal states enjoy an undeserved advantage by accident of
birth, while minorities must often bargain away cultural identity for success
or income. Indeed, he leaves no doubt that he feels the majority has its cul-
ture secured by the state, despite liberal claims to neutrality (Kymlicka 1995a:
189). Special support is justified where a minority suffers from unequal “un-
chosen” circumstances, as is the case with national minorities, as opposed
to suffering from the consequences of their unique choices, as do volun-
tary immigrants.Thus, while rejecting the proceduralist liberal notion that
“the right is prior to the good,” Kymlicka employs standard egalitarian lib-
eral redistributive arguments. This expansion of rights-based liberalism is
required if liberalism is “to ensure that no one is penalized or disadvantaged
by their natural or social endowment, but allow that people’s fates vary
with their choices” (Kymlicka 1995a: 190).
Kymlicka occasionally implies that cultural identity is unchosen, but like
Tamir he seeks to defuse the implications of his apparently communitarian
notion of the self as constituted by, and inheriting values and ends from,
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community or tradition. He clarifies that liberalism requires, not that the
self be “prior” to its communally inculcated ends, but merely that “no end
or goal is exempt from possible re-examination.” Ends, while communally
bequeathed, are all “reversible” by the individual’s choice. Each can be dis-
tributively, that is, piecemeal, subjected to critical revision. Hence the lib-
eral “desires a society that is transparently intelligible—where nothing works
behind the backs of its members,” determining their actions without their
self-aware approval (Kymlicka 1995a: 63).This conforms to his view, shared
by Tamir, that the source of affinity among a people is culture, not ethnic-
ity. For “descent-based approaches to national membership have obvious
racial overtones, and are manifestly unjust” (Kymlicka 1995a: 23).
Kymlicka maintains individual rights for the members of minority cul-
tures against their own cultural communities. He denies that self-ruling,
democratic cultural minorities will often need to restrict the freedom of
members, although he admits temporary restrictions on members’ liberty
to ensure cultural survival:“If certain liberties really would undermine the
very existence of the community, then we should allow what would other-
wise be illiberal measures” (Kymlicka 1989: 170). Such measures may be
“wrong,” but the state may not prohibit them. “Peaceful negotiation, not
force,” should carry the day, even though this may involve “exempting the
national minority from federal bills of rights and judicial review” (Kym-
licka 1989: 167–68). But, he continues,“Obviously intervention is justified
in the case of gross and systematic violation of human rights . . . just as
these are grounds for intervention in foreign countries” (Kymlicka 1989:
169). Here, as elsewhere, Kymlicka models the rights of national minorities
on those of sovereign states.
Other thinkers, whom we might call postliberals, are heir to a more rad-
ical approach, finding that difference cuts deeper into the fabric of liberal
thought. Iris Marion Young’s influential Justice and the Politics of Difference is
not specifically concerned with ethnic or national groups, but more broadly
with social groups “differentiated from at least one other group by cultural
forms, practices, or way of life” (Young 1990: 43). Such groups “constitute
individuals . . . [in their] sense of history, affinity and separateness, even the
person’s mode of reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling.” Denying
that group identity is chosen, she evokes a Heideggerian notion that “group
affiliation has the character of . . . ‘thrownness’: one finds oneself as a member
of a group.”The majority’s oppression of such groups inhibits group mem-
bers’“ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs,
thoughts, and feelings” (Young 1990: 40).What grounds oppression is the
ascription of a “unified, orderly identity” which must “essentialize” otherness
so as to deny any sameness between self and other.This reflects majoritar-
ian fear of particularity or “specificity,” or in Julia Kristeva’s term, the abject
in oneself, which is represented by the other. In contrast, the nonoppres-
sive use of difference conceives it as relational and circumstantial, hence
variable, thereby avoiding exclusion.Young writes, “Difference no longer
implies that groups lie outside one another . . . that there are no overlap-
ping experiences . . . nothing in common. Different groups are always similar
in some respects” (Young 1990: 171).
Of the allegedly impartial liberal state,Young claims that “the idea of
impartiality legitimates hierarchical decision making and allows the stand-
point for the privileged to appear as universal” (Young 1990: 116).Against
this oppressive “depoliticization,”Young insists that “all aspects of institu-
tional structure, public action, social practices and habits, and cultural mean-
ings” are to be politicized,“potentially subject to collective discussion and
decision making.”A cultural politics that critically examines all forms of group
oppression will contribute to achieving the “democratic cultural plural-
ism” of “city life.” City dwellers do not, like rural people and suburbanites,
stick to their own.Their lives are lived in public space, in the “being together
of strangers” who belong to the city without unity or commonness, an
“infinite . . . network” that encourages risky encounters, difference “with-
out exclusion.”
In a series of essays, culminating in his Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cul-
tural Diversity and Political Theory, Lord Bhikhu Parekh has pushed the con-
frontation of liberal theory with culture the furthest of all (Parekh 2000).
Like Young, he accepts that cultural identity is un-chosen. He explicitly
qualifies liberalism with multiculturalism, endorsing group rights and refus-
ing to grant unqualified priority to individual rights. Parekh distinguishes
several models for handling cultural diversity in a modern state (Parekh
1998).“Cultural assimilation” takes the state to be underwritten by a com-
mon culture into which immigrants and minorities must be assimilated.
“Proceduralism” or neutralism demands that the state have no cultural
predilections. “Civic assimilation” bifurcates a common political or civic
culture, to which immigrants and minorities must be assimilated, from “pri-
vate” culture with respect to which the state must be neutral.The bifurca-
tionist and neutralist approaches in the end suffer from a version of the
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assimilationist model: they effectively leave the inherited civic or majority
culture as an unalterable given.
The multicultural model, on the other hand, opens civic and supracivic
majority culture to transformation. Minorities are to receive not only tol-
eration but support qua minorities, guaranteeing a robust pluralism. The
dominant culture is then liable to ongoing negotiation with minorities
regarding what it means to be a member of society. Not only can the major-
ity change the minority, the minority can change the majority.The Indian
or Pakistani can change England for the better; the constitution of English
identity is “negotiable.” Parekh admirably foresees a relationship of reci-
procity that obligates the minority as well; thus in Britain,“minorities can
hardly expect to be taken seriously and play their part unless they accept the
full obligations of British citizenship . . . and sensitivity to [British society’s]
values, fears and dilemmas. . . . they must master English and acquire detailed
knowledge of British history” (Parekh 1991: 200). Rethinking Multicultural-
ism is a mediator’s handbook, arguing above all for intercultural dialogue
within a just “community of communities.” Like Kymlicka, he accepts a
differentiated or pluralistic conception of citizenship, by which individuals
and groups may exhibit different ties to the state. Social unity is then to be
“grounded in a multiculturally constituted public realm which both sus-
tains, and is in turn sustained by, a multiculturally constituted private realm”
(Parekh 1998: 10). Parekh writes that “a politics of citizenship which both
promotes the rights of communities with regard to each other, as well as the
obligations of communities to each other is an essential precondition of this
pluralist vision” (Parekh 1991: 199).What is needed between minority and
majority communities is “what the Romans called civic friendship.”
Culture Without Tears
These thinkers perform the needed service of opening our understanding
of the politics of a free society to cultural group differences. Nevertheless,
they share three problems: their conclusions differ less from the standard
liberal approach than they suggest; they fail to credit the antiliberal troubles
caused by the new culturalism; and they offer a conception of cultural group
identity that has already been predigested by notions of liberal freedom and
equality, mitigating their claimed rapprochement with the realities of culture.
First, a preliminary question whose homely answer will become more
significant later: is what distinguishes the Quebecois or the Native Ameri-
can or the Israeli Palestinian from fellow citizens entirely cultural? Is “a
culture” the right name for the unity of these groups? As Anthony Appiah
has warned, recent critics tend to expand the application of “cultural” to
what is merely “social” (Appiah 1997). Exhibiting a culture, without mutual
social obligations and interactions, might not be sufficient to the kind of
associational identity the new culturalists are after.The objection is not solely
terminological. For the expansion of “culture” is motivated, since group
identity hanging on culture seems furthest removed from descent, race, and
biology generally.The move also presupposes a central feature of modern,
polyethnic societies, namely, their acceptance of the distinction between
society and culture, which permits social members to be culturally distinct.
However attractive that feature may be, we ought not to build it into our
very concept of the polity (on pain of disqualifying most states in history).
I would rather say that the groupings in question are sociocultural; if their
group identities matter, they matter in a social network of expectations,
both of members and nonmembers.
Tamir’s conclusion that we can draw a line between state and nation, leav-
ing national groups their right to cultural self-determination while avoid-
ing staatlich consequences, is very important. She is surely right that in
most cases cultural self-determination can and ought to be achieved with-
out a state.All that is required to reach this conclusion is to do the math: as
Ernest Gellner notes, by any reasonable count the numbers of peoples far
exceeds any plausible number of states the world could accommodate. But
Tamir’s approach does not actually dissociate state from nation: it multi-
plies the levels of state, associating nation with a lower or subsovereign level
of state.After all, cultural self-determination must have some political-legal-
governmental expression, some political borders and special rules. If not, if
state and culture are utterly dissociated, then we have returned to the stan-
dard liberal model in which culturally distinctive groups are supposed to
go unrecognized at the state level.
Likewise, the kind of polity Parekh and Young endorse cannot differ
greatly from the standard liberal one. For what would the political forum
of the multicultural polity, or of “city life,” sound like? If it is a forum, that
is, an inclusive public discourse among equals that constitutes or influences
power, then it must have a grammar, a set of rules that excludes and, in our
theorists’ view, privileges none.This may not be old-style assimilation to a
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supposedly neutral forum that in fact privileged the Anglo-Saxon, not a
store selling only white bread. Granted, it is an eclectic supermarket in which
loaves of wheat, rye, and pumpernickel, not to mention bagels, proudly
sport distinctive wrappings. But such a supermarket must still have rules;
customers must relate to the clerks in a linguistic or behavioral Esperanto,
accepting universal if minimal standards of propriety. In other words, this is
assimilation at a higher level. The authors remain at least second-order egali-
tarian liberals, revisited at that level by many of the problems they raise
against liberalism.
For in the end there are only three options regarding diversity, even if
these can be recursively applied.The political environment in which cultures
and culturally identified individuals interact must be understood either as
culturally neutral (as the standard liberal view claimed), or as somebody’s
culture (hence an openly proclaimed liberal nationalism or a liberally hid-
den assimilationism), or as a capacious and tolerant megaculture produced
by the merging of cultural elements, which itself must be either noncultural
or one of the cultures in question. Note that the third option empties into
the first or, if neutrality is a ruse, the second.That is, any megaculture would
still be derived from some cultural traditions and not others, excluding or
disadvantaging minorities who either find its capaciousness limited or who
are offended by capaciousness (namely, ethnic or religious purists).Tolerat-
ing every cultural identity is after all a specific way of life, one that makes
pluralism a chief good. Parekh is right that liberal autonomy is not an in-
escapable or universally acclaimed virtue, but neither is the creative tension
he values so highly.As such, this megaculture is still a particular culture (op-
tion two), albeit at a higher level, to which assimilation would be required.
As a particular culture it bears important similarities with a way of life that
encourages people publicly to disregard cultural identity as private (option
one), for it would be inconceivable without rules that are up to some
point neutral among members’ cultures. Parekh himself argues that “from a
multicultural perspective the good society does not commit itself to a par-
ticular political doctrine or vision of the good life,” it “privileges no partic-
ular cultural perspective, be it liberal or otherwise” (Parekh 2000: 340). But
this is just a higher neutralism.
Moving to the question of the nature of the self, liberals have been crit-
icized by communitarians for accepting an impossible anthropology, in
which the self is entirely constituted by its own free choices, rather than by
community or tradition.Tamir and Kymlicka assert a middle ground: even
if the self is constituted by community, all liberalism requires is that every
element of the self be open to piecemeal, critical self-revision. Now, they are
certainly right that many, maybe most, humans can critically revise aspects
of their selves. But is there any evidence that all people have the capacity
to revise every aspect of self, piecemeal or otherwise? Or even to know
every aspect? No doubt virtually all people can raise some aspects of self to
critical reflection, but the vast majority seem to do a very limited job of it.
Presumably the ability to critically revise oneself is, like other human capac-
ities, variable, contingent, and limited: most have a moderate dose, a few have
a lot, and a few have almost none.True, we cannot say in advance which
traits of which persons are incapable of revision, or which are a priori
beneath awareness, but that ignorance does not justify the claim that all
traits are revisable, any more than the fact that I don’t know when I will die
justifies me in doubting that I will die.The claim of universal, even if dis-
tributive, revisability is a remnant of the metaphysics of transcendent free-
dom that has become anachronistic in almost every other area of contem-
porary philosophy.
Parekh and Young try to avoid this form of transcendence, but they retain
an analogous version. For theirs is an interculturalism, a multiculturalism of
interaction, creative tension, and personal transformation.All citizens must
accept the merely partial validity of their own culture. But like other liber-
als, the overcoming of fate, limitation, and ethnocentricity is still their
social and cultural ideal. Parekh writes that education in a multicultural
society should enable individuals to “see the contingency of their culture
and relate to it freely rather than as a fate or a predicament” (Parekh 2000:
167).This is an analogue of the notion of liberal freedom as the capacity to
transcend any particular set of constitutive bounds.Young and Parekh thus
inherit the tradition of romantic liberalism, albeit one with strong egalitarian
commitments.They share the Socratic ideal evident in John Stuart Mill’s
diatribe against conformity, John Dewey’s justification of democracy as end-
less growth, and George Kateb’s evocation of the transcendental experience
fostered by liberal democracy (Mill 1978; Dewey 1944; Kateb 1992). All 
the writers mentioned maintain the liberal commitment to self-reflection,
the ideal of a life in which all self-constituents are either chosen or freely
affirmed.
Self-reflection may generally be an admirable quality, but is it the best
quality, or good in every case? Would Mother Theresa have lived a better
life if one morning she awoke to the realization that religious service had
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been foisted on her by family and church, that she had never questioned
whether it suited her deepest self, and so opted instead to read philosophy
in a left-bank Parisian café and let the lepers die? Were there no young
Germans in the 1930s who came to Nazism via a sincere critique of their
childhood acceptance of bourgeois Weimar liberalism? Is the examined life
more likely to lead to a commitment to human rights than skepticism re-
garding such rights? My point is neither to reject nor to ridicule the
Socratic ideal, but to deny that it has a necessary relation to the good life,
or any obvious superiority over a number of other moral ideals. Not only
is it the case that, as William Galston wrote, people have “the right to live
unexamined lives,” but in some cases an unexamined life may be better
than an examined one (Galston 1991). From a practical or political point of
view, with the exception of professional philosophers, for whom “the exam-
ined life” is their practical life, it is presumably in the results, not the exami-
nation itself, that moral value lies.
All the thinkers in question seriously underestimate the threat of cul-
tural identity and cultural membership to individual liberties. Regarding
one putative example of intracultural conflict, Kymlicka insists,“But there
needn’t be any conflict here, for the kind of commonality involved—i.e.
commonality of language and history, shared membership in a cultural com-
munity—doesn’t constrain individuality. On the contrary, membership in a
cultural structure is what enables individual freedom” (Kymlicka 1989:
208). Here we see the tendency to conceive ethnic culture as a language
that grants ability but has no substantive, choice-restricting content. Parekh
likewise defines culture at one point as a grammar. But culture is not only
a how; it is also a what and a who. Cultures are not mere languages.We know
cases of rare individuals who speak ten languages. Can anybody belong to
ten cultures?
This attempt to have identity without tears leads Kymlicka to a strange
distinction between membership in a cultural community and adherence
to the content of its traditions. He insists that cultural identity does not
require fealty to tradition.While of course cultures change, being a mem-
ber of a cultural community cannot be wholly independent of inherited
content. Such a community cannot even be defined without reference to
inherited content, lest membership become indistinct from that of any vol-
untary association. Erasing the substance of cultural tradition makes being
Armenian and Rotarian equal in political significance, undermining the
new culturalism altogether. Similarly, Parekh accepts the inherited nature
of culture, then compensates by making it utterly flexible, insisting that
“every tradition can be read in different ways, none of them definitive and
final” (Parekh 2000: 175–77). His case studies make it clear that for him vir-
tually no modern, liberal, egalitarian policy—such as, for example, gender
equality—is incompatible with any cultural tradition; under his hand, every
tradition has the resources to adapt to liberal and egalitarian views. If that
were true, there would be little need for cultural rights in the first place.
This connects to the broader question of intercultural judgment, regard-
ing which, ironically, multiculturalists typically find identification with
one’s culture a liability.The issue was famously addressed by Amy Gutmann’s
popular 1992 collection, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, fea-
turing an essay by the philosopher Charles Taylor, which sparked much of
the philosophical debate over cultural identity and liberalism. In his essay
Taylor defends a moderately communitarian liberalism, arguing for liberal
rights but acknowledging that identity and self-recognition crucially arise
only in dialogue or communally. He accepts that attempts to protect a cul-
ture from withering away may justify some relaxation of normal liberal
rules of equality, like allowing Quebec to limit the property rights of shop-
keepers to prohibit the proliferation of English-language signs.At the same
time,Taylor criticizes the limits on our freedom of cultural judgment that
would be imposed by any stridently multicultural claim that we must rec-
ognize the “equal value” of different cultures.To grant foreign cultures the
benefit of the doubt, to respect them politically, to accept the obligation to
learn about them is one thing; but to deny that one culture’s literature or
art or politics can be better than another’s would be tantamount to a criti-
cal self-lobotomy.
It is a bit unfortunate that Taylor did not extend similar recognition to
American novelist Saul Bellow.Taylor reproduces a remark that Bellow is
“famously quoted” as having said—although Taylor adds in a footnote that
he has “no idea whether this statement was actually made in this form by
Saul Bellow, or by anyone else”—to wit:“When the Zulus produce a Tol-
stoi, we will read him” (Gutmann 1994: 42).Taylor and another contributor
to the volume differed on just how repugnant this insult was supposed to
be, but here as elsewhere it came to be regarded as a paradigmatic case of
ethnocentrism, or worse. The rumored insult seems to have been passed
around intellectual circles for years without proper documentation. The
issue became heated enough that Bellow eventually responded in a New
York Times op-ed essay, claiming that he had read a Zulu novel in college
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(Chaka by Thomas Mofolo), but had forgotten it.We now know that the
actual remark, as recorded by James Atlas during a 1987 interview with Bel-
low, was “Who is the Zulu Tolstoy? The Proust of the Papuans? I’d be glad
to read him!” (Atlas 2000: 572–76). It is odd that no one seems upset that
the Papuans have been neglected in the retelling.*
Putting aside the mild nature of Bellow’s actual remark, those upset by
the apocryphal comment seem to have been exercised by the presupposi-
tion that Zulu culture had not produced literature comparable to Western
in quality, and by the very act of negative evaluation across cultures. Both
reactions seem exaggerated. By all means such comparisons ought to be
based on knowledge, not ignorance.The most knowledgeable person in the
current case would be someone deeply familiar with Tolstoi and the liter-
ary world in which he has a place, and equally familiar with Zulu contem-
porary literature and traditions.There is probably a very good chance that,
if I were a Zulu bilingual in either Russian or a West European language, I
might still say that my Zulu culture has not produced a Tolstoi, if only
because of the relatively short history of writing in Zulu.That judgment
would not thereby declare the wholesale superiority of Western culture—if
Tolstoi is “Western” in the first place—to Zulu culture, not only because
literature is not the whole of anybody’s culture, but because the novel
arguably does not have an analogous place in Southern African and Euro-
pean culture. A more sensible comparison with Tolstoi as creative word-
smith might be instead to some great speaker or interpreter of Zulu tradi-
tional stories, although admittedly the more different the projects are, the
more tenuous such comparison becomes.All this aside,Taylor’s rejection of
de jure cultural egalitarianism is surely right.To declare all cultures’ products
of equal value would not only inhibit Western cultural judgments, but those
of non-Western peoples as well. It would have been rather bizarre to demand
that an Egyptian visiting Northern Europe in the second millennium
b.c.e. acknowledge that, in their own way, those European mud huts and
piles of manure were just as impressive as the pyramids.What does belong-
ing to a cultural tradition mean if it does not entail the judgment that
one’s culture is superior in some respects to others? One would be a rather
poor Zulu if she did not regard Zulu culture as superior to Western, at
least in some respects.Why expect more from Bellow, unless one already
has made a tacit judgment that Westerners are supposed to “know better”?
*I thank Dr. Christopher Walsh for his research on this matter.
In this connection,Anthony K.Appiah cites the marvelous example of
the selection committee for a New York exhibit of African art, whose cura-
tor sought a diverse group to pick out “authentic” pieces, even including
one plausibly authentic practitioner, a traditional Baule artist from Ivory
Coast. But while the European,American, and African curators, academics,
and collectors comprising the rest of the group were shown photographs
of all potential selections, the Baule artist was allowed only to select among
the Baule pieces, because, the exhibition curator remarked,“African infor-
mants will criticize sculptures from other ethnic groups in terms of their
own traditional criteria,” hence reject them.As Appiah summarizes,“This
Baule diviner, this authentically African villager, the [curator’s] message is,
does not know what we, authentic postmodernists, now know: that the
first and last mistake is to judge the Other on one’s own terms.And so, in
the name of this, the relativist insight, we impose our judgment that [the
Baule] may not judge sculpture from beyond the Baule culture zone”
(Appiah 1992: 139). For the curator, cultural diversity is de rigeur, but only
as long as the cultural “member” has thinned her membership so much
that she no longer identifies with it completely. But the inevitable fact is
that cultural membership shapes judgment, whether one’s culture is that of
a former colonizer repentantly gone relativist, or a former colonized who
remains identified with her ethnic group. It is not a priori clear which per-
spective is in any particular case the more insightful or the more jingoist.
The new culturalists seem unwilling to acknowledge that culture limits.
If it empowers, it also disempowers; if it enables, it disables too.A few current
writers have accepted the constraining reality of culture. Allen Buchanan
points out that it is culture’s job to provide limits. Human existence needs
a “structure” of what is intelligible, proper, and rightly desirable (Buchanan
1995: 356). Even if my culture is a smorgasbord of elements drawn from
diverse societal cultures, it is still a culture, and a culture that does not limit
cannot perform its job. Chandran Kukathas, a rare libertarian in a discus-
sion dominated by egalitarian liberals, proposes that a minimal-state policy
toward cultural minorities, built on a negative conception of liberty as mere
“acquiescence,” would be more tolerant of non-Western minority commu-
nities inside the liberal polity than “progressive” policies which promote the
values of individual autonomy and equality (for example, gender equality)
that many of the aforementioned communities reject, thereby undermining
them (Kukathas 2003). In classical (not progressive) liberal style, Kukathas
argues that the state’s legitimate concern about individuals inside an illiberal
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minority community is to guarantee their right to exit, not their right to
legislate community reform. He is willing to recognize that his kind of lib-
ertarian toleration means tolerating what progressives consider coercion, because
that is what cultural diversity often entails. Likewise,Appiah points out the
downside to a politics that recognizes cultural identity:“The politics of rec-
ognition requires that one’s skin color, one’s sexual body, should be acknowl-
edged politically in ways that make it hard for those who want to treat their
skin and sexual body as personal . . . [where] personal means . . . not too
tightly scripted” (Appiah 1994: 163). Moral-political recognition of such
identity makes it inevitable that there will be “proper ways of being black
and gay, there will be expectations to be met, demands will be made.”
There is no cultural or associational identity without scripting.Absence of
scripts would mean absence of identity, just as absence of exclusion means
absence of membership.Appiah concludes,“Between the politics of recog-
nition and the politics of compulsion, there is no bright line.” Most cul-
tures are pluralistic, but not utterly so. If a culture is not all cultures—if it
is one thing and not another—it must be limited, hence impose limits.
Analogously, to allow culture into the center of our politics is not merely
to empower minority affiliations, but to render majority cultural power
unobjectionable. It is to turn the allegedly de facto promotion of the major-
ity culture by the liberal state into an explicit promotion. Multiculturalists
go to remarkable lengths to avoid this consequence.While Parekh admirably
accepts that the majority culture has rightful claims against minorities, he
consistently denies its coercive power.Thus in calling for a differentiated
citizenship he writes,“A white Briton who does not understand the cultural
accents of his Muslim or Afro-Caribbean fellow-citizen is just as incom-
pletely British as the Indian ignorant of the way his white fellow-citizens
speak. . . . Only he is fully British who can honestly say that no British citi-
zen, black or white, Christian or Hindu, is a cultural stranger to him” (Parekh
1991: 203).Well, do the Chinese suddenly fail to be fully Chinese if I move
to Beijing, obtain citizenship, and they fail to understand my “cultural
accents”? This sets the bar so high that the concept of cultural membership
lapses into uselessness. Once culture matters, some cultures will matter more
than others, and some may matter very little. Parekh is right that culture must
be “negotiated,” but to be open to negotiation is to be open to the relative
power of different groups, hence to the likelihood of unequal outcomes.
The new culturalists have cooked the books.They have forced cultural
identity onto a diet, making it thin enough to be compatible with their
politics.They follow the classical liberals they criticize in their fear of biol-
ogy, that is, race, ethnicity, or any descent-based affinity, which they link
automatically with racism and anti-Semitism. For them, as for most liber-
als, the mention of blood and soil always brings Birmingham and Auschwitz
to mind.At the same time, of course, they motivate their work by claiming
to accommodate liberalism to ethnic, racial, and cultural identity. But despite
that motivation, their analyses and proposals are justified—through what
we might call argument creep—by reference to lighter, thinner, liberal iden-
tities, often freely chosen, unburdened by objective criteria, for which blood,
soil, and birthright are irrelevant. As in the old joke about the man who
loses his keys in the grass, but searches for them under a streetlight, they
look for answers where the light is better. They should have tested their
reformed liberalism against a thicker notion of culture, one not predigested
by liberal values. If thin and elective associations adequately described cul-
tural identity, then there would be no problem to address in the first place.
A Culture-Based Liberalism?
I agree with the new culturalists that cultural identity is compatible with
liberal society, not because cultural identity is thin and nonethnic, but
because even moderately thick, descent- hence blood-and-soil-based eth-
nicity is not a problem for liberal institutions and practices. To see this,
however, requires work on the political end of their view, their concept 
of a liberal polity. For, despite their openness to culture, they derive their
concept of a free society from the neutralism they claim to transcend.They
continue to insist that government’s handling of cultural identity must be
neutral with respect to all cultural identities and associations, hence such
groups must be treated equally in all respects. If these theorists made their
lives easier by short-weighting culture, they made them harder by staying
too close to the neutralist, and especially Rawlsian, version of liberalism.A
less dogmatic liberalism would have been easier to combine with thicker
and thornier cultural differences.To see this we must examine the forms of
identity liberals fear most (which will be explored more fully in Chapter 3).
We may begin with the blood and soil. Blood does not mean race, but
descent, the relation to parentage.To say that blood matters is merely to say
that who my parents were plays a role in constituting my associational iden-
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tity. Minimally, soil is locale.Their salience is a consequence of the front-
loaded character of human biography. Blood and the soil that surrounds it
are markers for the natal-maturational world of personal origin, which plays a
disproportionate role in the constitution of identity. Descent and locale are
thus virtually ubiquitous as the first determinants of social and cultural
membership, because almost everyone in every society descends from some
other social members.As Edward Shils writes, kin loyalty cathects a social
environment, not because all social members are related—which would
make society a clan—but because virtually everyone in a society has kin in
that society. Put it this way: where is there a political society which does
not regard the offspring of members automatically as members? Being born
and growing up in a place inevitably tie one to that place and its residents,
even if they are civic and liberal in their conception of membership.
Contrary to Tamir and Kymlicka, racial, ethnic, national, and cultural
memberships cannot be solely personal choices because they logically entail
public and social criteria.Their meanings are no more under personal con-
trol than the meanings of words in a natural language are.The culture sets
its membership criteria, and often they cannot be acquired through choice.
Must the Sioux accept me, with no Sioux blood, if I learn Lakota and give
up my credentials in the outside world? Of course not. Some cultures set
criteria that are easier to meet than others; the point is that the criteria are
not under the individual’s control.The “right to culture” is thus more like
the right of association than, for example, the right to self-expression. My
right to speak in Hyde Park is actualized whether or not anyone listens,
but I cannot associate with others if they walk away. If cultural member-
ship is a right, it is a right to seek such membership, not to have it.
Simply, for the vast majority of human beings, including those in con-
temporary liberal societies, culture and cultural identity are largely found
or inherited, not created or selected. Most of us lack a self that could gain
the “distance” required critically to examine and “revise” our cultural reper-
toire and exchange our identity. Even in the most liberal case of all, the
highly modern, immigrant society that is the United States, such freedom
there is mostly means the freedom to avoid affirming the group identity we
were bequeathed via descent, or to prioritize one of several cultural iden-
tities my genealogy and maturation offer me. Even this degree of freedom
is rare, and more rare as we go back in time, arising historically only in those
cases where people occupy a “boundary situation” where they happen to
meet the criteria of two different societal cultures, often after conquest or
dislocation (MacIntyre 1989).Tiger Woods could indeed identify himself as
African-,Thai-, or European-American. But Arab-American?
As Michael Walzer rightly argues in On Toleration, political history exhibits
a variety of “regimes of toleration” (Walzer 1997). For example, the liberal
nation-state, where there is a dominant yet tolerant cultural majority and
guaranteed civic rights for all as individuals, takes a different approach to
polyethnicity than do liberal immigrant societies, where no ethnicity is
officially dominant. France exemplifies the first, and the United States the
second.Thus, as I write, the French continue to face a basic controversy over
whether Islamic public school girls should be allowed to wear religious veils
in school.The French understood the veil not as an issue of religious lib-
erty but as a denial of a public religious neutrality that is synonymous with
secular French culture and the guarantor of its equality and liberty. The
girls were seen not as asserting individual freedom but as rejecting that free-
dom, and the French culture that provides it, by absorbing themselves into
an anti-French, antisecular faction. In the United States of today it is hard
to imagine the issue arising, even given the American wariness of Islamic
dress since September 11, 2001.We are legally and culturally committed to
the notion that religious expression is not in conflict with our notion of
citizenship, which we structure differently than the French. For us, individ-
ual identity is outside the civic realm; wearing the marker of an ethnic or
religious community does not imply civic disloyalty (as long as the wearers
pay their taxes and respond to draft notices). For the French, civic liberties
are based in identification with a French-speaking, secular tradition.
Kymlicka is right that citizenship can be “differentiated,” various citi-
zens being tied to the polity in various ways. But it is differentiated both in
the sense of permitting different ties to the polity and in the sense of dif-
ferentiating or narrowing the requirements of citizenship.The traits which
constitute liberal citizenship are indeed more limited or thin than ethnic-
ity, hence the former is compatible with,“civil” or tolerant of, a variety of
other group memberships and identifications on the part of its citizens.
The kind of cultural identity the theorists want their work to concern is
actually best termed ethnic, not merely cultural, identity (although the two
overlap, as we shall see in Chapter 3). For present purposes, we may say
that such identity is acquired by descent, from what is understood by mem-
bers to be a present or past culturally homogeneous society; and is thick, meaning
that it significantly determines the meaning of the bearer’s life across insti-
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tutional roles (thin identities being role- and institution-specific), hence is
relatively exclusive of others (thickness being proportional to exclusivity).
Liberal citizenship then requires of domestic associational groups an in-
versely proportional narrowing of associational identity to permit civic mem-
bership; the group identity must leave open whatever space is required by
the thin civic identity. My point is that what violates liberal civility is not
blood or soil or unchosen history; it is a matter not of identity’s source but
rather of its thickness, hence dominance over the rest of identity and the
degree of exclusion of others.
We can see this in application to American cases. Clearly some Ameri-
cans identify with no ethnic or national group except what they regard as
“American.” They may regard that identity, and the association it impli-
cates, as purely civic, the endorsement of a political form of life; or they
may regard it as relatively thick and descent-based, investing “American”
with supracivic traits. Still other citizens affirm their citizenship while never-
theless identifying themselves with an ethnic (or other) group understood
to be relatively thick—so-called hyphenated Americans. Concomitantly,
they must regard their American-ness as relatively thinner.Their ethnicity
has a significant meaning-constituting role in their lives; they may prioritize
it in mundane circumstances over their American-ness, although they must
limit its demands to make room for citizenship.American civic identity is
thin enough to be compatible with these moderately thick group identities;
in fact, probably most Americans fall in this category. It remains the case
that the differences between the unhyphenated and the hyphenated, or all
the various particular hyphenations, can lead to conflicting notions of who
is a “real”American. But no stronger or thicker American unity is required;
what I have described is for America the normal ongoing negotiation
over the meaning of American identity.
What is more troublesome are the very thick, hence highly exclusive,
forms of associational identity, which are at home only in homogeneous
societies in which citizenship, social membership, and cultural identity are
fused, that is to say, where to be a member of society also means being a
citizen and having a single thick cultural identity.The American who invests
American-ness with ethnic or descent-based meaning can reach this point—
thinking, for example, that only American-born white English-speakers are
“real” Americans. The same is true of a resident alien, or a hyphenated
American, whose “offshore” identity thickens to the point of reducing the
“American” component below its minimal, civic threshold. It is these forms
of thick association and identity which, when writ large, are sacralized by
the highly modern technologies of an authoritarian-nationalist state, which
are indeed at odds with civil society. But unlike some other liberal societies
(such as France), even these forms of association and identity can be tolerated
in America if they remain largely private, hence make minimal demands on
fellow citizens. Members of the Aryan nation who stay on their compound
in Idaho and Islamic fundamentalists who stay in their neighborhood are
acceptable. It is only when they become a force in the public—not only
in acts of intolerance or violence, but as a political movements—that they
threaten civil society.
Thus I agree with the new culturalists that liberal society is not violated
by cultural memberships or identities. But this is so whether the latter are
thin or moderately thick, inherited, fixed or unchangeable, perceived as “pri-
mordial,” tied to blood and soil or even race.Those characteristics by them-
selves need not imply the exclusivity that either prevents or is in direct
conflict with the conditions of citizenship.
The Dialectic of Civility and Culture
But to claim such compatibility we must move beyond the concept of lib-
eralism that the new culturalists take over from neutralist liberals with little
modification.We must accept that liberal society—or better, civil society—
obtains only in and through cultural tradition. (Cahoone 2002a).This implies,
among other things, that political norms cannot be wholly independent of
other sociocultural norms and values, thus liberal politics must be under-
girded by extrapolitical commitments; that liberalism may be incompatible
with some cultures; and that individual liberty cannot mean independence
from communal inheritance.The issue is not one of fleshing out a “liberal
culture,” but of recognizing our political form as part of a cultural tradition
sufficiently complex that it qualifies, and is qualified by, its civility or civic
rules.This means breaking with the neutralist ideal. It means accepting that
liberal or civil society, in its politics, law, and government, can never be neu-
tral with respect to cultures. It cannot treat all cultures equally, cannot avoid
differentially advantaging and disadvantaging particular cultural identities
and group associations. Neither its “official,” civicly implicated culture, nor
its mass culture can fail to script, or valorize, cultural identities differently.
Its polity cannot avoid cultural exclusion or discrimination.All it can do is
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coerce as little as possible, exclude least often, permit in privacy what is
publicly excluded, and treat a wider, rather than a narrower, set of cultural
identities as officially, publicly equal.The toleration of civil society is a mat-
ter of degree.
Civility, which for present purposes we may take to be the rules of citi-
zenship in a liberal society, needs cultural tradition. For civility must be
interpreted, and the transmission across generations of the store of inter-
pretive resources that form the background against which individuals make
their unique selections and contributions is culture. The rules of citizen
relations and behavior, including an account of membership, rights, obliga-
tions, and liberty, must be culturally represented and valorized across gen-
erations. Edward Shils was one of the few to articulate the complex relation
of civil structures and culture. He reminds us that “civility requires respect
for tradition because the sense of affinity on which it rests is not momen-
tary only but reaches into the past and the future” (Shils 1997: 51). If civil
rules are to be upheld as more than a modus vivendi or means of avoiding
conflict (as Rawls agreed they must), then the cultures of society must
endorse them as valuable in themselves. Loyalty to the sovereign society
and fellow citizens, which is required as much by redistributive justice as
by military service, implies that under culturally inherited accounts of the
Good, the polity is good. Tradition thus provides the “largely unreflective
acceptance” of the ultimate rightness of “rules of the game of the free soci-
ety” (Shils 1997: 110).
But even while civility is culturally informed, it must also restrain cultural
tradition. Culturally transmitted civility can limit and oppose other parts of
the cultural tradition, thereby promoting toleration and liberty. There is
nothing strange about this once we accept the complex and agonistic con-
stitution of what Alasdair MacIntyre called living traditions (MacIntyre
1981). Civility exists in tension with other elements of our culture. And
why not? Civility is, after all, all about limitation; as Shils claimed, it “per-
mits neither the single individual nor the total community the complete
realization of their essential potentialities” (Shils 1997: 49). Civility inhibits
tendencies within a culture toward what he called ideology. Endorsing a
pluralism represented in contemporary political theory by Michael Walzer,
Shils wrote, “What is so malign in ideology is the elevation of one value,
such as equality or national or ethnic solidarity, to supremacy over all others,
and the insistence on its exclusive dominion in every sphere of life” (Shils
1997: 59). Thus the culture of a liberal society must distinguish between
the rules of association—culturally interpreted—and its supracivil cultural
aims, in order to tolerate wider deviance in the latter than in the former.
Cultures often designate subspheres as quasi-independent, that is, as oper-
ating by distinctive rules that differentiate them from other cultural spheres.
The cultures of modern civil societies grant such quasi-independence to civic
life. If we say that American culture currently valorizes both the civil good
of individual liberty and commitment to the supracivic goods of work,
family, and religion (if inconsistently), then the former must sometimes
lead our culture to restrict its promotion of the latter.The culture of liberal
society thus engages in self-deformation or self-limitation, itself restraining
its reproduction of supracivil values by a valorization of civility, hence of
the liberty and dignity of each member.That is the real basis of toleration.
An Overlapping Cultural Consensus
This opposition appears analogous to the neutralist distinction between the
political and the cultural.That is true. But it is only “analogous,” and this
makes, in my view, all the difference. First, here the line is drawn within the
realm of culture, between the culturally valorized civic tradition and other
cultural strains. Second, the line is porous, not rigid.As Shils rightly argued,
there can be no “pure” civility, utterly procedural norms unconnected with
cultural sources of legitimacy or theories of the Good.The problem with
neutralism was not that it drew a line, but that it drew a rigid line and drew it
in the wrong place, or better, in a place that does not exist—a “noncultural”
place. Consequently, minority cultures can come fully dressed to the forum
to negotiate their interests and impact political norms. But this also means,
as neutralist liberals quickly point out, that cultural majorities would like-
wise be empowered, hence may be able to “establish” their dominant cul-
tures and hence sanction intolerance of cultural minorities and individuals.
To this a cultured liberalism must make a complex response.
First, a negative point. Critics of neutralism must admit the truth of the
neutralists’ underlying fear: any step away from neutrality permits greater limits
on individual and minority liberty. Yet, we retort, there has never been nor
will ever be a culturally neutral polity, hence the kind of individual liberty
neutralists hope for. Thus, the neutralist and I agree that any reasonable
interpretation of American civil rules through its legitimately dominant
cultural tradition must outlaw ritual genital mutilation of underage females.
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The neutralist must argue that this prohibition is based on a culturally neu-
tral principle of individual liberty. I suggest there is no such principle, that
our prohibition is as inevitably cultured as our notion of liberty, and never-
theless acceptable as such.
More positively, in a diverse liberal society the “cultural majority” takes
a rather special form. Here a Rawlsian concept is helpful, albeit for a pur-
pose not shared by its author. In Political Liberalism Rawls introduced the
notion of an “overlapping consensus” of reasonable, that is, fair or tolerant,
comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 1993). Distinctive comprehensive meta-
narratives overlap, or jointly endorse, political liberalism, each on a distinc-
tive basis.The overlap for Rawls is solely political—it is a set of political
values, procedures, and institutions. But arguably liberal societies require as
well an overlapping cultural consensus, the joint endorsement of an account
of the human Good and key social practices and institutions by distinctive
cultural traditions.This consensus is likely to be thick but vague, in Martha
Nussbaum’s phrase, substantive but formulated in nonsectarian terms (Nuss-
baum 1990). It can include goods or institutions jointly valued but differ-
entially instantiated by prominent cultural groups, such as, for example, the
promotion of family-friendly economic policies.The consensus around lib-
eral or civil political practices, institutions, and values is then a subset of
this broader, nonpolitical consensus. So the cultural majority of a pluralistic
liberal society is already culturally pluralistic.
Still, the empowerment of an overlapping cultural consensus would
authorize the deprivileging of those minority cultural values and practices
which fall outside the overlapping consensus. In short, some people’s cul-
tures will be more fully reflected in public policy than others. It is the func-
tion of a culturally valorized civility to provide the limit on what the con-
sensus may encourage or require of all members. Civility requires tolerance
of those who do not share the dominant cultural values and practices, since
it requires the liberty and dignity of all members be respected.This is why
civility is in occasional conflict with other cultural values. Civil society’s
repertoire of strategies for reproducing its dominant cultural values is com-
plex, ranging from legal requirement or prohibition, to government pro-
motion or discouragement, to extralegal social approbation and disapproba-
tion.What makes society liberal is, as Galston argues, not the absence of
officially promoted or required notions of the Good, but that the strategy of
coercion be held to a minimum (Galston 1991).And what constitutes the
minimum is itself a matter of cultural interpretation.All societies, including
civil or liberal ones, have texts and margins, norms and exceptions, domi-
nant and subdominant narratives. Marginalized cultures can demand nei-
ther a social declaration of their cultural normativity nor that their vision
be uncluttered by the dominant consensus. I might be comfortable with a
subculture in which adults ride their motorcycles naked while swilling
beer, but while I can hope to do so on private land, I cannot expect others
to endure such a vision in public space.The cultural majority has a right to
promote its supracivil cultural aims via the civitas, as long as this promotion
does not threaten to undermine civility, membership, and liberty—again,
as interpreted—for any members. And the consensus is open to change
through minority negotiation and promotion of their cultural aims within
the civil space.
Arguably the political force of an overlapping cultural consensus is a fact
in any liberal democratic society.What else ought we call that set of social
meanings which interprets the requirements of civility, liberty, and mem-
bership, which teaches social members how to be civil, tolerant and respect-
ful of others, other than the intersection and accommodation of a finite set
of cultural traditions varying in pervasiveness and dominance? This affects
even policies of distributive justice, which cannot ignore the cultural mean-
ings of the goods that need to be distributed; as Michael Walzer writes,
“Every substantive account of distributive justice is a local account” (Walzer
1983: 314). Culturally diverse Americans constantly negotiate these matters,
striking a shifting balance in national politics, mass culture, and local publics.
As in all negotiations, the outcome at any moment will tend to be closer
to the intersection of the interests or traits of the most dominant groups.
There is nothing profound or unusual in these observations; the point is sim-
ply that the political-legal-governmental sphere cannot be understood as
devoid of cultural partiality.
In sum, the relation of civil society and culture is a dialectical one. Civil
life cannot mean and be valued in itself without culture, and culture can-
not be the culture of citizens unless it restrains itself from treading on civil-
ity, itself part of the complex of cultural values that gives life in the civitas
meaning. Society as civil is society understood as a moral association of free
members. Culture is the interpretive inheritance of those members.Thus
cultural reproduction must not be allowed to overwhelm civility, and civil
rules must not be allowed to eviscerate its own cultural cathexis. Neither
side can win, each must support the other while struggling against it, each
must limit its prevalence in order to survive.
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Nobody makes the concept of culture more dubious than the practitioners
of the discipline that defines itself in terms of culture. In their 1952 book,
Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, the anthropologists
Kroeber and Kluckhohn found 164 distinct meanings of the term in the
literature, no doubt chilling further attempts at definition. Other anthro-
pologists have lately been questioning whether there are any cultures at all.
Thus Robert Brightman suggests that we “forget culture” (Brightman 1995).
Perhaps this is not so odd.While we have made “culture” our favorite name
for what it is about groups of “Others” we ought to tolerate, it is the anthro-
pologists who have had to make methodological sense out of what is for
many of us a bumper sticker.
Their worries are multiple.We cannot find in human societies anything
answering to Emile Durkheim’s conscience collectif. There is no reason to
assume “holism” across very diverse social contexts, to expect a society’s
way of cooking, its literature, public health, sports, manners, religion, and
military technology to express common meanings. Certainly in almost all
societies social meanings are contested: rich and poor, high-status and low-
status, employed and unemployed members may each give the anthropolo-
gist a different account of “shared” meanings depending on their position
in the intramural competition. If the degree of diversity within a society
rivals the degree of diversity between it and others, what does the ascription
to that society of one shared culture explain? And last, even if it makes
sense to speak of culture, it may not make sense to speak of cultures, bounded
packets of meaning. Is “culture” then merely a simplifying construction
meant to harness the exoticism of the native, the “other” for the Western
anthropologist?
Our response can be simple, although working it out will be complex.
Calling aspects of a social group’s behavior cultural is an empirical claim
that two conditions hold.The first is that explanations of the behavior of
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social members are not exhausted by class, occupation, legal status or citi-
zenship, social status, clan, and gender differences or by species-wide char-
acteristics.The second is that we can observe commonalities holding across
distinctive behavioral zones in group members’ lives, such that purely intra-
contextual explanations of their sports or business or religious rituals or
kinship arrangements miss something.The tolerably adequate adjective for
the commonalities missed by such explanations is “cultural.”Would it really
make sense to say that class, occupational, status, clan, and gender descrip-
tions exhaust group dynamics, or that manners, religious belief, ritual, kin-
ship rules, art, sport, and literature never exhibit overlapping meanings? Of
course not. Likewise the fact that discrete, rigid boundaries defining a cul-
ture are not discoverable indicates only the continuous and stochastic (sta-
tistical) nature of the phenomena.That we cannot see a nonarbitrary point
on the color spectrum where red turns into orange does not mean that red
is orange, or that there are no distinct colors.The same is true of distinct
cultures.
But there is another problem. Our understanding of culture is arguably
modern, which means that we may be imposing on the historical record
what culture means for us today. Of course, most of what we refer to with
the term “culture”—distinctive peoples and their folkways—is not modern.
But it would be right to say that the eighteenth century for the first time
made culture philosophically and politically important, albeit ambivalently as a
boon and threat.As Samuel Fleischacker recounts, it is the Enlightenment
that distinguished the artificial cultivation of human faculties and manners
beyond what is universally given by nature as a vehicle of progress (Fleis-
chacker 1994).When in his 1765 The Philosophy of HistoryVoltaire referred
to “culture” as the higher values, the cultivation, of the Enlightened era, he
reflected that modern usage. But it was the German philosopher Gottfried
Herder who set out to provide a systematic account of culture. In his Ideas
on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind (four volumes, 1784–91) Herder
argued that the world’s peoples embodied distinctive worldviews, virtues,
and interpretive habits, ordered by God to fully reveal the totality of spirit.
Thus for the first time in Western philosophical history, the differences
between peoples were claimed to matter philosophically. For the Greco-
Roman and Christian traditions, Goodness and Truth entailed approxima-
tion to a universal human standard, from which ethnic differences are at
best a distraction. Likewise for the mainstream of the Enlightenment, the
evolving ideal of universal scientific knowledge required abstraction from
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descent group, local origins, languages, and above all religious traditions and
superstitions. Cosmopolitan cultivation was good; local acculturation cre-
ated barriers to the universals of Reason and Science and Nature. In the
classical, medieval, and dominant modern views, a difference in virtue or
cognition between individuals or peoples just indicates that somebody is
wrong; uniqueness is only valuable in so far as it is a unique approximation
to the universal norm. To be sure, as recent critics of Eurocentrism have
pointed out, this supposed universalism was at the same time regarded as
the unique achievement of a particular continent, civilization, and race, in
comparison to which others were viewed as backward, or worse.
The nineteenth century, led by Romanticism’s love of the particular,
embraced Herder’s position. Anthropology emerged in 1843 as Gustav
Klem first used “culture” to label the complex of customs, beliefs, and polit-
ical forms that characterize a society, and was taken up in English by E. B.
Tylor’s influential Primitive Culture in 1871. Herder influenced Adolf Bast-
ian, and through him Franz Boas, one of the earliest and most influential
ethnographers, teacher of Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. But nothing
could have enhanced the role of the concept of culture more than the
political expression of Romanticism, nationalism, most famously formulated
by Germans in response to Napoleonic France’s threat to dominate Europe.
We are familiar with nationalism’s later checkered history, from the liberal
nationalism of Mazzini to the fascism of Mussolini and Hitler. But as Ernest
Gellner and Liah Greenfeld separately argue, nationalism played a crucial
role throughout the modern West in forging the modern egalitarian notion
of the citizen (Gellner 1983; Greenfeld 1992). Only nationalism was able 
to break the ancien régime separation of society into isonomic castes—a
hierarchy of unequal classes with rough equality within each—making the
German-speaking peasant and German-speaking aristocrat equal as Germans.
At any rate, the problem raised by this historical development is that
when we use the term “culture” today we may be presupposing a particu-
larly modern Western view of social behavior and meaning as resting on a
fundamental hermeneutic web possessed by sovereign nations or “coun-
tries” that does not easily apply to world history or prehistory. We must
especially be on guard against the canard that cultural politics or nationalism
is something traditional, premodern, or primitive. For thousands of years,
the great agricultural empires that created what we call civilization were
certainly not organized around national or linguistic solidarity. If in ancient,
hunter-gatherer societies clan trumped culture, in civilization caste trumped
culture. The triumph of cultural identity has been made possible by the
modernity that, with its other hand, dismissed culture as the great obstacle
to progress.
Preliminary Considerations
William James liked to say that “experience” is a double-barreled term,
being a name both for a process (experiencing) and for the contents or
data revealed by that process (experiences). Following his analogy beyond
the possibilities of the shotgun, culture is a triple-barreled word. It is in one
sense a how, a medium through which the world, society, and the self are
interpreted and represented, in this sense like a language. But culture is not
merely a process or medium, it is also a what, or a large collection of whats
including physical things: buildings, symbols, rituals, artifacts, paintings,
clothing, literary works, and so on. Cultures are repertoires, inventories.
Indeed, cultures can be destroyed, or deeply harmed, through the destruc-
tion of key icons or buildings, or the prohibitions of key practices and dis-
courses. Lastly, a culture is also a who. It belongs to or characterizes a group
of people.As such it comes in collections or networks that differ from one
another, even if, as noted, their borders are elusive.Thus an adequate view
of culture must show how the what, the how, and the who of culture qual-
ify one another.We may begin with some basic points attendant on the fact
that cultures are social phenomena.
Culture is collective, not individual or private.There can no more be a
“private” culture than a private language. So we may say that culture is pub-
lic. But in saying so we must recognize that culture is also private in that
people carry their cultures with them as individuals wherever they go, even
in solitude. Culture is not solely public, nor public in the sense that, for
example, politics is public. Robinson Crusoe remained a child of his cul-
ture (no doubt to Friday’s dismay).
Some inquirers, especially in ethology and anthropology, mean by “cul-
ture” the intersection of two things: the totality of what any living group
learns and passes on to the next generation, and what distinguishes one
population of a species from another.The effect and conceptual purpose of
such a definition is to make the antonym of culture whatever is genetic. For
genes neither learn nor carry anything acquired or devised in the process
of experience.Whatever else it is, then, a culture is learned.The term’s Latin
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root colere means tending, as in agricultural husbandry, or more broadly
“cultivation.” In the nature-nurture debate culture is thus on the side of nur-
ture and so, in this sense, against nature. Such learning is accomplished by a
local population, a subgroup of the species.The tokens or instances of the
term “culture” are particular and historical. Like persons, each culture is a his-
tory and cannot be understood independent of it. If there were only one
culture among humans on Earth, there would be little point in giving an
account of culture distinct from an account of human being per se. Dis-
cussing culture as distinct from human nature only makes sense because there
is more than one. Further, each is, we would say today, “contingent,” that
is, a product of largely undesigned, collectively acting forces whose effects
accumulate over time. Each culture could have been different if other
things, like its physical environment, had been different.
Cultures in the primary sense of the term belong to whole societies or
what Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz call “encompassing groups” (Margalit
and Raz 1995). To modify Will Kymlicka’s term, we are here concerned
with societal cultures, cultures of relatively independent, self-reproducing soci-
eties within which members can live their whole lives, and not the “cul-
tures” of corporations, voluntary associations, or professions, in which peo-
ple live only part of their days.Those things may be cultural, but they are
not cultures. Neither are “subcultures,” such as communes, monasteries, or
bohemias, which depend on a larger encompassing society for all manner
of sustenance. Likewise, cultures are almost never local or brief; they hold
usually over at least a region and last many generations.
Culture represents a form of human grouping that must be distinctive;
labeling the difference between two groups “cultural” must be different
from labeling it “social,”“economic,” or “religious.”A culture is not a fam-
ily, tribe, class, caste, status, or occupational group.Those distinctions must
range within the kind of grouping we are after. As seen earlier, this also
implies that the functional spheres of a society’s life—its sports, economy,
politics, and so on—are not distinctive cultures.What the term “culture”
refers to must be interdisciplinary, must include different kinds of phenom-
ena, different zones or areas of social life.While particular activities within
a culture can be regarded as valid in terms of distinctive norms—scientific
claims are supposed to be true, art aesthetically compelling, and political
action right—a culture spans all these activities, hence is omnivalent, respon-
sible to several norms, not one. Culture cannot be understood as a disci-
plinary sphere within social life. We can speak of a society’s economy, its
politics, its art, its religion, its sports, as differing from each other, but cul-
ture cannot be on that list.That would be a category mistake. None of this
implies, of course, that the various spheres of a culture’s social life must all
cohere or express a single pattern. Cultures are not monolithic; they do
not even need to be coherent. They are always conflicted. Nevertheless,
there is a kind of unity a culture must have: its various important compo-
nents must be capable of functioning together, capable of being lived and
belonged to by social members.
We could say that culture functions in part to provide sociocultural ex-
pectations and norms, so that signaling or being marked as a member acti-
vates the proper set of judgmental rules.We could call this judgmental endog-
amy, implying that under “normal” circumstances exogamous judgments
carry little or no normative force. In this sense a culture is something in
terms of which social members make their judgments (although culture is
not the only thing of which that is true). Hence we might employ a crite-
rion which applies to all human associational identities, cultural or not: ye
shall know them by what they exclude. As argued by Fredrick Barth and his
school, groups define themselves through boundary maintenance (Barth
1969).The kind of group a culture is will be evident in what other mem-
berships or identities cannot be exhibited by its members, identities which
render the individual’s cultural membership suspect or marginal.
Finally, we ought to distinguish culture from civilization, a word that has
its own long etymology.Without troubling ourselves with the fine points
separating recent students of the term (c.f.Toynbee 1961, Hodgson 1974,
Quigley 1979, and Huntington 1996), we can simply say that civilizations
are the broadest cultural groupings, families of cultures related along some
cultural axis. Thus it makes perfect sense to distinguish, for example, the
West—that is to say, Western Christendom dating to the eighth century
c.e.—as tied together by overlapping cultural themes, from Islamic civi-
lization, a family of cultures from the Maghreb to Indonesia, tied together
by religion above all.
Culture and Society
Having milked the dependence of culture upon society for what it’s worth,
we must, nevertheless, not identify society and culture. If we ascribe culture
to any species that exhibits social behavior, then we must also assert that
ants have cultures. But they don’t. Perhaps some primates or cetaceans do,
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but it is very difficult to argue for culture much lower on the phylogenetic
scale. Even staying with humans, the identification of society and culture
muddies the waters. Is every social fact a cultural fact? The computer-
generated list of courses for the next semester at my college is socially cre-
ated and produced, full of signs meant to communicate, but is it a part of
my culture? Using a distinction that will be important later, evolutionary
anthropologists have argued for the distinction of social from cultural com-
munication, or the social, communicative use of symbols from their cul-
tural, ritual use (Chase 1999;Watts 1999).The distinction of society from
culture is required if we are ever to notice that a society can change while
its culture remains the same, or its culture may change while society stag-
nates. Suppose a society of hunter-gatherers is forced by lack of game to
turn to rudimentary slash-and-burn agriculture. Which would illuminate
their predicament more, to say that they have a “slash-and-burn culture” or
that they are a hunter-gatherer culture that has recently and perhaps tem-
porarily adopted a new social practice that they consider distinct from their
culture? If there are culturally pluralistic societies, then it must be possible
for two people to belong to the same society but different cultures. And
finally, the distinction of society from culture also makes it at least logically
possible for a society not to have a culture.This is useful to contemplate.
The vaunted social contract theory of modern political philosophy precisely
imagines a group of people coming out of the wild to form an interdepen-
dent socioeconomic group, arguably a society, but without any shared
cultural resources. In the real world social groups under intense pressure 
to survive might in effect lose their cultures; we might want to say that
refugees, residents of a concentration camp, or plane crash survivors con-
stitute a “society” or social group, capable of cooperation, but share no cul-
ture. In The Mountain People Colin Turnbull described the Ik as so close to
starvation that all long-term cooperation, rituals of marriage and death, all
mediately significant human behavior, had fallen away (Turnbull 1972).
The “high” end of culture—meaning not only fine art, music, and litera-
ture, but all symbolic practices—can be absent and yet a kind of rudimen-
tary society exist, retaining predictable patterns of interaction and accepted
forms of communication.
For these reasons we will throughout this study regard culture as a sub-
set of the domain of social facts. We will reserve the term “society” for
geographically continuous associations whose members are open to regular
interaction in the tasks that constitute living, hence responsible to one con-
tinuous politics (note that members are “open to” such interaction, not
actually interacting all the time).A society is a horizon of interaction and inter-
dependence. Such social interaction entails a grammar of intelligibility and pro-
priety. Culture extends, contextualizes, and legitimates that grammar. It thus
has something to do with how and what a society thinks, means, under-
stands, interprets, imagines. In this sense, Hegel was on the right track in
viewing culture as objective or social mind.Thus we may say that culture
supervenes upon society like a mind supervenes upon a human organism, as
long as we remember that culture cannot have the unity of a mind (since it
is not an agent), that cultural “mind” is not immaterial (since it includes arti-
facts), and contra Hegelian idealism, culture is fundamentally, although not
exclusively, a matter of practices.
This third point, famously associated with Pierre Bourdieu, must be clari-
fied (Bourdieu 1990).The American pragmatists, beginning with Charles S.
Peirce, put meaning, truth, and mind itself in the context of action. Con-
cepts, words, and beliefs mean what their affirmation would imply for an
agent’s behavior. But a later contributor to this tradition, Justus Buchler,
offered a further step. Buchler argued that while the pragmatists had sought
to demonstrate the active nature of cognitive judgment, putting saying and
knowing in the context of doing, the more radical point is to expand the
notion of judgment per se, thereby to hold that “action as such [is] judicative”
(Buchler 1955: 32). Rather than making all forms of human appropriation
or discrimination matters of practice, Buchler severed, finally and com-
pletely, the presumed special relation of verbal utterance and representation to
rationality and wisdom. Unlike many contemporary critics of the “logocen-
tric” tradition who magnify linguistic primacy while criticizing it, Buchler
allowed doing (practice) and making (construction) utter equality with say-
ing (linguistic assertion) as the potential bearer of meaning, reason, knowl-
edge, and validity, so that those normative terms apply indiscriminately to
the three modes of judgment. This approach, crucial for conceptualizing
culture, will be followed throughout.
Meaning Culture
All the things we call cultural must mean. The how of culture, what it does
or the way it functions, has something to do with meaning. But it cannot
be true that everything that means, or all meanings, are what we mean by
“culture.” If, to take a slightly narrower term, culture is like a language, it is
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not the case that everything I can say in my language is equally and in-
differently part of my culture.There is a sense in which advanced mathe-
matics, a system of sentential logic, and the instruction manual that came
with my computer, while semiotic products of my society, are not cultural
in the way that, for example, a Japanese tea ceremony or a Gothic cathe-
dral or the figure of John Wayne are. If culture is semiosis, it must be rather
thick semiosis.
What is meaning? In the broadest sense it is implication. If an object,
event, or experience is capable of implying, referring to, or suggesting some-
thing beyond itself in the mind of an intelligent agent, then it has meaning.
In this sense, as Charles Peirce defined signs, what means must be some-
thing that means something to someone (or, I would say, be capable of so
doing) (Peirce 1955: 99). Meaning then has to do with connection among
things, as opposed to their—to borrow another Peircean doctrine—sheer
phenomenal quality (Peirce’s “Firstness”) or their brute facticity or physical
resistance (“Secondness”) (Peirce 1955: 75ff.). Qualia and difference impress,
and are salient; but when they “mean,” they must exhibit connection, rela-
tion (“Thirdness”). Meaning comes to spread across the majority of the
experienced world in the form of implication and is invoked and functions
in experience in all sorts of ways (which need not imply that relation meta-
physically outweighs particularity, disconnectedness, or irrelevance).While
everything cannot mean, anything can, given the right circumstances. The
first light of dawn means it is daytime, an open door can mean my apart-
ment was broken into, and a particular array of photonic traces on a photo-
graphic plate can mean that some physical theory is false. Even nothing, in
the sense of absence, can mean. Coming home to an empty house after an
argument with my wife on the telephone can have a lot of meaning. But
not everything which means is a sign. Signs are humanly appropriated
meaning-carriers that have a place in the process of thought or communi-
cation.The first light of dawn is not manipulable, and so not a sign. If we
wish, we can say that humanly created things alone can be signs, while other
things can function as signs.
We turn now to a crucial point. Instrumentality has an ambiguous relation
to culture. From Max Weber’s diagnosis of modern Zweckrationalität (means-
rationality) through Theodor Adorno’s and Max Horkheimer’s critique of
“functional reason” and Heidegger’s analysis of technology, to the more re-
cent three-cornered debate among Jean-François Lyotard’s postmodernism,
Alasdair MacIntyre’s premodernism, and Jürgen Habermas’s “promodern-
ism”—in all these analyses of modernity the critique of instrumentalism or
cult of efficiency devoid of “value” has been a constant.This is all familiar.
But what has gone unrecognized is that this has always been a debate about
the relation of culture, understood as the domain of humanly constructed
or posited ends, to instrumentality.There is something about the instrumen-
tal attitude—treating each thing as a fungible, exchangeable moment in a
process—which removes the “cultural” valence of a cultural thing, like
regarding a painting as nothing but an investment, or a religious service
solely as the venue for a business deal. Not that there is anything immoral
or unseemly here; there may be, but that is not the point.The point is that
such an approach removes the meaning of the thing or event from the
domain of culture. If a society regards a practice as purely instrumental,
hence as exchangeable without normative loss for greater efficiency, then
that practice ceases in some sense to be cultural.
The distinction of symbolic from everyday communication is relevant
here. Knight makes the provocative claim that in ancient societies ritual, the
first form of symbolic culture, cannot be reduced to signaling or messaging
(Knight 1999). Despite the overlap—culture, of course, uses language—
the modes and contexts of daily language use differ importantly from ritual
and religious speech. Ritual is very “costly” in its expenditure of energy,
repeating affectively loaded behaviors and sayings at high volume, over and
over again, in a way quite different from the nonritual, everyday speech of
preliterate peoples. His explanation is that ritual is not communication per
se, but the collective creation and maintenance of a virtual world, an
ontology of symbolic beings of various kinds: deities and ghosts (entities);
chiefs and bridesmaids (roles); scepters and stop signs (material objects); sin
and authority (concepts); baptizing and promising (acts). In the chronology
of Homo sapiens sapiens these are late achievements of the Upper Paleolithic
era, not “natural” expressions. Now, Knight and his colleagues presuppose
something that for philosophers is an open question, a pragmatic world of
fact on top of which a cultural deception has been added. But a slightly
different formulation can still capture the point.There is something about
culture which is in excess of, supererogatory to, the most basic or pragmatic
dimensions of human existence. In culture a people adds something to
their existence beyond the necessities of food, shelter, and reproduction,
even if that addition is often inextricably bound up with those activities—
as in a recipe, an architectural style, or the details of a marriage ceremony.
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I suggest we regard cultural meaning, as opposed to any other employ-
ment of signs, as meaning in relation to ends. An end, in the sense of goal or
the Greek telos, is something experienced, known, and acted upon for its
own sake. Ends draw attention, appreciation, thought, action. Ends arise
ontogenetically as qualitatively compelling phenomena, chief among sali-
ences, we may say.While an end emerges into experience as a compelling
quality, if it remains an end over time it comes to serve as the “for-which”
of a process that gives temporal organization to precedent events recon-
structed as a dramatic structure of process-leading-to-an-end. Ends form the
fabric that gives finality and shape, which is to say a certain kind of mean-
ing, to human existence. Here John Dewey’s account of means and ends is
particularly useful (Dewey 1958). For Dewey means and ends are not two
types of things but two respects in which the same event can be experi-
enced, or what is the same thing, two kinds of meaning an event can have.
Ends, or qualities, are moments of experience that constitute termini, expe-
rienced as that-for-which and that-toward-which a process of experiencing
was proceeding.They are consummatory, hence nonprocessural.They are the
stuff of norms, categorized as moral, aesthetic, or alethic (cognitive), and both
give meaning to and limit the processes they terminate, thereby restraining
imagination, desire, and action.
There are ultimate and proximate ends. The former are the summary
ends of human existence as understood by a social group, those values for
the sake of which socialized persons live; the latter are the indefinitely
many things which we experience and treat as consummatory.The ultimate
ends are like the peaks of a hilly countryside; they culminate the view, com-
plete the landscape, but the beauty of the surrounding fields and brush
would not disappear without them. Ultimate ends are those whose value
can be given no deeper account, whose finality is susceptible to explica-
tion and interpretation but not explanation. Proximal ends, while consum-
matory, do not leverage the value of existence itself; many people find
politeness valuable in itself, but very few make politeness that for which
they live.And certainly ends can do double-duty as means, which is to say,
function simultaneously in two different orders of events with two distinct
meanings. Romantic love is an end for those experiencing it, perhaps even an
ultimate end, and simultaneously serves reproduction. But to understand
romantic love as merely or primarily a means toward reproduction is to
cease to be a romantic lover.
Some meanings cluster about ends, forming networks where the mean-
ings in question each refer, however mediately, to ends that root the net-
work.The interpretation of the end is the operation of relating the end to
other things in such a way that the other things become the background
for understanding the value of the end, and the background is endowed
with value thereby. Culture entails social meaning-making and -interpreting,
where “meaning” is teleological meaning, meaning connected, however
mediately, to socially recognized ends.A set of meaningful things is cultural
in so far as it is connected to, gains its meaning in reference to, socially
posited ends. In terms of the relation of culture and society, whereas social
action must always presuppose a grammar of intelligibility and propriety,
that grammar, hence the social action in question, is cultural to the extent
that its rules of intelligibility and propriety are connected to, understood in terms of,
socially shared ends. In this way cultural things and processes intertwine with
social things and processes to varying degrees, some social acts being more
thickly and directly motivated and explained by ends, others less so. It is at
the point where the experienced and understood meaning of the event,
act, or object ceases to be consummatory, either proximally or ultimately,
that it and the network of acts and things oriented around it ceases to be
cultural.
Practices, Artifacts, and Narratives
Culture comprises three species of human appropriation of the world,
namely, practices, artifacts, and narratives. These overlap; a representation may
be an artifact and the focus of a practice.These categories are meant to cap-
ture Buchler’s rendition of the old Aristotelian trilogy of practical, produc-
tive, and theoretical reason, or more modestly, doing, making, and saying
(Buchler 1966). Such a categorization, if we were to pursue it to the “molec-
ular” or micrological level, might well be unsustainable; we might find that
human appropriation or judgment requires a more extensive list of cate-
gories. But left “molar” this categorization represents an advance on both
the tendency to cognitivize culture into assertive beliefs and the tendency
to pragmatize it solely into practices.
The whats of culture are artifacts.Artifacts, what is made, include fabri-
cations of all kinds, high art, all manner of technē, poiēsis, all decoration,
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clothing, building, the construction and transmission of stories and speeches,
the organization or configuration of elements, and so on. Not all made
things are, however, artifacts. The tool whose structure and use is not
endowed with meanings that are related to consummatory values is not an
artifact.The screwdriver is not cultural until decorated, or experienced as
itself the consummation of a process, or otherwise endowed with teleologi-
cal meaning. In so far as culture is a set of meaningful items that characterize
a people, in which they find and express significance, culture is artifacts.
Culture is also comprised by what a society believes, how it depicts the
world and itself, whether this is expressed in plastic arts or verbal asser-
tions, whether it aims to describe a given world or posit a better or ideal
world. “Representations” may be the best term here. Representations tell
about states of affairs, and they are supposed to be true. But not all repre-
sentations are cultural phenomena, just as not all made things are artifacts.
They become cultural when placed within social narrative.What does not
fit into a narrative, hence dramatic, structure is not a narrative representa-
tion, hence not cultural.
Lastly, culture is practices. A practice is a discrete, repeatable, organized
process of action. Following MacIntyre, practices have internal goods,
dependent upon internal ends or purposes; that is, it makes no sense to
claim to understand the practice and to engage in it while discounting the
goods thereby entailed.They are the characteristic things cultural members
do, in the way that they do them, carrying the meaning that they typically
or normatively carry for members. Not all behaviors, even all behaviors
common to or typical of a society, count as practices. The act of nose
scratching I just engaged in is no cultural practice, nor is the slash-and-
burn agriculture of the tribe for whom it is a pragmatic necessity at odds
with their cultural self-understanding.The latter is social, of course, but not
cultural.At least not yet.
To this horizontal categorization of cultural judgments and things we
must add a vertical distinction. Practices, artifacts, and narratives can func-
tion on a mundane level characterizing more narrow, context-specific con-
cerns as well as on a symbolic level as global, explicit ends-in-view, norma-
tive anchors of all other more contextually narrow appropriations. Practices,
constructions, and narratives become symbolic as ritual, icon, and metanarrative
or myth. While a particular way of decorating spoons (artifact) or of greet-
ing strangers (practice) or a conception of who counts as a cousin (fitting
into a narration of familial life) may be characteristic of a culture, and
meaningful as such, we nevertheless may in our analysis pay more attention
to religious rituals, metaphysics, and sacred icons.“Foundational” would be
the wrong metaphor for the symbolic; symbols do not ground, but complete
other cultural phenomena, retrospectively and anticipatorily serving as
that-for-which they are accomplished and that-in-terms-of-which they are
to be understood.The symbolic cultural items are not more cultural than
the mundane; the mundane are just as fully implicated in a cultural net-
work. Nor must it be the case that all the mundane cultural phenomena
refer to or implicate the symbolic phenomena. Rather, the symbolic refers
to the cultural phenomena that the culture itself regards as ends in them-
selves, as its “sacred” points, its grand stories of origin or destiny, its most
treasured objects, which most nexuses or collections of related cultural
phenomena at some point entail.The symbolic is the pinnacle of a contin-
uous (which is not to say unified or harmonious) realm of cultural prac-
tices and meanings, just as, in an earlier figure, the hilltops remain continu-
ous with the slopes and fields below. And as symbols they are inherently
vague. They are reference points capable of diverse interpretations, as are
canonical texts in MacIntyre’s sense or myths in Baeten’s sense.That a cul-
ture cannot “go beyond” them does not mean it cannot observe them or
reflect on them.
Agency, Practice, and Ritual
Metaphysically, normatively, and logically, neither practices nor artifacts nor
symbols are prior to the others. However, ontogenetically, psychologically,
and pedagogically doing comes first. As Buchler suggests, each human being
is born in a “state of natural debt, being antecedently committed to the
execution or the furtherance of acts that will largely determine his indi-
vidual existence” (Buchler 1966: 3). If sharing a culture means sharing a
“way of life,” then practices are the leading edge of what constitutes such 
a “way.” I must learn to do what members of my society do, I must acquire
its practices as the most basic dimension of my judgmental repertoire.And
it is primarily through cultivation or training or acquisition of these prac-
tices that individuals are socialized, come to share the sensibilities of other
members, and to divide up the world as the culture represents it. Pragma-
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tism, which, like both Kant and Wittgenstein, accepts Goethe’s figural
response to the opening of the Gospel of John, that “Im Anfang war die Tat,”
“In the beginning was the deed,” need not be the metaphysical or epis-
temic truth, but it may well be the anthropological truth. If nothing else,
our old and continuing theoretical tendency to focus on “beliefs,”“world-
views,” or representations makes it at least circumstantially beneficial to put
practices, for once, first.
A practice is a series of acts, purposively organized into a unit such that
the acts gain their intelligibility from that inclusion and their end from the
telos of the practice.A practice is distinct from “technique” in that it is not
purely instrumental.That is, society inculcates and vets the process, not just
the product. Practices are modules, each a complex series of acts distinct
from others, so a social actor knows when they begin or end.They are repet-
itive and social.The goods internal to practices must be valuable—that is,
they must really be goods. In one of MacIntyre’s favorite examples, knives
should be sharp. Practices are, as for Pierre Bourdieu, manifestations of a prac-
tical intelligence that is not reducible to linguistic or cognitive intelligence
(Bourdieu 1990). Expanding Dewey’s early notion of the “sensori-motor
circuit,” we can say that a practice is a motor-affective-sensory-imaginative
process of doing, a bodily and cultural engagement with the world, distin-
guished and delimited by social learning. As Michael Oakeshott insists, it
cannot be adequately summarized by a verbal formula, hence captured by
theoretical knowledge (Oakeshott 1991). Practices are the most basic web
of meaning and value, self and society.They are fundamentally communica-
tive, being always “gestural” in George Herbert Mead’s sense (Mead 1974).
As noted, a society must have a set of largely implicit but occasionally
explicit rules for how people are meaningfully to behave, which entail a
grammar of intelligibility and propriety, of what acts, artifacts, and sayings
mean, and what may and may not be done, made, or said. But there is an
additional component of interaction: a shared grammar of sensibility. I mean
a configuration of salience in perception and feeling, in what we some-
times call taste, which then is a constitutive part of the practical wisdom
common among members. The culture must encourage in members a
particular distribution of attention across the indefinitely complex array 
of experience and a corresponding distribution of emotional response,
hence various sensibilities, dispositions to weigh certain experiences more
than others, to feel some things more than others, to “natively” respond to
experiences in certain ways.This is the affective substrate of the grammars
of intelligibility and propriety that must hold in a person’s relations to
others.A fundamental part of what we call practical wisdom is exhibiting
the right or proper sense of proportion, of what matters in personal and
social life.This must be built into the structure of a person’s experience, not
merely into a reflective response to that experience. The individual who
feels rage in inappropriate situations, but reflectively exercises self-control,
not only fails to be a phronēmos or “wise” woman or man, but even a reli-
able or socially accepted woman or man. It is in this way that culture enters
most intimately into the constitution of the process of experiencing char-
acteristic of members.
The primacy of practice means that the self is primarily, although not
exclusively, an agent. The agent is the dominant coagulation of or nexus in
experience. I do not mean that the self is nothing other than what the per-
son is taken, and takes herself, to be socially. Rather, of the totality of phe-
nomena involved in the experiences characterizing a person, which are too
overwhelmingly plural to be incorporated into any meaningful unity, those
cohering about what can be socially expressed in agency must inevitably be
dominant.The requirements of agency select saliences within the inner hori-
zon of experience. Not that there is a perfect match; social requirements
are not a purely procedural definition of the self. But components of per-
sonal experience that are in stark contrast to, or cannot be integrated with,
a relatively coherent agency must be neglected under most circumstances.
At the symbolic level, practice becomes ritual, an end-in-itself that is
known as such by the agent.This does not mean it is devoid of instrumen-
tal significance. But the culture comes to regard its practices as rituals at
the point where they function as crucial normative components of social
organization whose meanings must be internalized.The ritual both enacts an
ultimate end of social existence, and in doing so, itself becomes such an ulti-
mate end. Or, to preview a later point, ritual is practice become dramatic.
Construction, Artifact, and Icon
Constructions, artifacts, things people make, are certainly a major part of
culture. Indeed, one might imagine that culture is pretty much all construc-
tions. But this is not so. In the classical sense making or poiēsis is about the
formation of materials into meaningful wholes.While much of what we call
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culture, and virtually all cultural things, are indeed the products of making,
certainly making is not all of culture. Practices are done, not made. The
notion that culture is all made is the result of the overuse and expansion of
the metaphor of “construction” by contemporary theorists, who tend to
label “constructed” anything showing the effects of human activity.Assertion
and action then get subsumed under making.This tendency must be resis-
ted. Making is one pole of a continuum that includes selecting, choosing,
interacting, and affecting, unless we are going to claim that leaving footprints
on K-2, or even naming it “K-2,” are no different from having built the
mountain itself from the ground up. It is true that people construct things.
The things they construct are artifacts where they carry cultural meanings.
The artifacts of a society have the special function of constituting a mean-
ingful environment for members. It is the system of artifacts that has a right
to the overused philosophical term “second-nature,” a constructed world
that supervenes upon nature.
And it is in this sense that construction does have a kind of primacy in
the conception of culture. For while culture as a whole is equally a matter
of doing, making, and saying, the entire symbolic dimension of culture, as
opposed to the mundane, can from an external point of view rightly be
considered something we make. By “external” I mean from the perspective
of an observer, rather than a member, of a culture. For symbolic rituals,
icons, and myths are arguably added to nature by human beings, and addi-
tion is more making than doing or saying. That is, while we engage the
world by saying what it is, and by responding to or dealing with it, we also
engage by supplementing it, clothing it in human terms, hence by arrang-
ing and forming natural materials into a new whole. But it remains the
case, as we will see in Chapter 6, that this making is always the making of
an agent.
Remarkably, the best recent account of this artifactural world comes from
a work in social and political theory; but then, its author was a remarkable
political theorist. In The Human Condition Hanna Arendt expands the con-
cept of Welt and its dependence on practice from Heidegger’s Being and
Time. “World” for Heidegger was the horizon of all meaningful things, a
horizon projected by Dasein or human being as the context for its experi-
ence. Whereas Heidegger’s analysis of the physical projects that form, or
form part of, this world stopped with tools (zuhanden, “ready to hand”
things), Arendt makes human artifacts the structure of the world. Like a
tent, Arendt’s world is propped up and given structure by human poiēsis,
making, or as she calls it,“work” (not to be confused with labor), including
art, poetry, history, and crafts, all the manifold forms of human creation that
leave behind durable meaningful objects. For even though political action
is her focus, action is only commemorated and memorialized, hence capa-
ble of building something that outlasts the actor, if there is an artifact to
capture it.The work-world of Arendt is clearly the world of culture.
As she notes, modern society privileges construction. Modernity makes
man the maker (homo faber). In the premodern world two castes present
alternate models of ideal humanity: the aristocratic model dictates that the
sheer being of an individual marks its worth, granted by blood, while the
scribal-religious class regards contemplation of the eternal as the essential task
of humanity. Work was, in agroliterate civilization, a degraded category,
embodied by peasants and merchants. In modern bourgeois society the
measure of greatness is fabrication: here Kant’s transcendental turn provides
the epistemological twin to modernist art and Promethean capitalism. Cer-
tainly premodern people worked, but modernity shifts work to the center
of its anthropology, thereby liberating work from the classical and medieval
versions in which the fabricator is a copyist of ideal, tradition-bequeathed
models. Modernity is the triumph of work, even if, as Arendt fears, in late
modernity work threatens to degenerate into metabolic, meaningless labor.
The artifact or cultural construction that becomes a recognized end-in-
view is an icon, a thing that is an end in itself for social members.Art-works
are the most obvious examples, but so are many treasured objects. Iconic
constructions provide to sensibility the aesthetically normative compulsions
of a culture.They become centers of interpretation just as do the canonical
texts of narrative tradition.
Representation, Narrative, and Myth
Representations are depictions and descriptions which claim to be true of
what is described. It is here that the beliefs shared by cultural members
have their place. I claim cultural representations are organized into mean-
ingful patterns through narrative.That is the form in which representations
come to be shared by social members as part of their culture. This is to
argue that the primary form of the intelligibility of human existence, one
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which coheres with both practices and artifacts, is the narrative. It is in the
historical depiction of events as they pass from beginning through middle
to end via the activities of agents (human or nonhuman, that is to say, divine,
supranatural) that culture provides this intelligibility.This might seem too
restrictive. Certainly social members also share purely synchronic (non-
temporal) representations or beliefs. But just as not all makings or actions
are cultural, representations or beliefs that are not connected to shared nar-
ratives are not cultural.
Storytelling was presumably one of the first forms of culture, along with
ritual practices and the artifacts of cave painting and bodily ornamentation.
The canonical texts and folk wisdom of later agricultural civilizations are
also primarily narrative. And in a postreligious age secular societies com-
monly substitute narratives of progress, national self-determination, and
the achievement of liberty and individual authenticity as their dominant
conceptions of the sense of life.
Narration is verbal representation normed, as noted, by truth. One might
argue that our modern notion of truth-functional discourse has no place
here, that ancient, segmentary narratives did not follow our modern notion
of true representations as propositions whose correspondence to states of
affairs can be evidenced or justified. One might imagine that the oral his-
tory heard by the fire functioned not to be the depiction of truth, but
rather the reinforcement of a social bond, as Lyotard says (Lyotard 1984).
He may be right, but that is beside the point. If the sociopolitical context
of the story made clear that all present must then “believe” it without “evi-
dence,” must see the world in relation to it, must say the world is as the
story says, then it was indeed offered as “true” as well as socially normative.
The difference is not the absence of truth in the ancient context. Truth
was there, just as aesthetic compulsion and moral-social normativity were
there. But they were there differently than for us, in a predifferentiated state,
as we shall see.
At the symbolic level the narrative structure of cultural representations
becomes what Lyotard called metanarrative, or more simply, myth. Myths
serve as the articulations of the ultimate ends of the culture and as such
become ultimate ends themselves. Following Elizabeth Baeten’s analysis, a
culture’s myths are the cognitive representations beyond which it cannot
go, which provide explanation for other social activities but cannot be
explained themselves, only explicated and interpreted (Baeten 1996).
Kingdoms of Ends
We can now offer a preliminary definition of culture. Culture is the public
repertoire of meaning-establishing and -interpreting processes and products, rooted in
socially projected ends. It is the teleologically thickest layer of a society’s herme-
neutic horizon. Culture is not a particular social sphere, not a rule-governed
context of action. It is the indefinite repertoire in terms of which all such
contexts gain their mediate significance, their “place.” Just as a sovereign
state cannot be part of a larger political unit (if it is, then it is not sovereign),
a culture cannot function as a part of society or society’s semiotics. It is rather
a dimension of social experience which invokes social norms in narrative,
practical, and artifactural meaning-structures. Differently put, culture is the
net of interpretive products in so far as they are connected to socially norma-
tive ends.As to the question why I ought to commit some social act, rather
than answering that I ought to do it because others expect it, it will feel
good, will be practically beneficial—perfectly good social reasons—cul-
ture amplifies by answering: because it is right, or good, or sacred, or beau-
tiful, or awesome, or true.
None of which implies that a culture is a system, or a substantive unity,
but it can function as a unity.A culture’s elements cannot be reduced to appli-
cations of a few central themes or ideals.An apt metaphor for its unity might
be Giles Deleuze’s “rhizomes,” tubers that reproduce from any point rather
than “arborially” in a “logical tree” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987).We may
imagine a culture as a family of variously connected hypotheses spread out
like clumps of kelp across a region of sea, swimming, as Peirce figured it,“in
a continuum of uncertainty and indeterminacy” (Peirce 1931a: 70). Like an
irregular construction of a child’s tinker toys, every clump is connected to at
least one other, but none connects to all or dominates the far-flung network.
The idea of a society of beings whose behavior is coordinated by ends-
in-themselves may remind us of the attractive phrase coined by Kant for
the imagined community of moral beings, “the kingdom of ends.” Moral
action requires that we act in conformity with that imagination, which is a
necessary posit of practical, or moral, reason for Kant. For rational beings are
and must be treated as ends in themselves.What is it about human beings
that makes them ends for Kant? It is their moral autonomy, their capacity
rationally to choose to obey moral law. For Kant the only ends in themselves
are the beings with that capacity.Whatever the virtues of this approach, it
denies that humans can reasonably regard something as more important than
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themselves, and this is an unnecessary truncation of how humans have in fact
imagined the meanings of their lives. Human beings require more guid-
ance in life than can be gotten from the notion that human individuals are
the sole ultimate ends. For humans are the kind of ends that must find other
ends, ends under which their autonomy, in so far as there is such a thing,
gains its value. Kant should have called his system of moral beings the king-
dom of choosers of ends. As for the kingdom of ends, that is culture. But unlike
Kant’s modern, cosmopolitan conception, the principalities of culture are
many. Culture is more like a feudal kingdom of ends, locally dominant
meaning-structures arranged in a decentralized patchwork of local author-
ities, in which no ruling end can be more than a primus inter pares, a first
among equals.
First I am a Pathan because I have been so for thousands of years; then I am a Muslim, which I have
been for 1,300 years and, third, I am a Pakistani, which I have been only for the last 40 years or so.
— W A L I  K H A N  ( A H M E D  1 9 9 2 :  1 3 3 )
Culture comes in cultures, attached to particular societies. Cultures are not
only whats and hows, but whos. This raises two thorny questions: what are
the criteria for deciding what counts as a particular culture, and what
constitutes cultural membership and identity? The latter connects to the
question of what it means to be a “people,” an “ethnic” group, or even a
“race,” briefly treated in Chapter 1.These connections are difficult to ana-
lyze, not only because of the sheer obscurity of the terms, but because such
groupings trouble us modern liberal folk. If we open the door to the salience
of cultural membership, will race and ethnicity and other “primordial”
attachments sneak through, bringing intolerance with them? But open
that door we must—it will not stay shut—and do some conceptual clean-
ing, even if sweeping initially kicks up enough dust to make the mess seem
worse than ever.
We may try to set the bounds of a culture as a single horizon of shared
practices, artifacts, and narratives, our judgment of “a horizon” being deter-
mined by the relative coherence of what is inside and its relative difference
from what is outside.We may imagine extreme cases of discreteness, where
one society bears a culture that is utterly unique and internally homoge-
neous.This is a perfectly decent procedure; starting with the easy cases usu-
ally makes sense. But easy cases are hard to find. It is dubious that we can
identify cultures that share nothing (as we will see later, the very idea is sense-
less).Also, if as we have noted cultures need not be coextensive with poli-
ties or societies, then we cannot employ administrative or state boundaries.
Further, we will always find internal disputes and differences in each society
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that are hard to distinguish from cultural differences. Even if, using Edward
Shils’s terminology, two cultural “centers” can be distinguished, they are
likely to have indistinct “peripheries” where the percentage of persons in
the locale embodying a trait goes continuously down, leaving us with the
choice of labeling them deviant members of culture A or members of
another culture B.
But things are not all that bleak. Unlike color spectra or other continua
we might study, here the objects of our investigation help us out: people iden-
tify themselves. Self-acknowledgment of membership is a prima facie sufficient,
if fallible, condition for cultural identification (“No, we are not Uzbeks.
We are Tadjiks”). Beyond this we would expect, as noted in Chapter 1,
those who identify with one culture to share a system of judgmental endog-
amy, the boundaries of a lifeworld of socially compelling expectations and
norms.Above all we must remember that the kind of unity a culture exhibits
may not be rigid.As MacIntyre claims of traditions, a culture is best char-
acterized as an ongoing debate. Following Martha Nussbaum again we can
expect societal cultures to be thick but vague. They deeply color the self, but
are in most cases broad and pluralistic enough not to determine one nar-
row course of life.The point is, we do have some markers to look for, as
long as we don’t expect bright lines and red flags.
The level or zone of cultural phenomena matters here as well. At the
“lowest” level, that is, most closely related to everyday social behavior, soci-
ety and culture must merge. Interacting social members, even if they have
different cultures, must share judgments of intelligibility and propriety.
Sharing an understanding of what the social group takes to be the mean-
ing of its practices, its rules of propriety, its natural language(s), is at the
same time sharing a part of a culture. In a polycultural society, members of
different cultures must, to the degree they are fellow social members, find
each other intelligible and proper.Thus their cultures must overlap at the
everyday level.At the less pragmatic and more symbolic level, however, cul-
ture includes rites, icons, and metanarratives for the constitution of mean-
ing in a more global sense. Depending on the kind of social norms active,
these can indeed diverge among social members. In the extreme case, mod-
ern liberal society, individuals or groups who bear distinct rites, icons, and
metanarratives may yet function together under common norms of intel-
ligibility and propriety on the everyday level in public and restrict the
nonoverlapping portions of their cultures to privacy. Citizenship in such a
society requires little sharing at the symbolic level.
More important for our purposes, however, is the meaning of the verb
that stands between person and culture.A culture is not the kind of thing
that can be “held” or “had” for external, instrumental reasons.While it makes
sense to say that I learned Italian to do business in Italy, I cannot say that I
became culturally Italian, that I am Italian, for such purposes. Parekh argues
for example that being British is sharing not a body of values, or history, or
civic institutions, but “a specific form of life . . . a specific way of talking
about and conducting common affairs. Being British therefore means learn-
ing the grammar, vocabulary and syntax of the prevailing form of life and
knowing how to participate in its ongoing dialogue . . . [it is] a matter of
acquiring conceptual competence in handling the prevailing cultural lan-
guage” (Parekh 1991: 203). This account would indeed capture much of
what we mean by cultural familiarity. But it does not capture cultural iden-
tity. For what does it mean to have competence in “handling the prevailing
cultural language”? This implies an instrumental attitude.There is nothing
wrong with that; my point is conceptual, not moral. Is being able to “han-
dle” British culture equivalent to being British? If it were, British-ness would
be a kind of technique or competence. But cultural identity must be thicker
than this; it must in some sense characterize my ends. As such, to treat a
“culture” as something to be acquired for a prior purpose, and perhaps dis-
carded later, is to admit that one has never really been a member.
Likewise we take culture to be something that cannot be gotten didac-
tically.To acquire a culture requires the kind of long training that comes
from living in or with the social group of which the culture is a possession.
The usual way is through birth and maturation.This distinguishes “know-
ing” a culture from “belonging” to a culture, or cultural facility from cultural
identity. I can be a scholar and lover of Egyptian culture and yet not iden-
tify myself as an Egyptian; indeed, I can adopt Egyptian values and still fail
to be Egyptian, for as Kymlicka himself notes, shared ideals are not enough
(Kymlicka 1995a: 188). I have a friend who immersed himself in things Jap-
anese, including moving to Japan, learning a great deal of the Japanese lan-
guage, studying Japanese philosophy, and finding a Japanese fiancée.This led
to the bizarre situation in which he knew more about traditional Japan
than most Japanese (including, awkwardly, his prospective in-laws). It may
be that we can say at this point, or will be able to say, that he has “acquired”
Japanese culture; certainly he is very familiar with it, knows an enormous
lot about it, and so on. But is he a “member”? Has he “turned Japanese”?
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No, for the Japanese do not accept him as Japanese. Knowing, and even
agreeing, is not being.
This is precisely where, as we saw in Chapter 1, the linguistic analogy
fails. Do I have a culture the way I have a language? The “having” of many
languages is possible precisely because it does not make the demands on
the self that cultural membership makes.A culture is not merely a compe-
tence, it is a social group. Having a culture is not like having a language; it
is more like having a family, regarding which having it entails being had by
it. Here having is belonging, and belonging constrains individuality while
constituting it.We must now explore some of the human groupings through
which the who of culture has been understood, forms of human association
or identity from which the modern and especially liberal democratic mind
often recoils.Today Western liberals often throw all of a list of suspected
bases of community and conflict together, using the terms “nationalist,”
“tribal,”“ethnic,” and “racial” as synonyms. But each has a distinct meaning.
Race
If the reality of race has always been divisive in the United States, in con-
temporary theory the concept has become so. On the one hand, the contin-
uation of integrationist and antiracist liberalism, which always denied the
political importance not only of race but of biology, has led to a denial of
the very sense of “race,” no doubt with the best of intentions. On the other
hand, a multicultural movement, trading on a Foucauldian view of dis-
course, actually promotes the notion of race against the attempts to erase
it. If the racists used race to oppress, it argues, we must now use it to com-
bat the results of oppression. Denying the importance of race is then a sub-
terfuge that actually serves the status quo. During a dinner a couple of years
ago among black and white intellectuals, I cringed as I heard a white lib-
eral—not an academic, hence a well-meaning and decent human being, but
out of touch with current theory—argue that, of course, the very concept
of race is senseless. He was immediately taken to the rhetorical woodshed
by a black Afro-American studies professor with whom he had thought he
was expressing solidarity. Alas, he had fallen behind the theoretical times.
The most cogent case against race in philosophy comes from Anthony
Appiah, who famously argues that nothing in the world corresponds to the
meaning the term has been given for the last century or so. For Appiah, sim-
ply,“The truth is that there are no races” (Appiah 1992). Races exist in the
same sense that witches do: there are none, but many people act as if there
were.The modern notion of race is the result of the nineteenth-century
“biologization” of the notion of culture, the view that culture is heritable.
The only real thing in the world the term “race” per se picks out is mor-
phology, that is to say, skin color, hair texture, facial features, and the like.
Morphological distinctiveness is the result of sufficiently long ancient peri-
ods of genetic isolation. But genetic sameness across such groups is much
greater than the groups’ differences from each other, just as differences
within each group are greater than differences between them. Racial deter-
minations of identity must then rely on two distinct judgments: a reference
back to a subcontinental genetic homeland of morphological homogene-
ity, then a series of rules in each generation as to what constitutes continuity
with the former (such as the American “one drop” rule according to which
having any black ancestors makes one black) (Appiah 1996). Such rules are
themselves changing sociocultural constructions. Thus if “race” means a
morphology that carries with it a culture, nobody has one.
Certainly the curve of human history is toward racial mixing;Theodore
von Laue’s characterization of the modern world as the “Great Confluence”
holds for race as for economics and culture. Immigration and emigration
mean a society includes more people racially distinct from its long-term
genetic pool; thus the “racial we” is increasingly inadequate to the “social
we.”The racial “we” gets further confounded by interracial mating.We may
also agree with David Hollinger that the contemporary American classifi-
cation of race is untenable (Hollinger 1995).As categorical schemes go, the
“ethno-racial pentagon” of colors—black (sub-Saharan African), red
(natives of the Americas), yellow (“Asians” and Pacific Islanders), brown
(Latin Americans), and white (European)—is a mess.The worst categories
are “Asian”—which ought to be “East Asian” so as not to include Israelis,
Siberian Russians, and Pakistanis, not to mention Polynesians—and Latino,
which is the best example of a cultural category masquerading as a race.
Many Latinos have mixed Native American and Spanish/Portuguese descent
and could be morphologically categorized as “brown,” but commonly iden-
tify themselves and others through language and culture, regardless of color.
Perhaps most bizarre, the official pentagon leaves South Asians, North
Africans,Arabs, and Persians as “white,” which, if it were true, would make
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Caucasian racism against them logically impossible.This is not even to raise
the problem that the pentagon’s categories of racial morphology do not
consistently correspond to color; by the criterion of skin tone alone, many
native Australians and some South Asian peoples should be “black” (being
as dark as many sub-Saharan Africans) and the majority of North Africans,
Arabs, Persians, South Asians, and many others, by process of elimination, if
nothing else, ought to join Latinos in the “brown” category.
We thus could say that for these reasons the discussion of culture has no
special interest in race at all.Appiah’s argument against race sensibly expresses
his Ghanaian roots in a multiply morphological family where nobody could
confuse color with culture or cultural identity. If the “Enlightened”West
did indeed play the race card, constituting European modernity through
invidious morphological contrasts, then that is a world well lost. But there
is more to understand here than the history of an error. For if race merely
means morphology, then Appiah’s argument does not deny its reference.
Racial differences are the real results of a bygone era of long-term genetic
isolation. At some point in prehistory and early history, the ancestors of
people who today bear distinctive racial morphologies must have lived and
reproduced separately.To this day, some racial descendents continue to live
both in genetic isolation and in the genetic “homeland.”And where persons
shared a homeland, they likely shared not only morphology, but other social
and cultural traits as well.This is roughly Philip Kitcher’s claim:“race” refers
to the phenotypic commonalities in a group defined by sufficiently inbred
lineages (Kitcher 1999).At this point the putatively scientific objection that
intraracial differences quantitatively exceed interracial differences is heard.
True, but so what? That is presumably true of any grouping of human beings
we can imagine, including sexes. Indeed, the vast majority of my DNA is
shared with mice, but nobody is arguing that membership in the human
species is open for application from rodents.
Race is a set of morphological traits that are inherited, hence can serve
as markers for ancestry, which societies may then pick out as salient when-
ever they think ancestry matters.There has been in some times and places,
and still can be found, a contingent, a posteriori connection between mor-
phology and culture.As such, race has functioned in many places and times
as a sign for social, psychological, and cultural differences. Certainly, even
in the best of correlations, morphology fails to be a sufficient marker, since
there are many more cultures than races. Still, many people can plausibly
claim that in the local world they know, race is in fact contingently corre-
lated with some sociocultural traits, that “we” are of one race and “others”
are of a different race. Such people can rightly regard themselves as de-
scended from a people who had a particular social or cultural character to
go with its morphological distinctiveness.When a citizen of Kinshasa and
his country cousin see two youngish men in dark suits with briefcases walk-
ing a city boulevard together, one light-skinned with straight hair and thin-
ner lips and one ebony-skinned with tight curls and fuller lips, the cousin
makes neither nonsense nor evil in saying,“The white man is a European.”
His statement’s only liability is its, admittedly, increased probability of empir-
ical error in a changing world, a probability usually proportional to igno-
rance of local conditions. Thus the Kinshasan may respond, “Man, don’t
you know that a community of whites has been living in this city for gen-
erations? That man is probably a son of Zaire like you.”The liability to error
makes the cousin’s inference no worse than many of our guesses.The evil
of such race-to-culture inductions lies not in the act of guessing but in
what is staked on the outcome.
Blood
Race is the ultimate, but not the only,“bad” source of cultural association
for modern liberals. Most of the “new culturalists” discussed in Chapter 1
regard connections of “blood and soil” to be only marginally less nasty.
Political references to blood are held to be reactionary, “essentialist,” and
“biologistic.” As noted, Kymlicka claims without argument that “descent-
based approaches to national membership have obvious racial overtones,
and are manifestly unjust” (Kymlicka 1995a: 23). Liberals fear the political
salience of the “natural,” anything prereflectively given and unchosen. For
the post–World War II generation of political theorists and their students, the
intrusion of biology into politics can only mean eugenics and racism. Femi-
nists added their own repugnance, fearing that biology is only relevant for
patriarchal dictation of female “destiny.” Even if race is Public Enemy Num-
ber One for progressives, blood remains high on the Most Wanted List.
But as suggested in Chapter 1, this is unfair. Blood is in one sense nar-
rower and in another sense broader than race. For blood means descent, and
descent is a complex matter. It first of all refers to natality and parentage. It
is partly genetic. (Even in this respect it is complicated by gamete donation
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and adoption. Is the singer American singer Shania Twain part Native Amer-
ican because her adoptive father is?) It is also partly social and legal, given
that nonincestuous parents are not close blood relatives. My family includes
lots of people from whom I did not descend: aunts and uncles, not to men-
tion in-laws. Kinship is wider than descent.An interesting point about blood
is that it can create ties among people who do not share blood. Descent gen-
erates non-descent ties. If it matters to one of my group memberships who
my parents were, then blood matters, even if it is not blood that constitutes
the tie among members. So if I am the child of police officers, but not my-
self a police officer, I am nevertheless tied in a way I may regard as impor-
tant to the “community” of police officers.At any rate, the political manifes-
tation of blood is not racial or ethnic politics, but clan politics. Blood-politics
is rule by, as Gellner says,“cousins, not kings.” It is Hatfields and McCoys,
not Hutus and Tutsis. Under normal conditions even a small segmentary
society cannot be constituted by a single clan, unless marriage partners are
regularly imported from outside.
Nor is “tribalism” equivalent to racialism, ethnocentrism, or nationalism.
The tribe is supralocal and subethnic, usually covering a set of clans living
in a collection of villages over a region. It must be carried by some non-
descent characteristics, like language or religion or a shared history. It is
true that in a small society characterized by racial (morphological) homo-
geneity in which clans to some extent intermarry, so that kin crisscross
society, it might be natural to conflate blood with ethnicity or tribe. But
any influx of foreign marriage partners, or emigration of members who
then isolate themselves from the homeland, drives at least the thin end of a
wedge between blood and culture.
As Tamir notes, while liberal polities assert a civic, not a blood, tie among
members, they nevertheless automatically extend citizenship to those who
descend from citizen parents. For blood correlates to the who that teaches
me a culture and to the where they taught me, in short, my natal-maturational
world. Because children are inevitably part of their parent’s surrounding
community at the most form-giving age in the human life cycle, descent
plays an enormous role in identity. Family is the most powerful and com-
mon way of acquiring a culture. Understood thus, blood is indeed crucial
to many human ties and certainly to conceptions of ethnicity, nationality,
and culture, in liberal as well as illiberal societies. Most families not subject
to recent emigration inhabit a single polity, hence their familial loyalties may
cathect the polity: to protect my family I may have to protect the state that
houses them.Therefore, most polities that have popular legitimacy are en-
dorsed by familial feeling even though not constituted by descent. If descent
is somehow an unjust means of acquiring legitimate, obligation-inducing
political identity, then virtually all extant polities are unjust.
Soil
The only competitor to biology as an object of liberal fear is soil. But of
course it is more corollary than competitor, since descent is from a family,
hence a community, on some plot of soil. Soil and place are feared by liberals
as the justification for intolerance and ethnic cleansing.They are certainly
right that the two are often linked; the most immediate goal of ethnic
cleansing is the removal of the hated group from “our soil.”
Liberal fears notwithstanding, we cannot avoid the fact that soil is com-
monly a significant correlate of culture. For soil is most simply place. My
natal-maturational world is likely defined by the boundaries of a place. If
we add local homogeneity, then the culture of the domicile and the locale
are identical; their nonidentity is virtually the definition of minority status.
If family and locale concur, failure to acquire their jointly carried culture is
virtually impossible. Soil or territory, then, is essential to the historical ref-
erence that is cultural identification, because there must have been a geo-
graphically continuous population at the source of this reference. Wher-
ever we find a societal culture, there had to have been at some historical point
a plot of soil on which it developed as a possible object of identification.
Unfortunately, recent liberal political philosophy—and as Edward Casey
has argued, recent Western philosophy in general—has shown at best a
remarkable neglect of the significance of place in human experience, and
at worst, an active hostility toward it (Casey 1995, 1999). For like blood, soil
is typically pregiven, “natural,” and unchosen.The liberal and intellectual
antipathy to location has led to serious mangling of the significance of soil
on the rare occasions when theory has turned to examine it. Jacob Levy
nicely punctures the common anti-imperial story of European protocapi-
talist colonizers importing a foreign notion of land as commodity into their
dealings with indigenous Americans and Australians (Levy 2000).That revi-
sionist narrative was always too simplistic.The feudal and early modern West
certainly did understand land as property, but precisely did not open it to
commercial exchange as a commodity. Hence the principles of primogeni-
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ture (eldest male heir inherits all, hence land parcels are never split among
offspring) and entail (prohibition of sale, or of sale outside the family) guar-
anteed the perennial aristocratic ownership of choice land.The reformers
of the late eighteenth century (including Adam Smith,Thomas Jefferson,
and even Edmund Burke) rejected these policies less because of a claimed
“right” of the owner to dispose of private property as desired (which would
have been a fully modern “liberal” position) than because of their desire to
develop a talent- (rather than birth-) based aristocracy, spur commercial
progress, and increase agricultural production.They deplored the “waste”
of perpetually held but undeveloped and uncultivated land.The tradition
they attacked—that is, their own—was thus not so different from that of
indigenous peoples, like the American natives, who far from lacking a notion
of property, typically regarded tribal land as collective property, in contrast to
the preliberal European conception of land as private yet noncommercial
(unexchangeable) property. In fact nineteenth- and twentieth-century West-
ern nationalism fairly, albeit not precisely, mirrored that indigenous view,
insisting on the coincidence of political sovereignty and ownership.The real
incompatibility between natives and Europeans was that between hunter-
gatherer and agricultural societies. For Euro-American settlers, the natives’
claims to huge expanses of untilled land echoed the claims of their own
homegrown elites to maintain game reserves at the expense of egalitarian
farming opportunities. It was fungibility of land that was crucial to the devel-
opment of modern liberal society; mere private ownership was not enough.
In this sense, recent liberals wary of current nationalists’ claims to their
home “soil” ironically continue the capitalist tradition of commodifying
land, a tradition responsible for the development of a liberal capitalist soci-
ety ill-equipped to recognize indigenous land claims.
While all communities obtain in a place, only some cultures cathect par-
ticular plots of soil on a permanent basis, sing of its specific hills and valleys
as their only rightful home.We may call this the Jerusalem syndrome. Tamir
is entirely right that this identification is troublesome and often dangerous,
simply on pragmatic terms. Given the history of conquest and migration, if
we want our children to live in peace we cannot generally grant ethnic
groups unqualified rights to particular plots of soil, just as ethnicities cannot
generally be granted sovereign states of their own.
Nevertheless, even if we cannot grant a general right to soil, we cannot
simply deny the moral weight of its claim either. For if ethnic cleansers
demand the relocation of a minority, even to good land where the latter
could enjoy sovereignty, would we not still object? Who would say today
that loss of particular homelands for Native Americans was not a catastrophic
violation of their rights? We admit as much whenever we grant financial
or other compensations for forced relocation of natives. Recognizing the
significance of the loss of a traditional territory need not mean that the
right to homeland trumps all other rights, but it does acknowledge some
kind of a right. For the power of the identification with place simply must
be recognized.
As an example of the Jerusalem syndrome we might as well take Jeru-
salem itself. It is often forgotten that the Israeli government and military
command before and during the Six-Day War of 1967 was dominated by
hard-headed realists concerned with security, fearful of losing international
support by expanding into Palestinian territory, rather than millenarian reli-
gionists longing for historical turf. On the second day of their defensive war
against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, with the military outcome very much in
doubt, survival was their overriding concern. Nevertheless, upon taking
the Temple Mount and the Western Wall in Jerusalem that day, a flood of
primordial emotions overcame the leadership. Michael Oren recounts that
at the Wall,
[Military Chief of Staff Yitzhak] Rabin . . . watched with awe the
scene of hundreds of soldiers, joined by Ultra-Orthodox Jews, danc-
ing.“This was the peak of my life,” he recalled. . . . “The sacrifices
of our comrades have not been in vain. . . . The countless genera-
tions of Jews murdered, martyred and massacred for the sake of
Jerusalem . . .” [Foreign Minister Abba] Eban, hearing about the
victory in New York, wrote of “a flood of historic emotion [that]
burst the dams of restraint and sent minds and hearts in movement
far beyond the limits of our land.”Among the most strenuous oppo-
nents of the war . . . [Religious Affairs Minister] Zorach Warhaftig
recalled how “my heart was filled with gladness,” as he rushed to
kiss the Western Wall and embraced both [Defense Minister Moshe]
Dayan and Rabin. (Oren 2002: 246–47)
The point is simply that place matters, sometimes very much, and however
we negotiate such claims to soil we must at least recognize their human
and political reality.
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Ethnicity
In sum, all societies are based in descent and territory in some sense. Blood
and soil matter everywhere, in nationalism and liberalism, civil societies and
ethnic states. Modern civil societies of course allow nondescent member-
ship, and de-ethnicize their membership criteria almost completely (with
telling exceptions like the exclusion of naturalized citizens from the presi-
dency).* Blood and soil are not equivalent to ethnicity.They are typically
local.This was true in premodern societies, and is not contradicted in moder-
nity, where rather than blood and place becoming supralocal, they simple
decline in public significance altogether. In the ancient agrarian empires
blood and place were not confused with either political membership or
culture, which were typically far broader groupings. Language commonly
obtained across a far-flung, distant network of clannish locales. Religion, at
least in Christian and Muslim civilizations, ranged much further. Modern
nationalism changed all that in the West by evolving a mass “nation-state”
culture over a dominant linguistic region, transcending descent and local
relations, beneath or within the larger circle of religion. Consequently, the
question of cultural membership in the modern era is inextricably entan-
gled with the meaning of nationality and its relative, ethnicity.
The term “ethnicity” as it is used in contemporary political theory is
rarely burdened by clarity. Sometimes it is a synonym for nationality. Other
times it serves as a kind of quasi-race, a kinder, gentler alternative to that
feared term, allowing writers to mean descent and morphology without say-
ing so. Sometimes it is condemned for that very reason, as an attempt to
water down racial distinctions. But its historical meaning is plain. The
English “ethnic” derives from the Greek ethnikos, which referred to a for-
eign people, normally in a somewhat disparaging way, like “heathen.”This
holds true also for the roots of “nation,” which in Roman times meant non-
Italianate peoples ruled by Rome.Although the connotations of the terms
differ—ethnikos was linked both to éthos, character, and ethos, custom, while
“nation” derives from nasci, to be born, hence refers to descent—their
referent is the same: a people, understood either through their reproductive
isolation or distinctive character. Unfortunately for us “nation” has been
overwhelmed by the term nationalism, hence sovereignty and states. Bowing
*As Phu Nguyen reminded me.
to aural custom, I will save “nationality” for the political mobilization of a
people, usually in modern nationalism, and use “ethnicity,” for the more
fundamental condition of being a people. That is the root notion.The basic
issue is, then, what does it mean to be a people? Or better . . .
Who Is a People?
Let us imagine the “ideal type” of a people in the sense of what the most
complete form of the kind of homogeneity we mean by “ethnic” would
be like. In such a condition differences among intrasocial groups could not
be cultural. There would have to be one sociocultural horizon, one set of
socioeconomic arrangements, one system of roles, one set of rules of in-
telligibility, propriety, and status, and one commonly held reservoir of
meaning-endowing practices, artifacts, and narratives. This scheme does
not imply equality; it could certainly include stark clan, caste, gender, and
political differences. Let us further imagine that no social outsiders share the
local culture (arguably a rare condition in the last several millennia). Such a
society maximally fulfills the criteria for being considered “a people” by
themselves and by outsiders.What would be true of such a condition?
First, in it we would find the identity of society and culture. Being a social
member and being a cultural member would not be distinguished, because
nobody would have one without the other.The conditions of membership
in society and the conditions of membership in its culture would be iden-
tical. (In reality, the closest we would get to this condition would be small,
isolated segmentary societies scattered across a region, where all such vil-
lages share the same language, religion, and so on, hence cultural member-
ship would extend beyond local society. But still the crucial point would be
that all social members belong to one culture.) Second, we would expect
to find the coincidence of spheres, the disciplinary unity of the conditions of
membership for that sociocultural group.That is, if a people calls itself the
Ipo, then all social members must conduct their lives in an Ipo-way, speak
the Ipo-tongue, worship the Ipo-gods, practice Ipo-sports, and so on.This
people has not had to make distinctions among members who, while they
share the Ipo way of economic life, do not share the Ipo gods or marriage
rituals, or refuse the authority of Ipo chiefs, and so on. Third, the natal-
maturational world, hence the primary kin-local sphere, would be continu-
ous with the public social world.The culture may of course specify distinc-
tive roles and norms in each, and there may well be interclan conflict. But as
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long as all social members regard themselves as one “people,” their forms
of family life will be continuous with the social order. No one, for exam-
ple, will argue that kinship relations or religion should be “private” mat-
ters, irrelevant or inappropriate to public life, so as not to offend or coerce
others. Last, the cultural life of this society will presumably be thick. By
“thick” I mean that the shared culture is adequate to the determination of
the sense and significance of human life. It fills the normative space for
members. No further guidance is needed (except of course for deviant or
idiosyncratic individuals).
We can then conceive of a variety of other, more pluralistic conditions
as differing degrees of departure from this homogeneous condition. The
first significant departure appears in conditions in which local societies sub-
sist in a larger polity ruled by a culturally distinct center.This was character-
istic of the great literate, agrarian empires that even today we count as our
cultural forebears. By virtue of size they inevitably incorporated heteroge-
neous peoples, ruling regions and locales whose languages or religions were
different from that of the imperial center. Here membership in the sover-
eign society or state is culturally different from membership in the locale
or region.The greater the center’s intrusion into the periphery—not only
requiring taxes, denying local sovereignty, and providing protection from
outsiders, but perhaps enforcing a religion, interfering with local jurispru-
dence, and so on—the more local members will have to distinguish spheres
within their own lives and identities that cannot reflect or obey their local
cultural norms. Furthermore, if legitimate political and religious authority are
monopolized by the center, as in the Fertile Crescent empires and Egypt,
for the first time distant peoples and events may surpass locale in norma-
tive or causal significance.There may in addition be polyethnic commer-
cial trading and learning centers, but this complexity affects a small per-
centage of the population.
In a greater departure from homogeneity, a civilization may diffuse across
half a continent, placing a layer of cultural unity across many linguistic
groups and sovereignties, occasionally becoming the basis for more or less
unified political action. In both the Western European and the Islamic cases,
religion played this role.The result was a more complex notion of group
identity, seen in the West in feudal society. In this orderly but decentralized
system, life and political authority remained local while language and hence
folk culture held over a region, and a symbolic cultural layer extended over
much of a continent. Levels of identification thereby multiply, even if the
local society remains primary, and can be mobilized under the right cir-
cumstances.The sovereign need share neither my local culture nor my lan-
guage; my homogeneous locale, along with far-flung cultural-linguistic-
religious cousins, may occupy a region ruled by a foreign monarch. Even
the local lord, while culturally and linguistically similar to myself, is sepa-
rated from me by a social hierarchy more salient than any cultural sharing.
At the same time, a profoundly important layer of culture—religion—may
enforce a far wider civilizational loyalty and identity. I bow to the distant
authority of miter as well as crown, and may fight and die for either, my
nonlocal identity playing the final trump to my local self. Of course, local
contests continue to trump that unitary identity in daily social life. In reac-
tion to transcendent, universalist religion, locale often exerts its home court
advantage in creating folk religion, a “pagan” or animistic version of the
script-based high culture managed by literate urban elites.At any rate, all of
these movements away from simple homogeneity entail the differentiation of
the conditions of membership, hence the de-fusion of spheres. Political, reli-
gious, linguistic, and social identity and membership can now differ, even if
each remains quite stable.
Notice that up to this point local diversity has still not been mentioned.
With the exception of the towns, where there may be commercial or ad-
ministrative contacts with visitors and immigrants from culturally diverse
provinces, the rural locales rarely deviate from the homogeneous condition.
There is still no possibility of doffing the local identity; it can be trumped, but
not discarded or rendered ineffective. In any case, it is only with country-
wide or rural immigration, or population shifts to the diverse cities, that
the sharing of the same local society by more than one “people” becomes
widespread. At this point even local culture and local society begin to
diverge; I may share social membership in the most diurnally relevant por-
tion of my life with people whose culture, in some sense, I do not share,
and thus my understanding of social membership must differentiate, distin-
guishing, for example, the forms of address due local fellow citizens as such
from those citizens who are of “my people.” Responses to immigration vary,
of course. However locales or states respond—with intermixing, assimila-
tion, tolerant mutual segregation, not-so-tolerant forced segregation, or
violence—unless the others are stamped out, membership and the relation
of society to culture have changed forever. Eventually we get, as Michael
Walzer explains, a variety of regimes of toleration: the millet system (local
religious-cultural autonomy under a dominant group’s imperial taxation
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and military protection), consociations (shared rule between two or three
communities with designated spheres of power), the liberal nation-state 
(a dominant yet tolerant cultural majority that guarantees civic rights for
all), or the immigrant society (where no people is officially dominant)
(Walzer 1997).
What then constitutes “a people”? We can now hazard that a people is
formed by a descent society  culture, a group that subsists in the homoge-
neous condition, in which social and cultural membership are indistinct,
and both acquired by descent or birth. But while this may be the ultimate
reference, it is not the proximal or everyday meaning of the term today.
For by those criteria, nobody I have ever met would have an ethnicity. So
by extension we must say that in today’s normal usage to claim “ethnicity”
is to claim descent from a group that is claimed to have at one time subsisted in
the homogeneous condition of society  culture. By today’s lights, anyone fitting
that criterion can rightly claim,“That is my people.” Note that such claims
can be false. No doubt all of us have ancestors who were members of such
homogeneous groups, but often in the distant past about which we know
virtually nothing.Those ancestors about whom we are likely to know any-
thing may well have lived in relatively modern societies that were no longer
homogeneous. It is this sense in which, as Benedict Anderson argues, nation
or ethnicity is “imagined.” But “imagined” here means selectively recon-
structed, not invented.The claimed homogeneous society  culture—for
example, the Scottish of my Scottish-American-ness—is likely an inaccu-
rately simple portrayal of a diverse network of Scottish ancestors who, in a
premodern and prenationalistic age, may have regarded each other as com-
peting clans and tribes with little in common. My ethnic reference does
indeed organize that past through a retrospective simplification and selec-
tion. But simplification is not falsification, for if it were, virtually all our
“knowledge” would be false.
Ethnicity can coincide with morphology, hence race or subracial char-
acteristics. Italian Americans and Irish Americans, like Korean Americans and
Japanese Americans, often look different, have distinctive ideals of beauty,
and so on.This is a contingent and historical matter. Peoples vary in their
degree of morphological distinctiveness and in their valuation of such, and
members may ignore such differences, or may distinguish among their fel-
lows those whose appearance calls to mind less-mixed ancestors, giving their
morphology a special status, for good or ill. For example, among many Latin
American families it is not unusual to find people of very different skin
tones. Still, Mexican-American writer Richard Rodriguez’s mother warned
him to avoid the sun, since he was already the brownest member of the
family, and she feared he looked too “Indian,” which for her was a marker
of lower class (Rodriguez 1982).The point is that ethnicity is both cultural
and bodily, the result of shared culture and shared society, hence endogamy.
That is what it means to be tied by descent to a culture.
Last, if referring one’s identity to an ethnicity is to have contemporary
significance for behavior, two conditions must hold. First, the claimed people
must continue to exist in some form, although not necessarily in the homo-
geneous condition. Ethnicity matters in the present if and only if there is a
community in some place that shares the ethnicity. Second, there must be
some kind of problematic social circumstances in which my ethnic mem-
bership is relevant. Ethnicity sinks in importance if the major social issues
of my life call out only my other, nonethnic identities and associations in
response.
The Function of Primordialism
What is it about ethnicity that seems to make it so seemingly powerful,
primitive, and troublesome to the modern consciousness? How is it that it
appears in the world as an evil temptation, a siren song from the depths, as
bloody romance? What is it about understanding myself passionately as,
say, a Serb, rather than a Croat, that seems more threatening than passion-
ately understanding myself as a member of the Cahoone family, or the
educated middle class, or the American Philosophical Association? What is
the unique quality, hence the potential intensity, of that attachment?
Edward Shils gave it a name. As we know, the attempt to distinguish
modern society from traditional forms of social organization was a pre-
occupation of the early giants of sociology. Each of the great thinkers took
his own dualistic terminological stab at the question: capitalism versus feu-
dalism for Karl Marx; Gemeinschaft (community) versus Gesellschaft (soci-
ety) for Ferdinand Tönnies; mechanical versus organic solidarity for Émile
Durkheim; status versus contract for Henry Sumner Maine; charismatic or
traditional versus legal and routinized forms of authority for Max Weber.
Shils makes the interesting claim that all these analyses of traditional soci-
ety conflate three distinct forms of connection: personal connection based
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in individual interaction and hence the relational characteristics and roles of
the persons involved (father, sister, coworker, friend, superior officer); sacred
connection that subsumes relations under central teleological symbols; and
last, primordial connection among persons through “objective” links of blood
and territory (Shils 1957). For Shils, ethnic or national bonds are primordial,
hence qualitatively and structurally distinct, not only from rational-legal or
civic ties, but also from sacred and personal ties. His controversial claim is
that they are unavoidable in any society, even modern civil society: the
human mind must find ultimacy “not only in the spiritual transcendental
sphere but in the primordial transcendental sphere as well.”The horrors of
fascism were not due to primordialism per se, but the sacralization of pri-
mordial ties under spiritual symbols.
Now, to call such primordial ties or qualities objective, natural, or absolute
has for the contemporary scholar of culture an anachronistic ring. But
these appellations are at least half-right. Natality, parentage, and locale are
indeed objective facts. That is, given a set of concepts, for example, the
definition of “sister” as female child of the same parents, one is or is not
somebody’s sister by public criteria. But only in some societies at some
times have those objective markers of descent and locale been the primary
means of group assignment, mobilized as important sources of social coher-
ence. Kin and locale were far more important in premodern societies. As
Robert Nisbet and Anthony Giddens separately argued, modernity is pred-
icated on the reduction of the significance of local/kin or “communal”
relations. Descent and soil can be objective yet at the same time socially
indecisive.
This aside, Shils’s account is insightful. It is reflected in mythology; since
the rise of urban, agrarian-literate civilization many cultures have tradi-
tionally accessed not one but two distinct sets of ultimate referents or nar-
ratives, one from above and one from below. The former is the Divine,
the otherworldly, the transcendent, the pure, the heavenly, the Ruler of the
Cosmic cycle, often living in the sky or on the mountaintop.The other is
chthonic, physical, dark, deep, reproductive, the Source, the earth itself or
what is beneath and behind the earth. Presumably this opposition emerged
once animism was largely replaced by transcendental notions of divinity,
notions that, in the great agrarian civilizations, came to hold over far-flung
peoples, leaving a gap in the legitimation of local and descent ties. Suffice
to say that the Highest and the Beneath, the Towards-Which and the Out-
of-Which are qualitatively distinct forms of ultimacy. Primordiality is the
feeling of the latter, transcendence the feeling of the former.What then are
the definitive features of the primordial form of ultimacy?
First and foremost, primordial bonds and identities concern personal and
social origins. They tie us together through the past.They link me to a his-
tory. My people may understand themselves in terms of a coming golden
age, the return of the Messiah, or the eventual attainment of secular utopia,
but the primordial bond is my descent from, origination from, the tradi-
tion that projects such a future.The future can never be primordial. Hence
primordial ties are necessitous; the past is that mode of time that cannot be
the subject of action. Although I can selectively reinterpret it, I cannot
change it.The future is unknowable, the present is yet to be comprehended.
The primordial repeats the only temporality we can understand, the past.
Second, primordiality characterizes my being, not primarily my doing or
making. Thus its acquisition and maintenance are effortless. Now, I do not
mean that the primordial is somehow “natural” and that other connections
are “constructed.” Heavy duties and efforts may attend any form of iden-
tity or membership, the culture of an ethnic group being no exception.
But those duties are consequences of identity; they do not make the identity.
I can fail at them; indeed, I can even be outcast and disowned. I cannot
achieve the identity or membership by the performance of the duties; rather,
I fulfill them as obligations attaching to me a priori. Primordial attachments
are unearned.
Third, what flows from the first two characteristics is, as Shils argued,
that a primordial bond is unelective and ascriptive, and is experienced as such.
It is not chosen. It makes demands and claims that cannot be ignored while
the identity it roots remains relevant. It holds for a person in virtue of the
person’s “nature,” what the person is regarded, by self and others, unchange-
ably as being. It is experienced as fixed.As noted, even in a modern liberal
society where I may cease to regard my ethnicity as significant or select one
of several descent ties for identification, I cannot choose to make a new eth-
nicity where descent ties do not exist.
Fourth, primordial attachments are bodily, hence erotic, in the broad sense
of that term, connoting not sex per se but bodily love. As noted, my ethnic-
ity may well be “written” into my bodily appearance by my parents’ genes,
then read and interpreted by culture.As such it can then double back and
play a role in my own sexual life, hence also for my progeny. It is not with-
out psychic significance that the only venues in life where most people
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experience intimate bodily care, experience another human being cherish-
ing their body, are in infancy and during sex.We cannot avoid noticing that
primordiality works through sex, through both sexual reproduction and through
the intimate familial world of bodily care, mediated by the marital relation.
It is hard to deny that primordial ties are the stuff of psychoanalysis.The
natal-maturational world attaches our deepest feelings to immediate fam-
ily, clan, the community in which the family lives, and the place these reside.
As noted, human personality is notoriously front-loaded; the events and
conditions of the first three or five or ten years are more salient and influen-
tial than any other period of three or five or ten years later in the life cycle.
Thus kin-local relations are the warp and woof of the primordial. Primor-
dial connections are thus eroticized just as the body, its appearance, family
relations, and other maturational circumstances are eroticized.
The unique function or significance of the primordial can now be seen.
Primordiality alone renders intelligible, and normatively vets, the contingencies of my
particular bodily existence. In religions with a transcendent Divinity, although
God has a plan, nothing about my religious life hangs on my having been
the child of these parents, in this place, at this time, with this color of skin,
with these genetic abilities and deficits, married to this spouse, with these
children.The monotheistic personal God knows and cares about all this, to
be sure. But the nature of the religious task in monotheism is to transcend
these particulars. In transcending them, in demoting their importance, I
recognize all other believers as my brothers and sisters, equal in the sight of
God. I leave my origin, clan, locale, and body behind. Christ brought not
only a new love, but a sword that might separate father and son, mother
and daughter. Islam, the acme of monotheism, found its primary enemy in
the clan-tribal network of Arabian society. Primordialism in contrast tells
me that I had to have been born to those parents, in that place, with this body,
within that community, speaking that language, because these constitute my
true nature. From this perspective the true me is the primordial me of ori-
gin.What is the distinctive quality of self-recognition and satisfaction that
contemporary people derive from researching family genealogy? The gene-
alogical satisfaction comes from making intelligible and normatively “right”
my bodily, genetic, historical origin and location, all those aspects of self
that are not the product of choice or achievement, whose salience is rec-
ognized by all (with the possible exception of doctrinaire liberals). Return-
ing to old models, ethnic or religious connections, the gender roles of our
grandparents, the foods and clothing and manners of the family, all grant
that feeling of “rightness.”This is not to say, of course, that such a return is
right. Even if philosophers today recognize many exceptions to G. E. Moore’s
attack on the “naturalistic fallacy” of deriving ought from is, modern citi-
zens in the forum of public discourse are perfectly well habituated to deny
that what is, what is “natural,” or what is bequeathed by the past is ipso facto
good or right. But primordiality lives on the naturalistic fallacy. It grants the nor-
mative status of the given.
“What Is She?”
None of the foregoing is a lament. I do not mean to urge the superiority
of the primordial, or of “thick” cultures, to thinned,modernized, and rational-
voluntary social forms.The point is simply that cultural thickness and pri-
mordiality remain facts, even if attenuated in the most developed societies,
and that these facts are not intrinsically immoral, ignorant, and threatening.
For as we shall later see, it is not at all clear that the Western way of mod-
ernization, whose dominant post–World War II form did indeed seek to
overcome the primordial, will be the form in which modernization is best
achieved by the developing world, or even by the postmodern West.
Nevertheless, clearly modern and postmodern society tend to efface the
conditions necessary for primordialism. In those areas and dimensions of
social life where it is correct to say that modernity is a world of “contract,”
not status, of individual initiative, liberty, and self-creation, not inheritance
or acceptance, of making and doing, not being, primordialism is blocked or
demoted. Likewise, ethnicity has a very tentative and convoluted meaning
in societies like the United States. On the one hand, just as modernity
inevitably reduces the identity- and affiliation-constituting power of clan
and local community, the rise of civic-nationalism as well as educational,
class, and career association tend to trump the meaning of ethno-linguistic
community. On the other hand, the lack of a thick national culture leaves
much room for ethno-racial identities magnified through intramural jockey-
ing for a political and economic place in the sun. Some Americans identify
with no other cultural grouping than “American,” others are “hyphenated”
by an old country-American combination, still others identify themselves
with a thick ethnicity while maintaining a permissibly thin civic commit-
ment, as we saw in Chapter 1.
But the situation is even more complex, and, as usual in the American
case, it is the racial end of the spectrum of identity that leads the way. David
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Hollinger has criticized our recent American habit of “racializing” ethnic-
ity, of regarding racial morphology as the key to group difference. He la-
ments the Irish-African-American writer Ishmael Reed’s inability to march
in St. Patrick’s Day parades without drawing quizzical stares (Hollinger
1995: 21). However, that inability is not the result of ethno-racial identity per
se but of one very particular historical artifact of a single interracial rela-
tionship, the American “one drop rule”—equally beloved of white racists and
black nationalists—according to which one drop of African blood makes a
person black. Retired basketball star Charles Barkley admits to pressuring
the multiethnic champion golfer Tiger Woods to identify himself primarily
as black, which Woods will not do, presumably out of respect for his mother’s
(hence his own) Thai heritage.“Ethnicity” sounds wimpy to racial nation-
alists—hence their opposition to viewing Afro-Americans as a mere ethnic
group—only because the fading importance of ethnic distinctions among
white or Euro-Americans has been drowned out by the history of white
racism. Unfortunately, the historical animosity of the United States’s two
oldest non-native peoples, Afro- and Euro-Americans, joined at the hip
like Siamese twins in a seemingly endless dance in which they cannot see
past each other, tends to warp any discussion of race and ethnicity in Amer-
ica.As Appiah warned, this conflict may be social—race being historically
taken as a marker of social groups in conflict—but it is hard to argue that
it is cultural, the “cultural” differences between white and black Americans
being, on a world-historical scale, very limited (Appiah 1997). Peoples come
in greater variety than black and white.
Which is not to gainsay the musing of Glenn Loury, who remarked to
himself after a speech to a racially and politically divided (and divisive) col-
lege audience,“Man, this race thing is deep” (Loury 1995).To take a sim-
ple, and not unpleasant example, a very good student of mine, an African-
American woman of Haitian descent, upon glimpsing a rather artsy photo
of my wife on my desk—black and white, with her sporting dark lipstick
and dark glasses—asked me enthusiastically,“Is that your wife? What is she?”
We both knew what she meant. She was excited by the possibility that one
of her white professors might have a nonwhite wife. For this cosmopoli-
tan, multicultural, sophisticated young woman, the morphology of descent
was the first criterion and marker of social identity. No doubt, once having
identified my wife racially, other identities would have become more salient
for her. Nevertheless, race was the first question on her mind, even if only
because of its function as a marker for ethnicity or origin.Thus, for good
as well as ill, I agree with Cornell West that “race matters” (West 1994). So
does ethnicity. But they matter only where and when they matter, being objec-
tive facts whose salience is the result of sociocultural selection and whose
meaning is a matter of constant negotiation. By the way, my wife is about
as white as white comes, being Dutch-American, an affiliation which might
seem fairly devoid of sociocultural importance in today’s United States.
Unless of course you happen to be speaking to a Belgian-American in my
wife’s native northeastern Wisconsin, where you would confuse those two
designations at your great peril.
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As I have argued elsewhere, modernity is in some important sense anticul-
tural (Cahoone 1988).This may sound absurd.The Enlightenment was cer-
tainly a cultural movement, initiating an explosion of literature, philosophy,
and scientific activity.The sheer volume of production of modern cultural
items—books, art, political discussion, and so on—dwarfs earlier cultural
production. My suggestion may also sound ideological, either a conserva-
tive plea for the reinvigoration of a Greco-Roman or Christian-Medieval
culture of unity, hierarchy, and transcendence, or a condescending implica-
tion that what modern Euro-Americans produce is objective truth while the
rest of the world is mired in mere cultural particularity, that our knowers
are culture-transcending scientists but their knowers are culture-relative
witch doctors. I am implying nothing of the kind; modernity is as in-
escapable as it is beneficial, and while modern Western science does achieve
a unique cognitive status, it remains a cultural product. My point is rather
that the development of modernity alters the nature and social role of cul-
ture per se.The modern West, believing it had discovered a new, suprasocial,
universal cognitive method, went on to discover unprecedented knowledge,
amass unheard-of power, and create a novel way of life built on the con-
stant transgression of tradition for the sake of progress.We may say it con-
structed a new kind of culture, and that is perfectly true. But its new kind
of culture undermined the role that culture had played since prehistory. I
will try to explain and justify this observation in the present chapter and
the next.
We must note that such an investigation loads a new definitional prob-
lem onto our shoulders. For no account of modernity can be adequate to
the phenomena.The novel civilization that became fully apparent in the
West in, let us say, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which, in
various forms and accompanied by various social cataclysms, has spread
around the world, is complex beyond description.The difficulty is not the
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inaccessibility of the relevant historical phenomena but the variety of these
phenomena and a surfeit of ways to interpret them. J.G.A. Pocock remarked
of the eighteenth century that there is no one Enlightenment, but many
Enlightenments discoverable in that most fecund of centuries, so while each
of us can legitimately plump for our favorite version, we must accept it as
one among many. My own favorite recipe for describing modernity would
begin with the boiling away of community in favor of the dyadic confronta-
tion of individual and state sovereignty (as in Giddens 1990 and Nisbet
1990), grate in the concept of spontaneous or emergent order (from Adam
Smith to Charles Darwin), and mix with a pot full of social and intellectual
differentiation, sometimes called rationalization, all cooked into a more or
less (Max) Weberian stew. Nevertheless, while this would be my best dish,
it is hardly the only item on the menu. Using an old mammalian metaphor,
if I believe the elephant’s most distinctive, forward-looking feature is her
trunk, I must nevertheless acknowledge the tail, side, foot, ear, and tusk to
which my fellow blind men and women persistently call attention. The
reason for the indeterminacy is the complexity and size of the animal, not
to mention that it’s still growing. But even if a complete taxonomy of the
beast is impossible, a fuller naming of its parts is nothing to sneeze at.
Where Did Modernity Come From?
We cannot avoid the philosophy of history; our modern self-consciousness
makes it inevitable.The modern world knows that it is unique in human
history and cannot refrain from comparing itself to its the past in order to
gauge its own uniqueness.That knowledge is part of what makes it unique.
This does not mean, of course, that we can accept a teleological or neces-
sitarian view of historical change. History is a contingent affair, and no one
knows where it could have gone, or where it is going now. But we do
know something about where it happens to have been.
Leaping to the biggest of big pictures, Ernest Gellner argued in his sweep-
ing Sword, Plough, and Book:The Structure of Human History that the human
sojourn can be divided into three great periods: the segmentary, the agro-
literate or stratified, and the modern industrial (Gellner 1988).These cate-
gories are by no means novel, although Gellner gives them a new twist.The
first era is characterized by small, preliterate, relatively egalitarian, hunting-
gathering groups, societies of, if you will, spears and eventually swords.The
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creator of spoken language and oral history, music, and often striking visual
art and ornamentation, this form of life accounts for the great majority of
the human sojourn, although we know least about it.The second refers to
large, hierarchical societies with a marked division of labor that evolved
from the invention of agriculture and writing sometime after 10,000 b.c.e.,
hence the societies of the plough and the book.The most extensive and
longest lasting of these constitute what we call civilizations. In these two
forms the majority of humans lived until very recently. Our current era, at
most a three-century-old infant, if brazen beyond its years, is characterized
by industrial production, centralized bureaucratic-legal organization, scientific
knowledge, and technological innovation. In it progress is institutionalized
through the constant outstripping of sociocultural integration—the inher-
ited or traditional modes of social organization—by the “spontaneous”
order of interlocking, functionally organized contexts of enterprise, that is,
the coordination of human activities through jobs based on outcome effi-
ciency and profit.
To accept this three-fold philosophy of history is to assert that there
have been two momentous shifts in the human form of life once it was
achieved, from segmentary to agroliterate and from the latter to industrial-
ism.The recent shift has been, and still is, happening before our eyes, mak-
ing it easy to examine, if inconclusively.The earlier shift is virtually lost to
prehistory, with the exception of remaining segmentary populations, whose
study is hampered by the methodological quandaries they provoke among
anthropologists. Nevertheless, this is not to imply that the “surpassed” phases
wholly cease to exist, either in their complete form in backwaters, or as
undigested premodern elements in advanced societies. The addition of a
new form of life usually spells the reorganization and reinterpretation of an
older form, not its elimination.As Freudians argue of the mind, in human
society as well the past lives on.
I take this account to be barely arguable. Certainly other economic and
social forms have existed among island and coastal peoples dependent on
the sea, cosmopolitan trading centers, themselves coexisting with and often
parasitic on Agraria, and pastoral peoples, many nomadic.The latter became
the dominant forces in a number of civilizations, most remarkably in central
and south Asia. But as Gellner shows in his Muslim Society, pastoral society in
some respects resembles segmentary society, and in most other cases where
one can speak of a nomadic civilization, we find a segmentary herding
people who, in conquering a sedentary agrarian population, settle down to
create a kind of hybrid with Agraria, as Ibn Khaldun famously recounted
in his Muqquhadima. Additionally, other questions can be raised about the
division and the precise delineation of the basic characteristics of each form.
But the deeper analysis is not, I think, a threat to the basic hypothesis. So let
us back up and follow developments more slowly.
Segmentary societies are primarily small and local, even if they involve
migration in pursuit of herds.Their religions are typically polytheistic and
animistic, and not soteriological. That is, segmentary individuals do not
need “saving,” for they can hardly fail to have their lives legitimated by the
social membership with which religious meaning is by definition inter-
twined. Gellner’s essay into the murky, ever-revisited concept of the “prim-
itive mentality” offers the helpful notion of “multistranded” thought and
activity. Segmentary culture is characterized by the nondifferentiation of
norms; each act is beholden to a multiplicity of value-constraints that the
actors do not differentiate. For example, a social utterance may simultane-
ously serve as a report, a reaffirmation of a personal tie, and the ritual re-
enactment of a social norm. Indeed, it is characteristic of early social life that
it is differentiation, not multistrandedness, that needs to be explained. For
Gellner this means that in segmentary societies the points of the cognitive-
ritual system that allow unaltered inputs from the “natural” or “factual”
world are highly limited. Some forms of disconfirmation could get through,
of course; otherwise you and I wouldn’t exist. But few do, or need to; social
cohesiveness is more important.While this issue will require a more com-
plete epistemological response in later chapters, basically Gellner is right.
As he remarks of the vast majority of human existence, “Language is not
merely rooted in ritual; it is a ritual. Grammar is the set of rules of a ritual
performance. . . . Most uses of speech are closer in principle to the raising
of one’s hat in greeting than to the mailing of an informative report” (Gell-
ner 1988: 51).
For us moderns, in contrast, the objective truth of an utterance is en-
tirely differentiated from its social role; we can value truth independently
of social fealty.The rationalization that Max Weber described as essential to
modernity depends on dividing up the social functions of an act or utter-
ance, so that only one kind of consideration is relevant to its validity at a
time. Only thereby can progress become continuous. Rationality thus re-
quires commensurability of acts or utterances, requires that those to be com-
pared serve the same goal or norm (such as truth as correspondence to
objects). To do this it must accept the incommensurability of distinctive
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types of utterance or act. Differentiation between types permits commensu-
rability within type. Hence the normative, custom-conforming function,
which exhibits the agent’s or speaker’s fealty, cannot be compared to truth-
functional speech acts.Again, we who make such distinctions think of them
as having been implicit in segmentary utterance, waiting for us to discover
them, but for the segmentary mind our distinction is an invention of dubi-
ous justification.As Gellner puts it, logical cohesion and social cohesion are
incompatible—the former requires differentiation, the latter multistrand-
edness. For multistrandedness is the primacy of the social. The price of (our)
logical cohesion is the separation of the referential function of acts and
utterances from their social function, which for a ritual society would rend
social cohesion.
The domestication of plants and animals ushered in a new period, but
only after thousands of years of experimentation and social evolution. It
seems likely that from their southwest Asian epicenter, the grain agricul-
turalists—later to be matched by maize growers in the Meso- and Andean-
America, and rice growers in the warm and wet areas from India around
through southern and coastal China—continually exhausted their soils,
becoming slow-moving agrarian nomads. Eventually the rich river valleys
of the Nile,Tigris-Euphrates, and Indus provided yearly silting that enriched
soil and permitted permanent settlement, stimulating the development of
cities around 5,000 to 3,000 b.c.e.
Urban agroliterate societies brought something new into the world: stor-
age.What we call civilization is the result of two great leaps in human stor-
age capacity, bringing liberation from the here and now and a vast expan-
sion of human constructive capacity, hence the creation of an increasingly
artificial environment. For the first time people are able to store cereals and
culture, dry grain for times of scarcity and information in writing. Each
entails a hierarchical society, for grain must be defended by a military elite
and codes must be interpreted by a literate elite.The restriction of swordplay
to the few (farmers having famously beaten their swords into ploughshares,
unlike those original citizen-soldiers, segmentary hunters) encouraged the
political division into a vast farming population ruled by warrior-aristocrats
(maintaining a sort of continuity with the segmentary war party and its,
now called, martial values), themselves flanked by the other elite, the liter-
ate authority of scribes, keepers of written records and sacred texts. In some
cases, as Marshall Hodgson put it, court and temple kept each other in check,
in others they merged (Hodgson 1974).We can also say that civilization is
based in cities, and, like Hodgson, speak of civilizations as “citied” cultures
(as long as we do not make the mistake of saying that culture and progress
are intrinsically urban, since it is more efficient rural food production that
allows the cities to develop in the first place). And certainly with cities
comes a third player, beyond court and temple: the market.There are no
cities without markets.
To this new age we can add a conception which Gellner, and sociologist
S. N. Eisenstadt, take from the German existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers.
Jaspers coined the term “Axial Period” for the remarkable global explosion
of philosophical-religious genius that occurred during the first millennium
b.c.e. (Jaspers 1953). Isaiah, Jeremiah, Zoroaster, the authors of the Upan-
ishads, the Buddha, Confucius, Lao-Tzu, and the Hellenic Greek philoso-
phers all lived within three centuries of the millennium’s “axis” of 500
b.c.e. In southwest Asia, this brought the flowering of monotheism, whose
most successful forms, Christianity and Islam, would later announce their
revivals of the prophetic message, thereby eventually conquering between
them most of the agrarian world outside the South-to-East Asian crescent
of India-Indochina-China-Japan. In the Axial Age the implicit possibilities
of a transcendental conception of God—which already existed in Judaism—
were fully exploited. Something new enters the religious world: the need for
salvation. Agrarian religion evolved the novel method of calling the indi-
vidual conscience to confess its fealty to the Ideal.The soteriological nature
of agroliterate religion presumes the possibility of being a social member
yet having one’s religious bona fides in question. In the religions of older
animistic hunter-gatherer groups one could hardly be a social member and
not be a faithful religious participant. Once the religious task has changed
from performance of ritual to belief in doctrine and obedience to author-
ity, religion becomes something to which social members can be recalled
by the prophets and periodic revivals.
Agraria thus encourages a Platonic model of social reasoning, in which
the validation of particulars entails their participation in, or conformity to,
ideal norms or patterns. Social structure is divinely sanctioned, and divinity
is omnivalent, that is, logically prior to any distinction between the true, the
good, and the beautiful. God is an inherently multistranded concept, hence
too is God’s society. Here truth is indeed distinguished from political right-
ness, but then rationally reintegrated in the Divine. Literate metanarratives
become essential to hierarchic, stratified societies.They make society bind-
ing on all human activities by inscribing it on the cosmos, forming what
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Gaston Bachelard described as the anthropocosmic order (Bachelard 1964).
Note that stratified society is not more integrated or unified than segmen-
tary society. It is differently integrated, or as one might say, it is integrated,
whereas segmentary society is predifferentiated. God, the Cosmos, and the
hierarchical society replaces the yet undifferentiated whole of segmentary
society with a differentiated whole.
To this account we can add our concern for the changing relation of
social and cultural spheres.Among segmentary times and groups, society is
culture and culture is society.We cannot distinguish social and cultural phe-
nomena, or religious and political phenomena.The reason is not merely the
great likelihood of local homogeneity. Social life is the way, the one and only
way, the universe of activities and icons, which are not yet differentiated
into the economic, social, or religious zones.The sacred/profane distinc-
tion, so important for Mircea Eliade, cuts across all activities and artifacts; it
does not contrast what we would call religion from secular life, but rather
the most impressive, symbolically rich, cognitively laden, and affectively
complex zones of a unified social-religious life from their more mundane
dimensions (Eliade 1954). So it would be perfectly apt to say that in seg-
mentary life culture is everything, for in such a time society is everything,
and culture is society. It is only in agroliterate or stratified societies, made
inevitably more complex by their size, incorporation of distinct peoples,
administrative complexity, and later their cosmopolitan trading and gov-
erning centers, that culture begins to be differentiated from society. High
culture based in writing, and reproduced by a literate elite, becomes for the
first time distinct from illiterate folk culture. High culture is led, of course,
by religion, as the site of metaphysical representation, the ultimate seat of
social norms, and the repository of education (that is, reading).The socio-
political and religious statuses of the individual are now dis-identified, even
if the symbolic code and political authority reintegrate them.Likewise, bring-
ing diverse cultures under one imperial state-roof means that state or social
membership can no longer be identified with cultural membership. It is
against this backdrop that modernity evolved.The new world of commerce,
science, republican politics, a growing wedge of secular culture, and the
manifold traits of the modern industrial society did not obliterate, but over-
laid and submerged, in some places only very thinly, the agrarian.
One last point, important as it is simple, needs to be kept in mind about
this “Western” civilization that was the first to modernize. It is seriously
misleading to refer to Ancient Greece and Rome, the Hebrew tradition,
the history of Christianity, and the modernity that began with the Renais-
sance and culminated in the capitalist-scientific supremacy of north-central
and especially Anglo-Saxon Europe all as the story of a triumphant “West.”
Ancient Greece, Rome, and early Judaism are not parts of Western civiliza-
tion.The first two belong to classical civilization, a series of eastern Medi-
terranean empires and cultures that ended with the fall of Rome, itself
issuing in three different civilizations:Western, Orthodox, and Islamic. For
its part the Hebrew tradition lived a complex life amongst the peoples of
the Levant for the two millennia preceding Christ. Nothing is surprising in
this.As Carroll Quigley argues, what we call Western civilization is a prod-
uct of feudal times, historically centered in North Central and Northwest
Europe, and defined by Western or Roman Christendom (Quigley 1979).
It follows the destruction of Greco-Roman civilization by three centuries,
dating from Charlemagne’s centralization of authority in the eighth cen-
tury c.e., flourishes in the High Middle Ages, then undergoes a series of
remarkable changes that create modernity. Even within this narrative we
cannot speak of any kind of progressive Western civilization, any scientific
or technical superiority, until the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the
scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. That we
can indeed trace characteristics of this modern civilization back to Rome,
Athens, and Jerusalem does not make them all one civilization. Civiliza-
tions rise, fall, mix, borrow, and otherwise influence each other.That China
and Japan have been heavily influenced by an Indian-born Buddhism does
not mean that they are part of Hindu civilization, or that Hindu civiliza-
tion is in any way East Asian.The point is that we ought to stop using that
convenient four-letter word,“West,” to weave a fantastic continuum, a tri-
umphant four-millennium march from Abraham to Aristotle to Aquinas to
Adorno.There is not and never has been such a civilization.
What Gets Colonized?
The most systematic of recent philosophical accounts of modernity and
the contemporary world remains Jürgen Habermas’s monumental Theory
of Communicative Action, published in German in 1981.This work has been
often criticized but never matched; no one else has provided a comparably
interdisciplinary, social and philosophical vision of the dynamics of the
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modern world, along with a diagnosis of the problems, and promise, of our
current condition.After two decades, while the debate over modernity and
postmodernity has generated much heat and some light, his account remains
the classic of its genre. It can serve to focus our discussion, while we high-
light one of its largely neglected themes.
Habermas’s account of contemporary society was rooted in three key
notions: the distinction of strategic or instrumental versus “communica-
tive” action, the corresponding distinction of system and lifeworld, and the
colonization of the latter by the former.The system is the “systematically
stabilized actions of a socially integrated group” coordinated by action con-
sequences or, in the modern world, the interlocking network of money-
and-power, capitalism and government bureaucracy. The lifeworld is the
realm of interaction among social actors coordinated by inherently norma-
tive communication among the actors themselves, institutionally embodied
in liberal democracy. For Habermas, modernity hangs on the release of the
system and the lifeworld from traditional cultures, each freed to pursue its
own “logic.” Modernity is rightly characterized by Habermas, in a Weber-
ian vein, as a differentiation of law, economics, and politics from tradition
and from each other.
This allows him to reinterpret the functionalization thesis of Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, who had argued that modern instrumental
rationalization undermined the possibility of reasoning about ends or values.
Habermas agrees that in late modernity the system of market and state
expands its power to the point of taking over social spheres that had been
in earlier phases of modernity coordinated by the lifeworld of communica-
tive action.“When stripped of their ideological veils,” he writes,“the imper-
atives of autonomous subsystems make their way into the lifeworld from
the outside—like colonial masters coming into a tribal society—and force a
process of assimilation upon it” (Habermas 1987: 355). But, he argues against
Adorno and Horkheimer, modern rationality is not all functional.There is
as well the communicative rationality of the lifeworld, the reason-giving of
agents who must implicitly respect the freedom and equality of each in dis-
course aimed at achieving agreement on any given issue.This is the source
both of the scientific method and of liberal democracy.There is in commu-
nicative action a “moment of unconditionality,” of normatively governed
freedom, uncorrupted by strategic purposes (Habermas 1987: 399). In his
later work Habermas derived an ethics from such discourse (Habermas 1990).
The political project, then, is to reverse the oppressive “colonization” of
face-to-face, communicatively rational human dialogue by the functional
system of money-and-power.
Along with this goes a related development, which Habermas had
explored in an earlier book: the rise and fall of the modern public sphere
(Habermas 1989). In the Middle Ages there was no public sphere of polit-
ical discussion to which citizens per se were invited, all land being owned
by the aristocracy and king. Habermas recounts the early modern devel-
opment of free towns, the movement of population to cities, increasing
commercialization, and above all the spread of literacy and the rise of news-
papers. But the colonization of the lifeworld in late modernity is at the
same time a colonization of the public sphere. Commentators have peri-
odically charted a decline of the public sphere in America for decades:
Hanna Arendt in the 1950s, Richard Sennett in the early 1970s, Christo-
pher Lasch in the late 1970s and 1980s, and Robert Putnam in the 1990s
(Arendt 1958; Sennett 1974; Lasch 1979; Putnam 1995).They have lamented
the decline of civility among strangers, participation in public organizations,
the condition of public spaces, and increasing cynicism regarding politics
itself. At the same time, our public spaces seem to be flooded with what
Lasch called narcissism, and Jean Bethke Elshtain has recently labeled the
politics of displacement, the displacing of private energies onto the public
realm, the emotional catharsis of Jerry Springer and the reported sex lives
of public figures (Lasch 1979; Elshtain 1995). In the language of Herbert
Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man, this is a “repressive desublimation,” a
release of passion and intimacy that serves political repression, or in Haber-
mas’s sense, the continued undermining of critical public discourse. Para-
dox remains, however, in that on the one hand we seem overwhelmed by
distant bureaucratic and corporate power that continually invades the pri-
vate sphere, and on the other our public discourse and media culture
seems saturated with personal, even intimate, coloration.We will return to
this conundrum.
As others have noted, Habermas’s concept is not entirely original (Cohen
and Arato 1997). In The Great Transformation:The Political and Economic Ori-
gins of Our Time (1944) Karl Polanyi had sketched the fitful birth of the
market economy. The heyday of laissez-faire capitalism from 1832 to the
early 1930s required that all the factors of economic life be managed by a
self-regulating market, hence the fiction of a “market society,” the triumph
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of economics over sociology. But even its champions eventually became
disabused of this fiction, recognizing that certain key “materials”—labor,
land, and currency—could not be entirely subject to market forces, hence
that capitalism had to limit itself to save itself. Unfortunately, it was fascism
and bolshevism that in the 1930s attempted to return economics to its tra-
ditional position of subservience to society (as Peter Drucker argued in his
1939 The Fall of Economic Man, one of the first analyses of totalitarianism).
To avoid those catastrophic systems, Polanyi argued, what liberal society
requires is a return to the primacy of society, albeit one that holds onto the
core of liberty and efficiency the market economy provides. Polanyi
described the social strains created by the market as “shifting” among var-
ious “institutional zones,” accumulating in one “comparatively indepen-
dent” sphere or another. He analogized the condition of workers with that
of colonized peoples (Polanyi 1957: 158). But unlike Habermas he claimed
it is culture that bears the brunt of the distress. “A social calamity,” Polanyi
wrote, “is primarily a cultural, not an economic phenomenon. . . . Not
economic exploitation, as often assumed, but the disintegration of the cul-
tural environment of the victim is then the cause of the degradation”
(Polanyi 1957: 157).The uncontrolled market created a “cultural vacuum.”
How does Habermas treat culture? Ambivalently, we must say. For while
he accepts culture in principle as a mainstay of free society, as long as it is a
culture of open communication and not oppressive tradition, the structure of
his theory betrays a common liberal fear of culture as a conservative force.
We can see this in his classic text on modernity. Habermas claims that
modernity entails a “linguistification of the sacred,” a transformation of
norms that in premodern society received their power from divinity and
ancestral authority into articulable, discursive social rules. From the distinc-
tion of the modes of utterance—truth-governed assertions, performatives
normed by “rightness,” and exhibitions normed by sincerity or authentic-
ity—Habermas derives three functions of utterances in communicative
action: reaching understanding, coordinating action, and socializing actors.
These yield in turn the three related processes of cultural reproduction,
social integration, and socialization, respectively, all to be coordinated by
communication oriented to achieving mutual understanding.Thus culture
is one of three zones in which communicative action operates, the one
specifically tied to truth-governed assertion, hence reaching understand-
ing, as in the “transmission of culturally stored knowledge” (Habermas 1987:
63).At the same time he describes the lifeworld as the “stock of knowledge,”
the repertoire of cultural-linguistic interpretive patterns which serves as the
logically prior background for the subjective, objective, and social worlds.
In a diagram depicting the special status of the lifeworld with respect to
these three worlds, culture is made, with language, the medium of the life-
world, and thus “constitutive for mutual understanding as such” (Habermas
1987: 126). In short, Habermas virtually identifies culture with the lifeworld;
rather than one sphere within the lifeworld, culture is the realm of meaning
from which participants supply themselves for the sake of all understanding.
He even admits, sounding a bit like his philosophical rival, the hermeneu-
tic thinker Hans-Georg Gadamer, that speakers and hearers cannot “dis-
tance” themselves from this cultural stock. So roughly speaking, culture is
the cognitive reservoir that funds society’s regulation of behavior. In this
vein Habermas does indeed recognize an “impoverishment of culture” in
late modernity (Habermas 1987: 327).
But having made culture the very basis of the lifeworld and communica-
tive rationality, Habermas proceeds to restrict its role. He criticizes what he
calls the “culturalistic” concept of the lifeworld, which he associates with
American sociologist Peter Berger, for ignoring the solidaristic function of
discourse. Culture’s validity is dependent on, and rightfully criticized by,
rationality and knowledge; its reproduction must be “evaluated according
to standards of the rationality of knowledge” (Habermas 1987: 141).Appar-
ently contradicting his own denial of our ability to distance ourselves from
culture, he insists that in the modern era of communicative action “culture
no longer remains at the backs of communicative actors; it sheds the mode
of background certainty and assumes the shape of knowledge that is in
principle criticizable” (Habermas 1987: 220). But where is this knowledge
to come from that could criticize the storehouse of knowledge (that is to
say, culture)? How do we acquire the ability to distance ourselves from,
what he earlier identified with the lifeworld itself?
The point is that there are two conflicting concepts of culture in Haber-
mas’s theory.Where he thinks of culture as the stock of interpretive pat-
terns that social actors carry into interaction, he in effect merges culture
with the lifeworld, according it a correspondingly central place. Here all
critique must operate within and through culture’s resources. But where
Habermas recognizes that such resources are predominantly inherited, his
progressive-liberal instincts lead to him to fear culture as an obstacle to
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freedom. He then shrinks culture to an object of or component of the life-
world so that knowledge and political discourse can act independently of
it and criticize it.This vacillation on culture is symptomatic of a problem
that plagues his entire theory.
Habermas’s thesis that modernity released various social spheres to pur-
sue their own “logics” is, I think, quite right. But, as others have criticized,
the lifeworld-system distinction is problematic. First, it is too rigid. In his
hands it simply recapitulates the old Kantian dualism of freedom and nature
(Cahoone 1989). Certainly the lifeworld is interwoven with practical con-
sequences, and the system includes moments of communicative action.
While it is true, as I have argued, that culture concerns ends and cannot be
fully instrumentalized without ceasing to be culture, we cannot separate
out social zones, regions of social life, according to whether they are instru-
mental or not.The distinction is more subtle and complex, as we shall see.
Second, it is too simple.Whereas Habermas calls attention to the two media
of money and power, it would make more sense to refer to four media:
money, power, law, and signs. Government as administration is part of the
system. Law and power—meaning political power—are each bivalent: there
is systematized law and unsystematized (or “lifeworlded”) law, systematized
political power and unsystematized power. For law and political power
exist within civil society, below the level of the system, as well as within
the system. Some of the inputs from civil politics arise to affect the system.
This is something Habermas notes but fails to emphasize. In the contem-
porary system, law and the signs manipulated by what we can call the mass
mediaculture are as much a medium of functionalization as money and
power.
One way of putting this is that there are several distinct forms of internal
“colonialism” that need to be differentiated. I will mention three: the col-
onization of local economic life, the replacement of local culture and civic
life by mass mediaculture, and the sheer obsolescence of culture.
Regional,“national,” and global corporations buy up and supplant local
business. If this is a form of “colonization” in Habermas’s sense—and I
think we must say that it is—then independent local businesses must not
be part of “the system” that is doing the colonizing.The system, then, is
that realm of activities, properties, and their effects that are tightly bound
up in the “logic” of the highly centralized, national, and increasingly, inter-
national market. What Habermas calls the “system” cannot simply mean
business and government; it must mean big, distant, bureaucratic, powerful
business and government (and as I have added, big law and big media).
What remains unsystematized are largely local regions of economy, social
relations, and culture, into which the tendrils of the system have as yet lim-
ited reach. IBM and CBS are part of the system, but the local bodega and
repair shop, where neighbors swap stories while engaging in low-yield
instrumental activity, are not.The greater the money, power, or audience at
stake, the more systematic, the more integrated into the system, any social
phenomenon must be.
This distinction can help to address the seeming paradox, presented
above, of a simultaneous decline in the public sphere through a flight to
privacy and a decline in privacy caused by public encroachment. It is true
that in contemporary American life we witness the triumph of the public
over the private. But what triumphs is not public life in general, it is a par-
ticular public, the distant public, primarily the electronically mediatized
public sphere, while local publics are devalued. In the last century the local
public realm has for many Americans been replaced by a public of strangers.
The operative public realm today is that realm contiguous with the state
and the major electronic media and entertainment outlets.This nonlocal
public soaks up more and more of social, cultural, and psychological life;
distantly regulated or initiated market and state activities penetrate and
replace local, family, and interpersonal life to an unprecedented degree,
making some of the most important of life’s skills the management of rela-
tions to those bureaucracies, while the mediaculture increasingly values
distant public life and achievement, hence fame, as the primary form of
social recognition. But even the triumphant nonlocal public paradoxically
loses part of its distinctiveness from privacy. For in its ubiquity, now without
a mediating local public sphere, the distant or national public is flooded by
energies earlier restricted to privacy or to the local, familiar public. Of
course, for many Americans the local public remains crucial. But we are
speaking here of tendencies, of the direction of change. For more and more,
the local means less and less.And since it is inevitable that for the majority
of Americans, and for an increasing number as we go down the economic
scale, their primary “empowerment zone” of interest, expertise, and likely
political action is in fact local, this shift has a profound antipopulist effect:
the ceding of more political clout to the upper classes and to the professional
politicians—not only electoral candidates, but bureaucratic officials, non-
governmental experts, and the journalists that manage their interaction.
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But it is the effect on culture that is our main concern. Here we face a
basic distinction. On the one hand, the systemic “mediatization” of culture
is the mediaculture.This is in effect the creation of a new market, which
Adorno and Horkheimer called “the culture industry,” a collaboration of
capitalism and culture that follows its own rules as a market subsystem. On
the other hand, what remains of culture outside the media, shared across
the locales that constitute America, is not colonized or shrinking; rather, it
is increasingly rendered obsolescent. In late modern or postmodern America
we witness the progressive displacement of non-media-culture from an
influential role in social life.This is to say that experience, the social regu-
lation of behavior, and the sense and significance of human life cease to be
guided by a teleologically thick layer of society’s hermeneutic horizon, an
inherited, shared public repertoire of interpretive processes rooted in socially
projected ends, and especially any symbolic reference to icons, rituals, and
metanarratives. To some extent these decay, but to a greater extent they
simply become irrelevant, in Wittgenstein’s figure, a wheel that plays no
role in the mechanism.We will trace the forms of this obsolescence in the
next chapter.
The obsolescence of culture can indeed impact political discourse. Cul-
tural obsolescence deprives political discourse of a teleologically laden
medium, a set of culturally shared figures, standards, or narratives for social
decision making. Even the “default” values of life, health, physical beauty,
and sensual pleasure, which are always compelling regardless of the lack of
more symbolic cultural agreement, must be deliberated and adjudicated
according to some shared notion of equality, fairness, rights, justice, and so
on.As Michael Walzer has argued, every scheme of distributive justice must
presuppose shared notions of the meaning and value of the things that are to
be distributed (Walzer 1983). How are such issues to be discussed, weighed,
or measured, how are their patterns of distribution to be considered, how
are they to be connected to fairness, survival, community, happiness, and
tracked across different spheres of life without the employment of shared,
moderately thick patterns of interpretation? As MacIntyre argued, such
discussion becomes a sheer tallying of preferences in which discourse among
opposing-preference groups has no convincing power (MacIntyre 1981).
Without a shared, substantive cultural vocabulary, political actors may be free
to speak, but have less to say and even less to agree on.This need not—
indeed, in a free and pluralistic society it cannot—imply a short list of ulti-
mate values to which all members must sign on. It implies rather that there
must be an overlapping, thick-but-vague cultural consensus, as described in
Chapter 1, implicating at least some substantive, more-than-default values
shared by most social members.
Thus, among its other roles, I am suggesting that culture is the stage-setting
for political discourse.Without it, we are condemned to communicate without
the ability to presuppose end-signifying motifs, concepts, and values in com-
mon. Political discussants without overlapping cultural inheritances are
reduced to only the most rudimentary considerations, like default values, and
even regarding them citizens will be unable to resolve conflicts except by the
most rudimentary means. Certainly with Habermas I hope for a reinvig-
orated discursive citizenship, but without a shared culture those public-
spirited citizens will not have anything to say to one another. Even if we
accept the whole machinery of Habermas’s discourse ethics, with the later
emendations of his epigones, can respect for the other be maintained, even
conceived, without respect for what the other values or stands for? Haber-
mas continues the error of egalitarian liberals who regard the democratic
association of citizens in the present, the political forum and its presumed
instrument, the state, as an adequate answer to the problems of a market-
driven society. But I believe a third thing is required, beyond the market and
the forum, namely culture, the inheritance of meaning-patterns that inform
the forum. It is the colonization of culture, not the forum, that undermines
the meaningful discourse among citizens. For solidarity presupposes culture.
Modernizing Culture
Among the various distinctions modernity enjoys, and suffers, is that it is
the first civilization to make culture a problem. In perhaps its most famous
strain, the eighteenth-century Enlightenment involved a self-conscious
break with the past on the part of educated, political, and commercial
elites, in which a putatively universal, impartial mode of validating human
judgments in terms of Reason, Experience, and Nature (REN for short)
replaced the prior standards that, from the perspective of the new mode,
appeared dependent on Culture,Authority, and Society (or CAS). Reason
is to operate on the data of Experience in order to ascertain the truth of
Nature, or the natures of things.All three of these norms for cognition and
practice are suprasocial and supracultural. REN aims to supplant what it
now finds to be the merely traditional trappings of an unself-conscious soci-
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ety.While “cultural” in the sense of being a cultural development expressed
in artifacts and historical metanarrative, it is nevertheless largely anticultural.
For whatever else we may say about culture, it certainly has something to
do with generationally transmitted interpretive networks, hence traditions
(the Latin traditum meaning simply what is handed down), which operate
with the force of authority to bind society together through compulsory
norms from the past. Culture is, among other things, the storehouse where
all the impediments to progress, all the customs and superstitions to be
undercut by Reason, all the hoary forms of authority to be replaced by
democracy, all the collective beliefs to be weighed in the scales held by lib-
erated individual experience, are kept.The new, modern culture is a culture
of individualism, where persons are both granted a degree of liberty from
inherited custom and encouraged to “question authority” and create nov-
elty, and progressivism, where for the first time in human history the past is
officially denied its normativity and the future is supposed to diverge from
it. Modern culture then presents us with an antitraditional tradition, a genera-
tionally transmitted message not to conform to generationally transmitted
messages, an authoritative command to question authority, a collective
commitment to the individual’s right to violate collective commitments, a
call from the (recent) past to ignore the past.
Let us explore this a bit more carefully. REN is asserted to be the new
method and norm of judgment. Universal Reason, understood as a capacity
that, while inculcated by particular cultures, rejects their authority; Experi-
ence, understood as a field of evidence that was always before our eyes but
heretofore unseen because we saw as through a cultural glass, prejudicially;
and Nature, the great object of our experience and reason, whose lawfulness
provides the order we seek to know—these are understood to be indepen-
dent of religion, society, and authority, even if they now will provide the
validity of the latter. God may well stand behind them all, but the only pub-
lic access to Him is through REN. REN must dislodge social, cultural, tra-
ditional forms of authority and belief. It is not an ideal on a par with the
monotheistic God of Agraria, because REN is first of all a method, not a
content, understood as progressive and fully differentiated from social, sal-
vific, practical, and aesthetic norms. Skirmishes over Darwinism in Ameri-
can public schools aside, our commitment to REN is unshaken by conflicts
with religion and authority.
But at the same time, in another of its strains, the Enlightenment invented
the notion that each “people,” understood as a homogeneous, territorial,
endogamous group, characterized by some fundamental weltanschauung or
virtue or capacity, ought to be equally free to express its portion of the
divinely created Whole. Originally voiced by Herder and eventually moti-
vating Romanticism, this notion became dominant in, of all places, our
politics, creating nationalism. If the Enlightenment was the first century to
claim to have transcended culture, it is also the first age to define culture.
Romanticism and nationalism then became the carriers of a countertradi-
tion which is inevitably the obverse of orthodoxy. In its pure form nation-
alism claims that for each culture there must be a state, and for each state, a
culture.This promoted egalitarianism and democracy, as I claimed earlier.
Nationalism entails the three-way convergence of state sovereignty, social order, and
high culture. As Gellner argues, modern industrial society evolved within
states that declared the official status of one language, literature, history, or
culture, thereby providing a “context-free” communications sphere across
which freed labor, capital, and cognition could move.
But along with this, culture is made not only political but philosophical.
The idea that deep presuppositions, worldviews, and cognitive habits, shared
regardless of class by peoples, the notion that thought is social, historical,
and particular is a modern view which in effect semiotizes or cognitivizes
ethnicity, construes what it means to be “a people” through a socialized cog-
nition.The more well-known Enlightenment of Reason may have intel-
lectualized morality, made human reason the judge of norms, but it also, in
this second strain, achieved a becoming-philosophical of social membership.To
this day contemporary relativists and social constructivists regard culture as
that-to-which knowledge is relative. This is a high compliment that the
ancients and medievals would never have granted folk or popular culture.
It remains relativism’s strongest suit. Even epistemic realists, denying that
culture goes “all the way down,” nevertheless grant that culture is that deep
structure of human belief whose determinative meaning must be undercut.
In each case social membership is intellectualized.
At the same time, as Habermas argued, particular spheres of social life
were granted charters to independence from culture, hence tradition. But
surely this release of spheres cannot have been a simple jailbreak. Culture
had to vet those incipient spheres as at least partially fulfilling its own norms.
Culture must have agreed to its own dismemberment, granting at least limited
permission for growth to science, markets, politics, law, and eventually art
and mass culture, to pursue their logics.The spheres were ambivalently, never
utterly, freed. But with their limited charters they nevertheless reconstructed
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each other and the cultural background from which they ever more con-
fidently distinguished themselves.The payoff came readily: modern society
achieved unheard-of levels of prosperity and power. Culture was not merely
circumvented; it did not remain an authoritarian traditionalism somehow
attached to exploding functional spheres. It cycled between accommodation-
incorporation of the progressive spheres and an ostrich-like refusal to rec-
ognize reality, alternately cutting deals and digging in heels. But by the
time everyone realized that what they thought was their culture was no
longer, the benefits had become too great to give up.And they remain so.
The point is that culture was destined by Western modernity for a per-
manently ambiguous status. The rationality and differentiation that the
released spheres of activity achieved became a part of culture generally,
although never absolutely. A dialectical relation of mutual support and
opposition was set up between each emerging, quasi-independent sphere
and the background culture which is now a culture-that-permits-and-vets
quasi-independent spheres.The spheres then do the driving. Culture doesn’t
drive. It never learned to drive because it never had to go anywhere before.
In its history, it has mostly sat still, sometimes walked, in a crisis rode a
horse or camel, but the speed of rail, liner, and the individualized transport
of the horseless carriage was beyond its powers of adaptation.
Once ambiguously released, however, the scientific or cognitive, eco-
nomic or productive, political-civil spheres, by expanding and rationalizing
themselves, push society and culture forward.This reinforces both the sense
in which they are, and are not, a part of culture; are not because they
repeatedly violate cultural norms, yet are because they constitute so much
of our way of life. Later, in postmodern society, culture becomes paradox-
ical in a new way. For, as should be evident, in so far as culture provides the
context of teleological intelligibility in which social spheres are demarcated
it can never become a sphere, a particular social context among others.That
would violate its logic. But as we shall see, in the twentieth century to the
extent that mass mediaculture becomes most of what members imbibe as
their culture, culture then does become a sphere, indeed a commercial sphere,
within social life, thus a part of the whole it is supposed to condition.
Let us hope that the passage of time has shown that the controversial term
“postmodern” means neither everything nor nothing, that it has settled
down to the normal, imprecise, contested linguistic life of meaning some-
thing. That contemporary society is postmodern is arguably true, but only
if we accept that the postmodern is merely the advanced course in moder-
nity, not its end. The break or discontinuity it claims obtains within the
modern, sociologically and cognitively defined. For it is implausible to
claim that the recent (“late” or “post” modern) world represents a break
from the nineteenth through mid-twentieth centuries comparable to the
break between, say, the eighteenth century and the Middle Ages. Recent
decades have not overturned the most novel features of the modernity that
was born in the Enlightenment, became a strapping youth in the second
half of the nineteenth century, and whose adult personality, if not future
antics, were clearly discernible by the early twentieth.Whatever one’s favorite
account of the modern period, no one can deny that it introduced the sci-
ence, technology, capitalism, industrialism, social egalitarianism, and cultural
pluralism that remain daily lessons. Nothing more recent can match that
break with earlier social history, not the eclipse of metanarrative, Newtonian
physics, or European imperialism, not the rise of electronic media culture,
quantum mechanics, or the knowledge-and-service based economy. Once
we accept its location within modernity,“postmodern” can nicely indicate
the recent deinstitutionalization or decontextualization of key elements of
modernity, whereby more traditional features of early modern society, them-
selves holdovers from the agrarian world, which had balanced or harmo-
nized the modern elements, have been undermined. It is then a plausibly
decent name for the recent acceptance of the increasingly complex and
troublesome nature of the modern, for a permanently problematic moder-
nity, a postutopian worry that we all now imbibe as if with our postmodern
mothers’ milk. So “postmodern” will do, at least until something better, or
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just newer, comes along. Our current job, at any rate, is to identify some of
the characteristics of this postmodern world and its relation to culture.
The Not-so-New Class
We have mostly been concerned with the structural changes of modernity.
But if the postmodern brings a novel form of life, there is still a class which,
if not the creator or producer of cultural change, is nevertheless its most
important carrier. Just as the bourgeoisie and its attendant classes arguably
brought us the modern world, the postmodern is carried by the New Class.
It is admittedly not so new.Woodrow Wilson warned against handing the
country over to “experts,” James Burnham’s 1941 book The Managerial
Revolution recognized the increasing prominence of the layer of managers,
lawyers, and information professionals, and Milovan Djilas’s The New Class
argued that Stalinist-era socialism had spawned a new bureaucratic manage-
ment with its own class interests.Then came the “postindustrial” knowledge-
economy diagnosed independently by Alain Touraine and Daniel Bell, and
adopted into postmodern theory by Jean François Lyotard. If anything, the
New Class has grown in importance in the last decade, swelled by the
computer and telecommunications revolutions.Two recent discussions are
the late Christopher Lasch’s Revolt of the Elites and David Brooks’s delight-
ful Bobos in Paradise:The New Upper Class and How They Got There.
A particularly useful investigation is Alvin Gouldner’s largely neglected
The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class. Gouldner identified
the Western version of the New Class as the highly educated possessors of
“cultural capital,” including college faculty, engineers, managers, account-
ants, government officials, attorneys, media personnel, and human service
and medical professionals. He divides them into humanist intellectuals and
technical intelligentsia.Together they form the “cultural bourgeoisie.”They
are most importantly marked by a linguistic practice, the Culture of Critical
Discourse (CCD).This “grammar of discourse” is characterized by a con-
cern to justify assertions in terms of truth or rightness in order to obtain
the “voluntary consent” of addressees without invocation of authority.The
New Class’s ideology is an ideology about discourse, about how beliefs and
language are to be treated and handled, accompanied by the conviction
that social action is rightly steered by such discourse. CCD conceives “pure”
speech to be status- and situation-independent, reflexive and self-monitoring,
hence devoid of the contaminants of inequality, status, authority, force, and
tradition.
Gouldner’s point first of all is that the New Class is a class, hence primar-
ily interested in its self-promotion vis-à-vis competing classes.The cultural
bourgeoisie is a guild. But “unlike the old working classes it is basically
committed to controlling the content of its work and its work environment,
rather than surrendering these in favor of getting the best wage bargain it
can negotiate” (Gouldner 1979: 20). Its members must professionalize as
they bid to claim superiority to the “old class,” the capitalist bourgeoisie.
Their medium is not money (like the old bourgeoisie) or land (like the yet
older aristocracy), but speech.The new class is committed to autonomy, inner-
directedness, the “chosen rather than the imposed,” the self-moving rather
than the “externally driven.” Rationality is then conceived as autonomy:
arguments must “stand on their own legs,” one must “consider the speech
not the speaker,” undetermined by the external forces of authority and tra-
dition, or impulse and nature. The New Class accepts, unacknowledged,
the bourgeois inheritance which holds that doing and producing are the
supreme human functions and proper legitimation of social status, the ban-
ner under which the bourgeoisie had fought the aristocratic conviction that
status lies in sheer being or birth. But the New Class’s version of doing and
producing is semiotic. Doing things with words, or other signs, is their busi-
ness, and the creative use of signs their goal.We may say, stealing from Haber-
mas, that the New Class is the linguistification of the bourgeoisie.
Gouldner does not fail to notice the virtues of the New Class. It is prob-
ably a better master than most elite classes, especially given its liberal com-
mitments to procedural equality. But its members are prone to resentment
over their “blocked ascendance,” namely, that at the end of the day they
have less money, status, and power than the business class.And their power
is limited.They are generally a managing, not an owning, hence ruling, class
(although there is nothing “petty” about a bourgeois class that includes the
richest man in the world, Bill Gates). But despite the lack of ultimate pro-
prietorship, their level of control is profound. Gouldner tellingly remarks,
“CCD treats the relationship between those who speak it, and others about
whom they speak, as a relationship between judges and judged. It implies
that the established social hierarchy is only a semblance and that the deeper,
more important distinction is between those who speak and understand
truly and those who do not. . . . To participate in the culture of critical dis-
course, then, is a political act” (Gouldner 1979: 59).
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The New Class thus tends to merge two ideal models of cognitive and
political responsibility: judge and scientist, importing a scientific model of
knowing into a juridical model of decision making and conflict resolution,
emphasizing rule-governed presentation of evidence and impartiality. For
the New Class, Gouldner writes, “Speech becomes impersonal. Speakers
hide behind their speech. Speech seems to be disembodied, de-contextualized
and self-grounded” (Gouldner 1979: 29). Their universalization of their
method, CCD, is the universalization of their own power.“This inflexibility
and insensitivity to the force of differing contexts,” he tells us, “this incli-
nation to impose one set of rules on different cases also goes by the ancient
name of ‘dogmatism’” (Gouldner 1979: 84).This may sound odd; as lovers
of discourse, the New Class is committed to the open-ended nature of
dialogue. But in this very “openness” Gouldner finds a set of abstract rules
that ignore or prohibit important modes of identity and tradition from
appearing in their “open” forum at all.We shall return to this.
Let us amplify three key components of Comprehensive Critical Dis-
course. First, the denial of incommensurability. All that is meaningful and cog-
nitively valid is believed to be translatable into a single neutral idiom of
culturally, historically, and geographically decontextualized, impersonal utter-
ance, or what Gellner calls context-free communication. Meaning and valid-
ity are delinked from status and social role, so that content of statements
can be judged independent from context of utterance and the social stand-
ing of the speaker. Second, the ubiquity of justification. All belief that seeks
public expression or enforcement must be legitimated by inquiry and evi-
dence, subject to highly stringent justificatory demands rather than vetted
by authority, faith, or tradition. Last, value-relativism and value-skepticism.Value-
questions are undecidable by the rules just described, hence are surds asserted
by individuals.They are to be treated equally as data.This very fact guar-
antees liberty and toleration.As factual claims that persons do value certain
things they can be registered by preference-counting (democracy) or nego-
tiated by discussants (liberal capitalism).
Expanding on Gouldner, the New Class’s unique concern with status
over money likens them to another class familiar in Western history. If, as
Gellner has argued, modern society involves the universalization of the clerisy,
the education of all citizens into literate high culture to establish the nec-
essary universe of communication for a mobile work force, the New Class
of CCD constitutes its high priesthood. Like the feudal clergy, the New Class
discovers that given the proper bureaucratic conditions, power and influence
can accrue to learning itself. Members of the New Class are the finest
products of contemporary education, the best students in class, who most
thoroughly master the context-free cultural semiotics delinked from place,
peoples, and past that is our ruling discourse.They are the vanguard of the
universalized culture of semiotic homogeneity.
It may come as no surprise that the New Class tends to have political
views that befit its status.The New Class is progressive, cosmopolitan, and
potentially internationalist. It tends to neutralist, rationalist liberalism,whether
libertarian and antigovernment or egalitarian and committed to redistrib-
ution and government control, and in the past two decades has absorbed a
strong commitment to cultural diversity under the neutralist umbrella. It is
no coincidence that neutralist liberalism and the New Class matured together
in the 1970s and 1980s.The egalitarian or welfare-state sector of the New
Class accepts its role as the defender of the victims of the bourgeoisie, that
class whose thunder it has always hoped to steal. Politics is primarily a mat-
ter of setting up Good-neutral rules of right which can be justified by a
culture-neutral inquiry. Christopher Lasch contrasted its values with those
of the petty bourgeoisie, skilled workers and small business owners, who
prize the virtues of loyalty, responsibility, and above all, a sense of limits and
hence the fragility of life and achievement. He remarked of New Class
members,“They find it hard to understand why their hygienic conception
of life fails to command universal enthusiasm.They have mounted a cru-
sade to sanitize American society: to create a ‘smoke-free environment,’ to
censor everything from pornography to ‘hate speech,’ and at the same time,
incongruously, to extend the range of personal choice in matters where
most people feel the need of solid moral guidelines” (Lasch 1995: 28). As
Galston argues, those petty bourgeois commitments, which formed the
historic basis of self-respect for the traditional clients of the Democratic
Party, were devalued in the 1970s by neutralist egalitarians in their over-
weening concern for the least advantaged (the underclass) and marginal-
ized social groups (such as homosexuals), shifting the petty bourgeoisie to
the Republican Party in the 1980s, most notably as “Reagan Democrats”
(Galston 1991: 162).The standoff has remained ever since.The “culture wars”
of the 1990s were then largely battles between New Class and the spokes-
persons of petty bourgeois values.
The New Class adopts a series of positions that are self-undermining or
at least self-threatening. Perhaps this is inevitable for a class that claims to
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transcend class. Given its role as vanguard of the postmodern era, these
paradoxes tend to be suffused throughout our society.
First, the commensurability of communication and justification requires
compartmentalization. Understanding utterances outside context in effect
places them in one communicative mode, as constative utterances or truth-
functional claims that can be justified by evidence or argument. But what-
ever cannot fit under that rubric must then be excluded. Incommensurability
then returns between the truth-functional claims and all other utterances,
particularly those expressing value-orientations. For CCD these cannot be
adjudicated. In other words, to paraphrase a Weberian point, rationalization
entails the refusal to treat ultimate questions, question comparing contexts, rationally.
Second, cultural self-determination is justified by equality and freedom.
No one, no people, is to be ruled by another; the only legitimate rule is
self-rule. So liberal rationalism justifies both individual rights and national
or tribal self-determination. Units should be autonomous, be they individuals
or societies. But the autonomy of individuals and the autonomy of groups
threaten each other, as we saw in Chapter 1. So, autonomy is in conflict
with itself.That is, the autonomy of individuals and the autonomy of collectivities
are both mutually necessary and antithetical.
Third, while authority is rejected as a legitimation of truth, it returns in
the form of expertise in the methods just described. Liberal society is man-
aged by authority in the form of rationalist expertise.The New Class says:
“In a free and equal society, I will rule.”This is a kind of meritocratic egal-
itarianism. Lasch called it the new paternalism of allegedly neutral experts
and bureaucrats, which replaces the patriarchs of old (Lasch 1979). For the
anti-authoritarian society has to be authoritatively managed.
Fourth, in a culture of criticism everything is questioned. But as Adorno
and Horkheimer argued, if everything is subject to open-ended criticism,
so is any critical ideal.The objection to the status quo turns out to be as
indefensible as the status quo, which leaves the status quo standing as that to
which we are no longer, to be sure, naively committed but ironically resigned
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1972). Equidistant between carrots, the critical
donkey stays where it is. So, the critical devaluation of everything leaves us with
a postcritical acceptance of the given.
Fifth, since it claims to be neutrally all-inclusive, CCD insists that it is
commensurable with any culture. Liberal rationalism is a culture of univer-
sal tolerance which claims it can incorporate all other cultures. Now there
are lots of cultures on earth that are not liberal, reject CCD (at least on ulti-
mate matters), hence enforce thick cultural values and practices. CCD is
committed both to granting these validity—thereby tolerating them—and
to asserting its own superiority and universality—thereby being intolerant
of them. It must, and it cannot, tolerate the intolerant.
Sixth, CCD claims to be an idiom, mastery of which can resolve all
resolvable issues because it is impartial regarding whatever claimants come
before it.The proper response to conflict is to rise above it. Issues unresolv-
able in that impartial idiom have no claim on rational human attention. But
if rationality is impartial, all partiality is irrational.That is, CCD is partial to
impartiality, hence partially condemns all partiality.
Last, as we said, the New Class is by virtue of its mandarin status the
educated or semiotic bourgeoisie, a cultural clerisy. But at the same time it
insists that its methods, and the world it imagines as “the True and Only
Heaven,” is a world devoid of cultures in the sense of distinctive peoples
with substantive, intransigent commitments. Its anthem, featured as the
soundtrack of corporate commercials, is John Lennon’s Imagine: “Imagine
there’s no heaven. . . . Imagine there’s no countries. . . . Nothing to kill or
die for. . . . No religion too. . . . Imagine no possessions”—the call for an
egalitarian utopia whose only remaining social inequality, one suspects,
would be that between the highly educated and creative cosmopolitans
who most identify with that message and the unenlightened. The New
Class accepts the liberal notion that the more one learns the less one em-
bodies, that education makes one less committed to the superiority of any
form of life, that “acculturation” and “cultivation” are antonyms.Thus, the
height of human culture is to have no culture.
Members of the New Class thus tend to be emancipatory dogmatists, elit-
ist egalitarians, self-styled princes and princesses of the anti-authoritarian
society. In a conflict with their opponents they sincerely offer themselves
as neutral judges to adjudicate the matter. Now, if you must fight with
someone, it is true that you are probably better off fighting with someone
sincerely devoted to truth and justice, as members of the New Class are.
They may fight fair, and may even compromise, or admit your victory once
the competitive process has produced its results. But if you become their
intractable opponent, watch out. For they must regard your opposition not
merely as a conflict of interests—since they believe they have no interests—
but as your opposition to truth, justice, and reason per se.You must then be
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“irrational” or “uneducated” or “politically incorrect,” which is to say,
immoral. As Carl Schmitt put it, those who claim to represent humanity as
a whole must regard their opponents as inhuman (Schmitt 1996: 54).
Leibnizian Postmodernism
One structural disagreement between the analyses of our time proffered by
postmodernists (such as Lyotard or Luhmann) and promodernists (such as
Habermas) is a social version of the old philosophical problem of the One
and the Many: do we witness today the deconstruction of society into a
(postmodern) multiplicity of social “language-games” or rather the coa-
lescing hegemony of a unitary (modernist) “system” or “empire” of money,
power, and mass culture? Putting it this starkly makes each side sound rather
simplistic; certainly there are aspects of unity and difference in our world.
Nevertheless, a real argument exists between those who see in the present
a tyrannical unitary technical-economic system that they hope to oppose
with a renewed social solidarity, and those postmodernists who see instead
disintegration and pluralism, for good or ill. I suggest that we can produce
a model that harmonizes these two claims, with the not inconsiderable
additional benefit of being true.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Habermas argued that in late moder-
nity the lifeworld of human communication is progressively replaced and
colonized by the “system” of money and power. As implied there, we can
now say that this metaphor rightly captures a static picture of local com-
munities facing the network of nonlocal capital and nonlocal administra-
tion, mediaculture, and law. What Habermas called the system is actually
the process of interaction among vast markets, fields of activity, and the col-
lective agencies acting in them, each composed of competing/cooperating
individuals in functional roles, engaged in rational improvements in the
context of overlapping and mutually impacting “games,” or rule-governed
contexts of mostly agonistic social activity and discourse.The total interac-
tion among these social contexts is fluid, although at any one moment there
is a constellation of games and their agencies with which all lesser games,
agencies, and players must contend.What we call the market is nothing but
the interlocking interactions among a huge number of subprocesses, each
attempting to survive by the rules of its own particular game in the market-
administrative-legal-mass cultural environment.The postmodern society of
autonomous contexts is this environment; it is what the globalized process
looks like at the level of individuals, agencies, and roles.This claim simply
expands the Weberian differentiation thesis, the breaking apart of social
spheres from tradition and into internally commensurable, rationalizable
spheres. Each context—science, economics, politics, and even art—freed to
pursue its own logic, reorganizes itself by internal rules.This is what made
progress possible.The meta- or supracontext is the environment formed by
the collection of all social contexts. Each faces the environment consti-
tuted by all.
The key to this view is that social agencies and contexts are simultane-
ously autonomous and interdependent. Autonomous in that they develop
according to internal rules, expressed in the theory of autopoiesis or self-
making systems (Luhmann 2003; Maturana and Varela 1980). But at the same
time all generate externally relevant effects, hence constrain one another,
to varying degrees of salience. None is independent of the outside consti-
tuted by the other agencies and contexts; each represents those effects in its
autonomous internal rules and problems. Continuing the metaphysical
metaphor, this is a roughly Leibnizian picture of monadic social contexts,
each with its own inner principle of growth and each reflecting changes in
all relevant others.The element of Leibniz’s metaphysics that is missing here,
of course, is his notion of a prearranged harmony created and sustained by
God. The combination of autonomy and interdependence implies that
more and more games become internally rationalized and progressive and
there are fewer and fewer boundaries to the effects games have on one
another. Every game and agency expands, rationalizes, in relation to its inter-
nal goals and rules, but every game tends to take on technologies of the
environment that is the sum of all. All are transparent, nothing is hidden.
What must be added to this roughly postmodern view is the fact that
the most dominant economic games, along with the progressive research
games of technology-creation, and the administrative games with their legal
rules, are the progressive driving forces of the process. Rather than describe
this as system hegemony we ought to recognize that this “multiheaded”
progressive force pluralizes all social activity into autonomous language
games or contexts.The metaphors of sovereignty (from politics), mechan-
ical regulation (as in systems theory), and difference (from semiotics) do
not hold here.What we see is a burgeoning set of internally normed, inter-
locked, practical-linguistic games, which, in their explosive progress, force
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pluralization and contextualization on the rest of social life.These driving
contexts do not establish unity or empire or system or hegemony; on the
contrary, they continuously break down any substantive metacontext of social activity,
the cognitive representation of which Lyotard called metanarratives. The
network of driving forces is not a thing; it is a process that erodes all things.
The total complex of these complexes indeed forms a “reality” or “envi-
ronment” for all other social contexts and individuals at any moment. Like
the physical universe, the social universe is expanding from every point
(with exceptions to be noted below). I am suggesting that the postmodern
condition is merely the advanced course in Weberian modernization.We
are still working out the implications of a society of “spontaneous order”
in which units are free to rationalize themselves, first initiated and con-
ceived in the eighteenth century.
The relevant categories of social contexts are then three. First are those
that constitute the progressive economic, technological, administrative-legal
games, and some components of mass culture.This is the driving sector, the
core of the process. It is driving, not determining; its members push against,
rather than rule, other contexts, creating continual pressure for change.
Second are the non-driving contexts that are nonetheless progressive and
rationalizing, like art, intellectual culture, other parts of mass culture, and a
host of voluntary and political associations which seek rational improve-
ment or advantage according to their own norms and hence create nov-
elty.This is the riding sector. Third are the social contexts that are outside the
dominant network most of the time, and are in themselves nonprogressive,
like the normative institutions of family, friendship, certain voluntary and
interest associations, and local economic, politics, and culture (indeed, I have
argued, civil society itself).They constitute the by-standing sector.They may or
may not be, to use Peter Berger’s terms, “de-” or “counter-modernizing”
but they are at least nonmodernizing, not internally normed by progress or
rationalization, and thus are usually under threat from the first two sectors.
We may profit from Charles Jencks’s claim that postmodern architecture,
rather than abandoning nostalgia or metanarrative, incorporates traditional
gestures into an otherwise modernist frame through “double-coding,” the
combination of signs from two opposed languages.The agencies of the pro-
gressive sectors of postmodern society do not forsake unity or metanarrative.
On the contrary, as Leibnizian monads, each represents or projects a vision
or goal of expansive unity, or metanarrative. One might say that each con-
text facing out into the environment understands other contexts through
an at least projected unity, employing George Herbert Mead’s figure, a “gen-
eralized other.”The postmodern condition is not one in which we abandon
metanarrative but in which metanarrative and rationalizing instrumental-
ity, unity and difference, the language of tradition and the language of prog-
ress, are mixed together and the inconsistency fails to be problematic. Every-
body is free to project what metanarratives they like, and free to notice that
shared metanarrative does not matter. The process works regardless. We follow
the contextual rules of particular functional linguistic-practical contexts
while simultaneously spouting grand narratives belied by our performance.
Weber argued that the differentiation of spheres and values made us no
longer agroliterate monotheists, but “polytheists.” In the postmodern con-
dition we are simultaneously polytheists and monotheists without the worry.
For there certainly are metanarratives in postmodern society, most notably
in the United States. But they subsist in a distinct fashion. First, there are
the official and public metanarratives of society that everyone takes seri-
ously: progressivism or the commitment to social progress as the meaning
of existence, and individualism or the view that human individuals are the
centers of value and the ultimate court of true judgment in the world.They
are powerful, broadcasted by mass culture, flown on banners, and sworn to
as oaths. But they are thin and procedural; their narrative structure under-
determines questions of the meaning of human existence and any hierar-
chy of values.What gets invested with effective loyalty is a how, not a whither
or why, a common pragmatic attitude, ability to adapt to novel contexts,
context-free problem solving, as well as a remarkably open cognitive sys-
tem. Genuinely thick metanarratives, on the other hand, are still held by
perhaps most citizens, and metaphors and references to these litter our pub-
lic life. But they generally have practical consequences only in private life
or in voluntary associations.When citizens announce thick metanarratives
in public, everyone recognizes them as socially unnecessary, to be taken with
a grain of salt, that is, tolerance. Thus, what the “loss” of or “incredulity”
toward metanarratives means in fact is not their absence but their ambigu-
ity or social impotence when substantive. If thick and determinative, meta-
narratives are merely private or contextual; if public or universal, they must
be thin. Social actors themselves recognize that coordinated social action
does not require thick belief.Thus, most Americans may endorse conser-
vative rhetoric, but it is precisely at the point that conservative political
groups seek to establish nativist or Christian policies that they back away.
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Now, the Leibnizian picture presented above may seem too fragmented.
The modernist is right to say that we cannot conceive of ongoing social
action that is not rule-governed or meaningfully contextualized. So it would
seem the differences can only obtain against a background unity. But the
postmodernist retort (or, what the postmodernist ought to retort) is correct:
while every interaction must be rule-governed or backgrounded, there does
not have to be a context of contexts, a rule of all rules.Agencies bootstrap
themselves into temporarily and contextually rule-governed interactions
with one another.A set of rules Q, projected by individuals or agencies R
and S in certain of their context-dependent roles, provides the background
against which R and S have a meaningful interaction. But when S turns to
interact with an individual or agency Y, another background Z will be
invoked, and so on.There is in each case a “third thing” but not one third
thing for all cases. My point is not the metaphysical claim that there are no
supracontextual norms, only that contemporary society has no need of
that hypothesis. No doubt many people accept as given that there is a com-
mon generalized other or, more subtly, that the metanarratives projected by
the various contexts of society are converging or will converge. But we do
not see evidence of that in contemporary society.The demands of the driv-
ing sector are cognitively and culturally minimal and, if you will, falsifica-
tionist: they rule out thick metanarratives, but don’t mandate any. The
open-ended issue, which each generation will have to recalibrate for itself,
is how to make sense, or coherence, of the differentiation of the progressive,
single-stranded, rationalized sectors and the nonprogressive, multistranded,
nonrationalizing sectors of human life.
Is Culture Obsolescent?
During the Soviet era Czech émigré novelist Milan Kundera argued that
in contemporary Europe culture had “bowed out” (Kundera 1984a).After
a friend’s manuscript was confiscated by authorities in communist Prague,
he and Kundera wandered the city discussing which great cultural figure in
the West they could contact to take a public stand. Despairingly, they could
think of no one who was not compromised by sectarian politics. Europeans
had ceased to believe in the moral autonomy of cultural creation, Kundera
lamented, in the intrinsic values constructed by learning and writing. For in
Soviet-dominated Europe there was no independent culture, while in the
West nobody—including the intellectual-cultural elite itself—valued cul-
ture except as something to be consumed.The great modern “age of cul-
ture,” which had, for Kundera, replaced religion as the repository of Euro-
pean ideals in the eighteenth century, was retreating like a melting glacier.
That we occupy a vastly different geopolitical environment today does not
gainsay Kundera’s question: do we now live in a postcultural era, a time
beyond culture?
Some may respond that this question is absurd; surely today we are not
devoid of culture, we are inundated with it! The sheer volume of cultural
artifacts and cultural producers, the enormous industries devoted to pro-
ducing and selling culture in the broad sense—film, television, radio, books,
news and entertainment weeklies and monthlies, all manner of toys and
print reproductions, fashion, sports, the ubiquity of journalistically transmit-
ted political discourse, and so on—is unprecedented in human history. Like-
wise, in our pop version of poststructuralism we seem more concerned
than ever with cultural signs, with images of reality rather than reality itself.
But the point is not the absence of cultural activity or artifacts; it is whether
our attitude toward them renders them incapable of doing what cultural
activities and artifacts have traditionally done. Indeed, a changed function
of culture may be the requisite precondition for massive cultural output.
Still, if not absurd, talk of the end of culture is at least politically suspicious.
Presumably it is an elitist Eurocentric conceit, a lament over the decline of
a high culture that was the property of mid-twentieth-century upper-class
whites in the towns and suburbs of London, Berlin, Paris, and New York in
the face of an upsurge of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural pluralism from
below. But the issue here is not the replacement of one culture by another,
or the lack of unity in culture. It is whether the meaning and experience
of culture per se has undergone a structural change. Here there is good (or at
least plausibly good) news, and bad (or at least sobering) news.
The bad news first.There are indeed a series of contemporary effects,
more complex than the “colonization” Habermas suggested, that arguably
undermine or encroach upon cultural practices, artifacts, and narratives per
se in a variety of ways. First, there is decontextualization, the splitting-up of
shared cultural contexts that roughly backgrounded all social action, leav-
ing, so to speak, bits and pieces of culture stuck to particular social con-
texts and practices to operate without any shared, cross-contextual back-
ground, as Alasdair MacIntyre has argued (MacIntyre 1981). In moral life it
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leads individuals to turn to purely vocational, bureaucratic, or role-specific
moral rules, having no other reliable and shared basis for moral judgments.
Second, there is de-culturation, the simple elimination of cultural elements
as unnecessary or incompatible with gains in efficiency or cost, as when
pushing buttons on a bank machine replaces small talk with a teller.Where
cultural elements are not actually eliminated, they tend to be reinterpreted
in a way that costs them their cultural function, which can happen in two
ways.They can be functionalized, regarded as publicly valuable only in an
instrumental sense, or privatized, regarded as meaningful or valuable in a
purely private sense that has no legitimacy in public.What then remains of
publicly shared culture often approximates a default culture focused on those
values which remain when other public values are undermined, in partic-
ular the biovalues of life, longevity, health, pleasure, and physical beauty.
The social reproduction of culture has changed dramatically. For the
first time in history people get acculturated at a distance, not primarily by kin
and locale.Throughout history family and neighbors were the sole means
of inculcating the majority.The sources of high culture were nonlocal, ex-
tending from cultural elites in cosmopolitan centers, but the agents of accul-
turation were always local. To be sure, today kin and locale continue to
work their socializing magic. But now, even if the familial and local culture
are idiosyncratic, or largely fail, the media, plus the schools, plus big busi-
ness and government, will train the child in the wider culture.While this
may have its benefits, it must give us pause, not only because it means the
continued erosion of locale, as noted earlier, and a running battle between
parents and the New Class culture-makers, but because it presumably must
alter the acculturation process itself, the way the young come to be cultural
members and what their “culture” means to them.
Last, contemporary culture exhibits as a prominent component an anti-
culture, in which culture depicts itself as anachronistic, trivial, merely private
or merely functional (Cahoone 1988). For among the things represented
and interpreted by the cultural medium is the cultural medium itself. Both at
the level of intellectual culture and the popular mediaculture one can en-
counter the message that all cultural practices serve economic or political
purposes, the evaluation of cultural products solely by financial criteria, and
campy cynicism regarding the ultimate meaninglessness of narrative repre-
sentation.Again, the point is not a turn from high to lowbrow or popular
culture; it is not that today our children prefer the sitcom to Shakespeare.
It is rather that part of their acculturation, their medicultural training, is
learning that culture does not matter, that inherited literatures and the wis-
dom of the past serve no purpose. It is true that Shakespeare will suffer
from this trend more than the sitcom, since Shakespeare demands more
effort and education. Nevertheless, people do not avoid Shakespeare merely
because it is hard, but because it is hard and because we feel Shakespeare
has nothing important to teach us, just as the sitcom has nothing impor-
tant to teach us.We don’t take Shakespeare seriously, and we don’t take the
sitcom seriously either. Shakespeare is a joke, like the sitcom is a joke; but the
latter is an easier joke. In fact, the sitcom is happy to consider itself a joke, to
wink at us in ironic self-comment and acknowledge its merely economic
function.The media-constituted public realm thus becomes saturated with
nonmeaning, open lies, and frank calculation.We train ourselves to regard
what are on their face cultural forms—dramatic narrative, images, rhetoric,
artifacts—as nonmeaningful and nonvaluable. We get used to discounting, ig-
noring, and trivializing cultural things.
Now, all that is on one side.Yet there is some good news about our
postmodern culture that makes it impossible to say, with Kundera, that cul-
ture has “bowed out.” Certainly mass electronic culture does not exhaust
our culture; there remain minority ethnic, regional, and local cultural eddies
and inlets. Perhaps most people live double cultural lives, moving between
the local and communally inherited on the one hand and mass culture on
the other. Nor is mass or mediaculture simply empty; the cultural obsoles-
cence just described is a powerful component of its description, but it would
be foolish to argue that it exhausts the whole. Certainly culture is bigger
than ever. In our age of universal literacy, universal schooling, an ever ris-
ing number of college attendees, and the postindustrial swelling of the
“semiotic” spheres of the economy—from knowledge to entertainment to
news—we virtually swim in signs, spoken and written words and images
and narratives. To this is now added globalization after 1989, which has
tended to spread the mass culture of the countries with the largest econo-
mies, the United States above all, over the globe. So the critic ought to be
cautious about any simplistic condemnation of the novelty and complexity
of postmodern culture.
First and most obviously, postmodern mediaculture is the first culture in
history that is commercial and built to change.These two traits go together. Cer-
tainly earlier cultural artifacts and practices had economic value. But only
today is the constant creation of cultural artifacts, as Adorno and Hork-
heimer lamented, an industry. Marx’s analysis that under capitalism “all that 
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is solid melts into air,” like Schumpeter’s attribution to capitalism of the
method of “creative destruction,” fits mass culture more than any aspect of
social life.The result is, as noted, a source of despair for many critics, but with
its economic and fluid nature goes the malleability and diversity of our
culture.Whatever postmodern capitalist culture is, it is not rigid. As they
say of New England weather, if you don’t like this culture or the role it
bequeaths you, wait five minutes.
Second, our culture is arguably more egalitarian than at any time since
the agroliterate revolution.The distinction between high and low culture
has virtually disappeared. All cultural products live in the same semiotic
dimension, self-consciously accessible to more or less all consumers. In ret-
rospect it seems that the construction of national high cultures in the
nineteenth century, with the drive toward universal literacy, set the stage
for the twentieth’s “revolt of the masses,” meaning the repeal of class (and
in the United States, racial) exclusions.The upwardly and outwardly expand-
ing lower-middle and working classes had an appetite for culture. When
the distinction of high and low culture was deconstructed, roughly at the
same time as the post–World War II expansion of higher education, the
result was a more and more homogeneous cultural environment in which
all classes absorb the same media in all regions, their local and historical
cultures taking a back seat.
Third, this equality extends beyond consumption to production. The
making of culture is no longer in the hands of a tiny educated elite.Almost
anyone can contribute to culture today. Of course regarding distant or mass
culture there are vast concentrations of power in the giant media conglom-
erates; the elites of New York and Los Angeles, with some canny spinning
by Washington, D.C., mostly decide the mass media topics of the week.
But tally the number of writers of books, movie scripts, reviews, letters to
newspaper editors, callers to talk radio, and posters of internet material.
Then add to this all contributors to local culture across the country, from
people who create programming for public access cable stations to the par-
ticipants in town, county, and neighborhood ethnic festivals, the designers,
gardeners, and home decorators that display their wares in local fairs, in
public venues, or even on the public face of their property. I hazard the
sum is a larger percentage of the populace than any time since the dawn of
stratified society. Ours is an open culture, no longer controlled by authority.
But we must close with more sobering news about a structural phenom-
enon implicit in what has been said. As noted, in the twentieth-century
culture, or a large part of it, became an industry. The critique of this devel-
opment has mostly concerned the economic attitude to which this sub-
jects culture. But there is another effect: for the first time in history culture
gets framed. Part of what we mean by culture is the interpretive horizon of
teleologically connected meanings in terms of which the frames or bound-
aries of social contexts are set and understood.As such it cannot be one of
those contexts. But in so far as postmodern mass culture is a business, cul-
ture becomes one of the industrial spheres of rationalizing activity. Elec-
tronic mass culture is not all of our culture, but it is a very significant part
and it certainly offers itself as the whole.We thus face the following ambigu-
ous condition.We have, and inherit, a horizon of meanings which valorize
the construction of differentiated social frames within some of which prog-
ress can occur. But as mediculture this background of social action becomes
one sphere of the foreground.This denies us the employment of culture as
background while permitting us to examine our own culture as an object,
which paradoxically makes the whole of our social world into a part of our
social world.This is characteristic of our postmodern predicament.
The Postmodern Cognitive Predicament
Modern Western society signified a break with all previous social orders.
There is an “asymmetry” of human cultures.The failure to recognize this
signals a self-reflexive inconsistency on the part of the theorist and obscures
one of the largest facts and problems about the contemporary world. If
symmetry or relativism were true, then no culture would contain cognitive
assets that put it in a general position of advantage with respect to all other
cultures. If that were so, then modernity would present us with no new
fundamental issue that has not been faced by any other historical period. If
you can’t quite bring yourself to believe that, then relativism must be false
on this point.
So let’s face facts (yes, actually, there are a lot of them).A novel cognitive
style has evolved over the last three centuries which yields unprecedented
and undeniable results.The style is epitomized in science, but it spreads over
other forms of practical endeavor. Let’s call its yield knowledge, at least ten-
tatively, absent a full epistemological justification. Certainly if pragmatic
capacity is any evidence of knowledge—we don’t have to agree that it is the
sole or primary evidence—then this new cognitive style yields a tremen-
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dous amount of knowledge. It is also true that a productive-industrial mode
of organization of material life linked to that cognitive style yields unprece-
dented and undeniable material gains, including weapons technologies, so
that the societies possessing the noted cognitive style tend to become dom-
inant world powers.We can philosophically question the validity and doubt
the ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual benefit of these gains, but we are not at
liberty to abandon them.As Marion Levy Jr. wrote, modern techniques are
irreversible; they cannot be discarded without tremendous suffering (Levy
1972).The provision of perennial human needs is in our age dependent on
modern bureaucracy, industrialism, technology, science, and advanced com-
munications. Cultures that have not fully embraced these developments
face an environment in which others have them. Nothing in the contem-
porary world, not its material life, its politics, its cultural conflicts, can be
understood if we deny the prima facie advantages of science, technological
innovation, and industrial production. Certainly the last century has exposed
plenty of troubling implications of life on the new side of history’s Big
Ditch, from nuclear weapons and global warming to the evening commute.
Modernity thus implies a commitment to the scientific method, broadly
construed, a search for publicly available evidence, the rejection of the
influence of other sociocultural norms on cognition.This is a procedural
commitment, not a substantive one. Modernity primarily entails a way of
seeking truth, not the truth of a given world-picture, or the latter only sec-
ondarily. For the former inevitably upsets the latter. Gellner notes the
remarkable fact about our society that we accept that our ontology is flexi-
ble, that it rightfully changes with the science of the day or decade. Indeed,
the revolutions of twentieth-century physics seem to guarantee that our
“official” ontology will never again be capable of social assimilation, as both
Aristotelian and Newtonian physics were.The account of the universe based
in relativity and quantum theory cannot be integrated into the worldview
of even educated citizens, cannot be put together with commonsense expe-
rience. It is unthinkable that future scientific advances will do other than
widen that gap. Just as our procedural commitment to emergent order based
on autonomous rationalization of spheres in other areas of social life upsets
any vision of the future, cognitive progress prevents the secure imagination
of the whole.
As we saw in the preceding chapter, Enlightenment culture attempted
to reorganize itself around, and judge itself against, Reason-Experience-
Nature or REN, rather than Culture-Authority-Society or CAS. But when
this cognitive form observes itself, it generates a host of philosophical or
hermeneutic problems. First, it comes to recognize itself as one function
among others each engaged in its own business, like politics, art, economic
production, and so on. Second, the cognitive function cannot legitimate
itself, because legitimation would require justification through reference to
an outside, including a practical justification in terms of scientific cogni-
tion’s social benefits.Third, this leads to constructivism, which is arguably
the trend of post-Kantian philosophy, although its roots are in Hume. A
cognitive examination of the cognition of nature progressively reveals the
cognitively self-constructed nature of that cognition, reveals, to use older
languages, the operation of “custom” or “transcendental” machinery or
“Geist” or the theory-ladenness of observations or the “historical” or “lin-
guistic” constitution of the alleged object. It discovers, as William James put
it, that “the trail of the human serpent is over all.” If the Enlightenment, in
one of that brilliant century’s modalities, had announced that REN, not
CAS, would be the norm of and constraint upon cognition, then its later
modern progeny discovered that Culture, Authority, and Society had re-
appeared within those norms.The post-Kantian claim—continued by ideal-
ism, phenomenology, pragmatism, Wittgenstein, philosophy of science
from Kuhn to the social constructivists, and postmodernism from Derrida
to Luhmann—that the world we encounter is our product, concurs with
Promethean capitalism, modernism’s conception of the task of art, and our
Baconian conception of science’s power. Not only on the factory floor and
in the executive suite, but in the seminar room, the SoHo loft, and the
Oval Office as well, the model of the human is homo faber.
I will argue later that constructivism, in anything like a literal form, is
untenable. Nevertheless, it is the spirit of the age, and this is revealing. For
my point is that the self-observation of REN returns us to CAS, as Richard
Rorty has argued. From “objectivity” we turn to “solidarity” as the ground
of our cognitive strategies. Rorty’s opposition is telling, but its application
is not. For solidarity is first and foremost the apt term, not for our “post-
modern,” postobjectivist condition, but for premodern epistemology.As we
have argued, before modernity society was virtually everything for almost
all human beings in history (and prehistory). Social convention and author-
ity have been the virtually ubiquitous determinants of belief-acceptance
and language-use, openness to nonsocialized or anomalous experience being
strictly limited.The widespread acceptance of the rightful distinction of true
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from socially legitimate is very recent.The aim of logical coherence inher-
ently violates social coherence. Now, we might say that rational inquiry has
always had as its inherent possibility from the time of Buddha and Plato that
it progressively abstracts from culture. But it never fulfilled that possibility
until modern science, which is indeed virtually neutral with respect to cul-
tures. It is not, of course, strictly neutral. Like every symbolic form, it has its
presuppositions. But it is precisely the development of a systematic proce-
dure of cognition that is maximally independent of culture, including the
culture in which it arose. It is a cognitive institution which pursues truth and
technē by isolating them from all other cultural norms. Its development
required and enabled a movement from omnivalence to differentiation, the
separation of inquiry from the soteriological, aesthetic, practical, and social
concerns in which it was traditionally embedded.
In this respect Rorty is right that the postmodern involves, again not
inescapably, a resocialization or reculturation, a rediscovery of Culture,
Authority, and Society beneath the (at least self-reflectively available) layers
of Reason, Experience, and Nature. But the second time around, as Marx
said of the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, is different. Rorty,
Berlin, and others call this difference irony. I think this is too precious.
More broadly and straightforwardly, the return to the social is procedural.
The solidarity that Rorty claims as our cognitive commitment is a proce-
dural solidarity, a commitment to liberal, bureaucratic, and scientific ration-
ality, accepted as the critical mesh through which our continued reference
to the real must be strained. In postmodern cognition we return not to the
thick inherited cultural narratives of earlier social history, but to justificatory
procedures that are social but thin. We are self-reflexive and pragmatic,
rather than naive and theocratic. Nevertheless, such commitments are strictly
held: constructivists and postmodernists do not suggest a return to religion
or faith, even ironically. Cognitive closure may be impossible, but some roads
are closed off.We doubt our ability to justify the binding nature of our prac-
tices, but remain bound to them nonetheless.We bang out another critique
of the “myth” of scientific objectivity on laptops created by that “myth,”
and call engineers and not shamans when they break down.Arguably it is
our very realism, our science, our rejecting of omnivalence in favor of the
differentiation of logical or cognitive from social norms, which leads to
procedural commitments ever in search of an unavailable foundational con-
tent. For refusal to identify social convention with truth is the hallmark of
modern cognition.We reject the “primitive” segmentary identification of
culture with nature, and the Agrarian cultural assertion of divine or tran-
scendent norms, in favor of a purely noncultural constraint, whose precise
determination escapes us. Differentiating logical from cultural validity
takes away the possibility of completing our circle, of justifying our inquiry
within a graspable whole. Hence our, apparently permanent, paradoxical
position.
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“Revolutionary” was certainly a term of praise for Karl Marx. So it may be
surprising that in one of his most famous passages Marx notes capitalism’s
revolutionary role.While it was for him the most repressive economic sys-
tem in history, as the apotheosis of unequal economies, the exit from his-
tory into communist utopia, Marx gave it its due. Unlike all earlier systems
of domination capitalist modernity is honest, its evil is naked. It demythol-
ogizes itself, tearing off the premodern masks by which ruling classes had
gilded their power with aristocratic crests and divine robes. In contrast the
capitalist says, “You aren’t going to do what I say because I am superior,
descended from the founders, or constructed of gold to your bronze.You’re
going to do what I say because I’ve got the money.”Thus in a famous passage
from the Communist Manifesto Marx writes:
The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part . . .
wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal,
patriarchal, idyllic relations . . . pitilessly torn asunder the motley
feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors,” and has left
remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-
interest. . . . The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupa-
tion hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe . . .
torn away from the family its sentimental veil. . . . All fixed, fast-
frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable preju-
dices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become
antiquated before they can ossify.All that is solid melts into air, all
that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with
sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his
kind. (Tucker 1978: 475–76)
It is ironic to note that half a century before, Edmund Burke, the arche-
typal English conservative, opponent of modern republicanism and equality,
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had made a remarkably similar diagnosis. Burke attacked the French Revo-
lution for its attempt to reform traditional political arrangements accord-
ing to abstract Enlightened principles. In one of the most famous passages
in his Reflections on the Revolution in France he reacted to the events of Octo-
ber 6, 1789, when a Parisian mob marched to Versailles and took the king
and queen into custody.
It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of
France, then the dauphiness, at Versailles, and surely never lighted
on this orb, which she hardly seemed to touch, a more delightful
vision. . . . [L]ittle did I dream that I should have lived to see such
disasters fallen upon her in a nation of gallant men, of men of
honor and of cavaliers. I thought ten thousand swords must have
leaped from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened
her with insult. But the age of chivalry is gone.That of sophisters,
economists, and calculators has succeeded; and the glory of Europe
is extinguished forever. . . . All the pleasing illusions which made
power gentle and obedience liberal, and which, by a bland assimi-
lation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify
and soften private society are to be dissolved by this new conquer-
ing empire of light and reason.All the decent drapery of life is to
be rudely torn off. . . . On this scheme of things, a king is but a
man, a queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal, and an
animal not of the highest order. (Burke 1987: 66–67)
Thus did Burke and Marx, the canonical conservative and the arch-
revolutionary, express a common discomfort with modern apparel, or rather
the lack thereof. Modernity tears off the traditional fabric of life to expose
the naked ape beneath.We can now say that fabric was nothing other than
culture, the costuming bequeathed by tradition. Note Burke’s conflict, how-
ever. It is impossible not to believe that he truly regarded the French queen
as more than a mere woman.At the same time he refers to such notions as
“superadded” ideas and “pleasing illusions,” implying that they are not true
but good, that we ought to believe them for social and moral, not cognitive,
reasons. Either way, modernity rips off the garments that make social life
bearable and virtuous.This leads to the most basic philosophical question
about culture and reason: is culture illusion? Must reason and truth reject
culture? Or is culture necessary illusion? Are human norms, and perhaps
even our sense of reality, dependent on artifice?
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There is a particularly useful path of access to this question, one traveled
by an eclectic historical line of thinkers who theorize culture as the devel-
opment of a particular form of artifice, a human propensity that would
seem to stand at the opposite pole from any sort of realistic or pragmatic
dealing with the world.That dimension is play. The analogy of culture to
play employs both sides of the ambiguity of the term, understanding cul-
ture as both free, creative, impractical activity and as the construction of
drama.The point is implicit in Marx and Burke, for whom costuming, or
in children’s parlance, dress-up, is essential to premodern social life. Pursu-
ing the question of play will lead to a deeper analysis of the function of
culture in human experience and thought.
Schiller: Free Play
Play owes its modern philosophical elevation to German romanticism and
in particular to Friedrich Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man
(1795). He argued that the dual human impulses toward sensuous concrete-
ness and eternal form achieve their union in the play impulse, which seeks
“living shape” or beauty as in art.Work results from the sanction of need,
hence is serious; superfluity and superabundance manifest as physical play.
But physical turns to aesthetic play when “free form” is imposed. Play is the
premier manifestation of freedom. Like other proponents of play, Schiller
feels the need to answer the objection, is it not a cheapening of art to call
it a “mere” game?
But why call it a mere game, when we consider that in every con-
dition of humanity it is precisely play, and play alone, that makes
man compete and displays at once his twofold nature. . . . Man is
only serious with the agreeable, the good, the perfect; but with
Beauty he plays. . . . Man shall only play with Beauty, and he shall
play only with Beauty. For, to declare it once and for all, Man plays
only when he is in the full sense of the word a man, and he is only
wholly man when he is playing.” (Schiller 1977: 79–80)
This is a lot to claim for play. But Schiller’s explanation is straightforward,
given the general terms of German idealism. Because play is the opposite
of work, is not serious, unproductive of needed goods, it is therefore free,
like art. But like art, play is at the same time formal, an attempt to embody a
structured whole. Play is not arbitrary or chaotic, it has rules that players must
follow.Thus in its completed form play gives us a free necessity, an external-
ity freely created by Spirit to which Spirit must then conform.This means
that play alone expresses the whole or inner man, our freedom and our
recognition of necessity, our inner instincts and outer, physical, social envi-
rons. Consequently, play arises at the meeting of the two halves of human
nature, the impulse toward the concrete or particular and the impulse toward
the abstract or universal. It is in this synthesis of particular and universal,
sensuous and abstract, necessitous and free, that only play—and that adult
play which is art—attains the highest fulfillment of human experience.
Mead: Just Gaming
The American philosopher George Herbert Mead presented perhaps the
first fully naturalist and pragmatic account of human consciousness. He
famously preceded the dominant philosophical perspectives of the mid-
and late twentieth century by making social communication the womb
from which meaning, mind, and self emerge. In his well-known Mind, Self,
and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, Mead imagined crea-
tures, higher animals and humans, engaged in a process of mutual adjustment
of response.A does something in response to a situation, B responds to the
new situation set up by A’s act, then A responds to the new situation that
includes what B has done, and so on.This is “gesture.” Humans alone are
capable of significant gesture, in which A responds not only to B’s but to its
own gesture.That is,A’s gesture calls out the same response in itself that it calls
out in B.This can only happen if A is able to calculate its gesture through
its anticipation of B’s perception of and response to it, hence capable of
taking the standpoint of B.
Play and games complicate this gestural dialectic, hence make sophisti-
cated communication and thought possible (Mead 1974). Play is the adop-
tion of the character of the other in pretending, acting “as if,” being another
to oneself. Games are the epitome of this process. In games the participants
must be capable of imaginatively occupying a whole series of other view-
points more or less simultaneously. I can play baseball acceptably well only
if I can imagine the likely response of nine other people to events or to my
own acts. It is from games that we begin to imagine a “generalized other,”
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a social viewpoint on our own actions, the source of both morality and
objectivity. So this generalized otherness which grants objectivity develops
from an “as if,” the capacity to modify one’s behavior in light of the ir-real,
something not actual, namely, how I would see events from the perspective
of someone I am not. As Peirce had argued earlier, reality, in a sense we shall
explore later, only emerges subjunctively, in terms of a perspective on states
of affairs “I could” or “I would” but do not now embody (Peirce 1955: 272–
73).Thus playing games is the school not only of self, society, and morality,
but of reality as well.
Huizinga: The Play’s the Thing
In his Homo Ludens (1938) or “Man as Player,” Dutch historian Johan Hui-
zinga provided a systematic interpretation of culture as play. For Huizinga
play situations are constructed, artificial, marked off from the rest of social
life as “nonserious,” not a continuation of the projects, interests, or func-
tions of the rest of life (namely, work). Play is, as he says, borrowing the
phrase of Romano Guardini, “zwecklos aber sinnvoll,” empty of practical
aims but full of meaning. Players are free but play is rule-governed, hence
action is ordered.There is always something at stake in play, hence tension,
something to be lost or won. Last, part of the significance of the play is
that it is “making a show,” an appearance for players or audience in which
participants are in effect actors.
What is remarkable about Huizinga’s account is less his analysis of play
than the range of social and cultural activities he traces to play: including
rites, sacred performances, contests, art, poetry, religious sacrifice, riddle-
solving, social costuming, and fashion. He argues that even legal trials and
war evolved as ritual contests mirroring an agonistic conception of truth
and divine favor.The heroic virtues are play virtues: honor, bravery, glory.
When one adds to this list the representations of such activities and virtues
in art, music, oral narration, poetry, and history, then Huizinga’s remarkable
claim for the importance of play becomes plausible:“Culture arises in the
form of play” (Huizinga 1980: 46).What he really wants to say is that culture
is play, except it becomes apparent that culture and civilization are capable
of losing their play-element, which for Huizinga means that they have lost
their true nature and function. He writes that “as a civilization becomes
more complex, more variegated and more overladen, and as the technique
of production and social life itself become more finely organized, the old
cultural soil is gradually smothered under a rank layer of ideas, systems of
thought and knowledge . . . which have all lost touch with play” (Huizinga
1980: 75).
Huizinga argues that today we live in a decadent “age of seriousness,” of
work, of time devoted to production, social aspiration, education, and know-
ledge of “reality.”The belief in progress is the antithesis of play. Starting with
the French Revolution,“Culture ceased to be ‘played.’ Outward forms were
no longer intended to give the appearance, the fiction, if you like, of a
higher, ideal mode of life” (Huizinga 1980: 192). Leveling and democratiza-
tion destroyed costume.Today the “systematization and regimentation” of
contest has even invaded sport itself; we have a professionalization of sport,
“sport among those for whom it is no longer play.”Whereas, he insists,“Real
civilization cannot exist in the absence of a certain play-element . . . [the]
limitation and mastery of the self, the ability not to confuse its own tenden-
cies with the ultimate and highest goal, but to understand that it is enclosed
within certain bounds freely accepted” (Huizinga 1980: 211). Huizinga does
not falter before the logical conclusion. Plato’s Laws, the Book of Proverbs,
Luther (“All creatures are God’s masks and mummeries”), and the Hindu
concept of divine lila (play) all describe the world as the play of God,“out-
side of morals, neither good or bad.” It is the deepest wisdom to conclude
that “all is play” (Huizinga 1980: 212).
Ortega y Gasset: Finding Game
There is a special meaning of “game,” which in English goes back a thousand
years, that deserves mention. In his fascinating essay “Meditations on Hunt-
ing” (1942), Jose Ortega y Gasset argues for hunting’s unique place in human
psychic history.The premier occupation of segmentary man, arguably the
first occupation and skill, and perhaps the first subject of human art (as in
the cave paintings of Lascaux), was elevated into sport by the privileged
landowners of the agrarian period. Hunting became the premier peacetime
demonstration of valor, strength, and endurance and came to be considered
legitimate training for aristocratic and royal sons and one of the major leisure
activities practiced by the wellborn (along with gambling, racing, physical
contests, dancing, and conversation). It was envied by those below; one of
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the first acts that (successful) modern revolutionaries committed against
the aristocracy was to tear down their fences to open game preserves.
For Ortega,“sport” hunting is for humans a reentry into the zoological
order, a return to the natural regulation of species. It is thus “an imitation
of the animal” (Ortega 1972: 124).This imitation rests on artificial conditions
in which man freely renounces some of his technical superiority to try to
“take possession” of an animal with whom man has a specific “venatic”
relationship. Thus “the fisherman who poisons the mountain brook to
annihilate . . . the trout swimming in it . . . ceases to be a hunter” (Ortega
1972: 45).The animal is allowed its “wiles,” principally evasive ability. It is
most definitely not appropriated, as by Agraria, in the form of “livestock,”
species under human control. It is the prey who stimulates the hunt:“The
only adequate response to a being that lives obsessed with avoiding capture
is to try to catch it” (Ortega 1972: 120). Each shot is then a “risk,” since it is
likely to reveal the hunter and spoil future chances. Ortega regards the
hunting relationship as profound. It is an intimate, ritual handling of death,
the construction of a situation in which life is at stake, in which humans
re-experience their ambiguous location in the animal order.The ambiva-
lence is reflected in the moment of the kill, where, he claims,“Every good
hunter is uneasy in the depths of his conscience when faced with the
death he is about to inflict on the enchanting animal” (Ortega 1972: 88).
Hunting then poses a rather remarkable example of an artificial return to the
natural, a re-positioning of the human player in a sort of contest with an
animal, a relation that is reciprocal but not between equals, a return to pre-
dation through the player’s acceptance of limits on the use of power.
Winnicott: Playing Reality
British psychiatrist D.W.Winnicott formed a powerful account of the role
of cultural artifacts in human development and their relation to play. In the
essay “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena” (1951), he argues
for the necessity of “transitional objects” in early childhood, typically the
beloved blanket or cuddly toy (Winnicott 1999).This play-object is the first
“not-me possession,” but it represents far more—indeed, it is the first repre-
sentation, the first symbol. It stands for a novel zone of experience, of which
the child cannot rightly be asked whether it is created or discovered, subjec-
tive or objective, just a projection of its feelings or just a blanket. Its psychic
role in allowing separation from the primary parent rests precisely on its
being understood neither as an erotically charged adjunct to the primary
parent’s body, nor as an uncathected object of indifference; it must occupy
an intermediate zone of experience. Put another way, what makes separa-
tion possible is that we never do separate, not fundamentally, for the
emerging zone of separation must be immediately filled with something
that is not-mother-but-not-indifferent-either. That filling does not dis-
appear in maturation, but is “diffused” across the whole domain where
meaningful living takes place.Winnicott argues that domain is culture. As he
says in a 1967 essay, among adults it is culture that fills the role of transi-
tional object as the dimension of life which is neither internal nor exter-
nal, subjective nor objective (Winnicott 1999). This “intermediate zone”
turns out to be for Winnicott the center of existence,“the place where we
live.” Without it the world becomes divided into an unstable subjectivity
that projects desire and fantasy and a value-less material reality whose only
valence would be as the constraint on, or negation of, desire and fantasy. It
is telling that the exploration of this topic is so deep that it compels Win-
nicott to put himself and his profession into the analysis.
You may cure your patient and not know what it is that makes
him or her go on living. . . . Psychotic patients who are all the time
hovering between living and not living force us to look at this
problem, one that belongs . . . to all human beings. I am claiming
that these same phenomena . . . appear in . . . cultural experiences.
It is these cultural experiences that provide the continuity in the
human race that transcends personal existence. (Winnicott 1999:
117–18)
Winnicott’s notion of transitional objects is rooted in an earlier argument
of his that the child’s capacity to be alone emerges through the experience
of “being alone in the presence of someone else,” that is, the experience of
being within sight and sound of, say, a parent, but without having to en-
counter, attend to, or deal with the present other (Winnicott 1965). The
presence of the parent not only secures the area, preventing anxiety, but
enables the child to learn the possibility of being with another without effort
or the fulfillment of demands. It is this meaning that is carried by the tran-
sitional object. It becomes a “symbol of union” with the primary parent
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through the process of the parent going away long enough to provoke
anxiety but returning before the anxiety becomes traumatic (that is to say,
before it generates a felt break in personal continuity), thereby establishing
a zone of supra-instinctual enjoyment.
Play and the play-object for Winnicott are then an area of concentration
or interest, into which objects from external reality are drawn for inter-
action under rules that are of the child’s free creation or adoption, in which
there is active and skilled manipulation of these objects in service of a con-
structed theme or meaning made possible by trust or security provided by
a parent or similar figure.This realm is precarious, threatened by erotogenic
excitement, meaning that intense feelings can swamp the experimental
“transitional” zone. Its unique position makes the division of other things
into subjective and objective, inner and outer, possible, opening the way
for noninstinctual valuation—that things may mean without directly serv-
ing instinctual demands—and hence the very perception of undesired real-
ity. Winnicott writes, “The transitional phenomena are allowable to the
infant because of the parents’ intuitive recognition of the strain inherent in
objective perception,” the strain of representing and interacting with what
is recalcitrant to fantasy and desire (Winnicott 1999: 15–16).The transitional
object is then a symbol standing for union-in-disunion, the possibility of a
world neither frustrating nor orgiastic, neither dead nor effortlessly control-
lable. It anchors a region where the self makes things that matter. It is,Win-
nicott claims, the source of the feeling of living, “what life itself is about.”
Bateson: “This Is Play”
In a 1955 essay Gregory Bateson made the remarkable claim that commu-
nicative play presents an instructive logical paradox, itself the subject of
much debate in early twentieth-century logic (Bateson 2000). Engaging in
play with another requires a “metacommunication,” itself internal to the play
context, which must then be logically paradoxical.The joust, for example,
must proceed in a situation guided by the metacommunication “This is
play.”To take a nonhuman example, the apparent bite one playing dog gives
another must, in Bateson’s terms, denote a real bite but in such a way that
it does not denote what a real bite denotes, namely, hostility.This is a version
of the ancient Paradox of the Liar, which arises whenever we try to interpret
statements like “I am lying.” If the statement is true, it means that the speaker
is telling a falsehood, hence his statement must be false. If the statement is
false, then what the speaker says is not a lie and must be true. Bertrand
Russell’s famous analysis of this problem considered the set of all sets that
do not contain themselves. Such a set must but also must not contain itself.
This problem caused Frege, the godfather of modern logic, to doubt the
adequacy of his own logical system and led Russell to formulate his “theory
of types” in an effort at solution (Kneale and Kneale 1962: 656).
Bateson is suggesting that the mundane phenomenon of play, as well as
drama, ritual, and art, are real-world expressions of this logical problem. In
order to play with others some prospective participant must signal that
“the following act is not to be taken seriously.” (In the case of art we may
think of Michel Duchamps’s famous painting of a pipe, titled “Ce n’est pas
un pipe,”“This is not a pipe.”) Bateson concludes, not that these activities
are devoid of sense, but that they presuppose a complex logic of commu-
nication. In a stream of behavior an agent indicates that the behavior now
arising, or about to arise, is not to be taken in its “normal” way.This can
only arise once the participants achieve the capacity to recognize their sig-
nals as signals and thus the ability to meta-communicate, to signal that one’s
signals ought to be understood in a certain way. For Bateson the logical
paradox is irremediable and productive; it marks the development of a cru-
cial human capacity. Human communication as we understand it is impos-
sible without the ability to create such paradoxes.
Callois: Playing the Self
Having reviewed Huizinga’s book, the French philosopher and anthropol-
ogist Roger Callois responded with his own account of play in Les jeux et les
hommes (translated as Man, Play and Games). Callois distinguishes four types
of games, separable into two pairs: agon, or contests, and alea, or games of
chance; mimesis, or imitation, and ilinx, vertigo or ecstasy. Agon is a struc-
tured rivalry in which members desire to win on the basis of merit. Alea
or games of chance involve no merit (except, we might say, the courage to
risk). Such games are passive in the sense that one can only wait for fate to
decide the outcome. Mimesis is the loss of self in another identity. Ilinx, as in
carnival rides and amusement parks, is the creation of vertiginous, ecstatic
states. Mimesis and ilinx are more primitive and predominate in segmentary
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societies, whereas agon and alea remain prominent in what he calls civiliza-
tion, presumably agroliterate, citified societies. Indeed, “the transition to
civilization as such implies the gradual elimination of the primacy of ilinx
and mimicry in combination, and the substitution and predominance of
the agon-alea pairing of competition and chance” (Callois 2001: 97).All four
vary in the degree to which they tend toward paidia, uncontrolled fantasy
or “tumult,” on one hand, or ludus, skill-employing play in which problems
are created for the sake of solving them, on the other.
Callois implies that play and games form the root metaphors of a vari-
ety of modern social institutions. Capitalism is agon. Our “serious” social
life is competition.We imagine, or want to make the competition, like a
contest, hence purely fair and equal, purely meretricious. But this results in
a great avocational need for alea, for games of chance, where merit can be
overcome, where anyone can win at any moment.We also create “disguised”
games of chance, forms of competition in which luck is decisive but a
veneer of merit is added (as in many television game shows). Our notion
of justice is tied up with agon and alea. They likewise reinforce identity in
a context of the negotiation of social status. On the other hand, mimicry
and vertigo permit the abandonment of identity. Callois invokes the Nietz-
schean distinction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, the order-
giving and order-breaking spirits of archaic Greek culture, relating them to
agon-alea and ilinx-mimesis, respectively. Like Nietzsche, who connected
the Apollonian and Dionysian to dreaming and intoxication, Callois argues
that neither of the play pairs is realistic; each avoids reality, one by the con-
struction of the pleasing illusion of a self and the other by the disintegra-
tion, hence dedifferentiation, of self and other. Callois suggests that the
movement from segmentary to civilized life entails the movement from the
desired loss of self in intoxication, or the Dionysian element of ilinx and
mimesis, to the dreamlike Apollonian constructions of agon and alea.
Callois makes an important point of what he calls the absolute status of
games.The equality of the players is established despite their unequal posi-
tions outside the game.The rules are absolute because they are arbitrary,
that is, have no meaning outside the game. The response to the child or
newcomer who asks why there is such a rule is a frustrated “Because that’s
the way we play!”The rules cannot be derived from outside. Play and game
thereby embody fictive necessity, made-up obligation. Rather than “nonseri-
ous,” Callois calls them “nonproductive,” meaning they do not produce what
is needed outside the play or game: in play “property is exchanged,” he
writes, “but no goods are produced.” Hence—and this is Callois’s real
improvement over a strain of thought about play from Schiller to Huizinga—
rather than being nonserious, play and games are nonhistorical.The results of
the preceding game are not retained, there is no progress between games.
Each new game starts at zero. Play and game are nonefficacious reenact-
ments of productive and serious activities, and thereby possess “the perma-
nence of the insignificant” (Callois 2001: 81). For this reason Callois resists
the direct connection of play and culture.While the “spirit” of play is essen-
tial to culture,“games and toys are historically the residues of culture,” cul-
tural activities whose “serious” meaning has been lost or truncated, as when
war is mimicked in peacetime by the tournament. (This judgment, I would
argue, is due to his inadequate definition of culture.War is clearly a social
activity, but not particularly cultural, however much it has cultural orna-
mentation and stimulates cultural motifs, hence the tournament is not an
inefficacious “playful” residue of war, but a cultural activity. Nevertheless,
Callois is right that culture is not play simpliciter, as we shall see.)
Gadamer: The Art of Play
More than any other twentieth-century philosopher, with the possible
exception of Ernst Cassirer, Hans Georg-Gadamer embedded human cog-
nition in culture. In his Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method), all under-
standing is a matter of dialogue between interpreter and interpreted, hence
the cultural traditions of each.This is not the place to exposit or evaluate
Gadamer’s hermeneutics; we shall focus only on his notion of play and
what it signifies within his account.
Gadamer emphasizes the “primacy of the play over the consciousness of
the player” (Gadamer 1994: 104).The play requires a bounded space, a play-
ing “field,” a “closed world.”The game “masters” the players in the sense
that roles taken on by players can be utterly false.Art begins in and culmi-
nates such play, for play presents the primary aesthetic process of “transfor-
mation into form” (Gebilde). The drama, for example, is the repetition of
origin whereby the unfulfilled possibilities of real situations are actualized,
revealing their truth in a “repetition that brings the essence forth.”
All this is presented in a section of Gadamer’s book titled “Play as the clue
to ontological explanation [of the work of art].” It introduces the notion of
“fusion” of present and past events, later to be articulated as Gadamer’s
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central concept.The dramatic or historiographical repetition of a past event
actualizes a fusion of the performance and the original, both in drama and
ritual; the original, as a “temporal” entity, exists only by repeating itself as dif-
ferent (Gadamer 1994: 123). His notion of Wirkungsgeschichte or “effective
history,” historically effected/effecting consciousness, is that all historical
research is already affected by the object which it investigates, by a “pre-
understanding” that is partly the result of that very object as it has been
understood through the tradition. Hence, knowledge of the object can never
be “objective” or “complete.” But how then do we know the past? It is
Gadamer’s achievement to suggest that our involvement with the past, our
being affected by it, being part of it, hence lacking “distance” from it, far
from being an obstacle to knowledge is the necessary condition for understand-
ing the past.True understanding occurs when the “horizons” of the histo-
rian and the historical document “fuse” (Horizonsverschmelzung), when “we
regain the concepts of a historical past in such a way that they also include
our own comprehension of them” (Gadamer 1994: 374).We reconstruct the
question to which the historical artifact or text or event is an answer by
making it for ourselves a “real” question. Following Plato, all our knowl-
edge of past cultural artifacts or texts is a dialogue with the artifacts, not an
observation of them.We know them when we “make [them] our own.”
From Play to Culture to Reality
All this may sound mildly interesting. Certainly many of the phenomena
we have discussed as play are parts of culture, and perhaps play informs cul-
ture as a whole. But what can this tell us about any supposed role of
culture in our understanding of reality? If a modern, might we say, “post-
cultural” understanding of reality has cast a skeptical eye on culture as pleas-
ing illusion, how much further removed from the real is play?
In drawing this connection we may start in what may seem an odd place,
the feeling of unreality. One version of that feeling is nicely described in
Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited, when the young Charles Ryder is leav-
ing the scene of his youthful romantic adventures.
But as I drove away and turned back in the car to take what prom-
ised to be my last view of the house, I felt that I was leaving part
of myself behind, and that wherever I went afterwards I should feel
the lack of it, and search for it hopelessly, as ghosts are said to do,
frequenting the spots where they buried material treasures without
which they cannot pay their way to the nether world. . . . I had
come to the surface, into the light of common day and the fresh
sea-air, after long captivity in the sunless coral palaces and waving
forests of the ocean bed. I had left behind my—what? Youth?
Adolescence? Romance? . . . “I have left behind illusion,” I said to
myself. “Henceforth I live in a world of three dimensions—with
the aid of my five senses.” I have since learned that there is no such
world. (Waugh 1964: 190–91)
There is a deep truth here in the final sentence’s recognition that in a real
experiential sense reality can evaporate.That is, among the issues of Charles
Ryder’s life, loves, and accomplishments, or lack thereof, there remains a
crucial underdetermination of decision by fact, a feeling that the tangible,
stable, and mundane could, on the breath of a whim, be turned upside
down, something that Milan Kundera called the unbearable lightness of
being (Kundera 1984b).This is one of the senses in which reality can seem
unreal. For the “real” has several meanings, and each one of them can only
be encountered given a certain condition of the experiencer.A functional
sensorium is not enough. Nor is desire, will, or the urge to survive. Nor is
even objectivity, by which I mean a socially understood system of lawfully
interacting objects. Something more is required. Not that feelings of un-
reality are, so to speak, bad, something to be gotten rid of, defended against.
They may be, as in the Waugh passage, highly important and illuminating
experiences. But one imagines they can only be so if the subject’s general
experience is one of reality, if the unreal is a passing, and not a normative,
phenomenon.At any rate, my point is that the sense of reality is complexly
funded. Simply put, reality is an acquired taste.
Here Charles Peirce’s phenomenological categories provide a useful
template for describing how “real” and “reality” function in human experi-
ence. One aspect of experienced reality is its sheer phenomenal quality, the
redness of the red dress, the bite of the wind, which Peirce called “Firstness”
(Peirce 1955: 75ff.). In a second sense the real is difference, opposition, the
resistance of physical bodies in space, the “Secondness” that Peirce nicely
exemplified by the feeling of a shoulder against a door.Third, reality is intel-
ligible and represent-able order, the primary sense of “objectivity” confirmed
by social agreement and ultimately science, which Peirce called “Thirdness”
132 CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS
PLAYING REALITY 133
(he does not imply that all is orderly). Peirce’s categories are offered here
not as metaphysically right or complete, although I do suspect the three are
necessary, that experience lacking felt quality, spatial resistance, or ordered
intelligibility would indeed feel “unreal.” Expanding Peirce’s description,
whatever else we are, we each inhabit reality as an intentional consciousness
with a functional sensorium revealing phenomena, as a physical object
among other physical objects, as an animal driven by needs to respond to
environmental stimulus patterns, and as an intelligent, fully socialized ob-
server, and tester, of objective regularities. I suggest that another mode of
encountering the world seems a necessary part of our experiential reper-
toire.We also inhabit reality as agents who act with understanding in a world
containing ends in themselves. This means not that all reals are ends in them-
selves, but that some must be, and the world in general is experienced as
structured by the significance rooted in these ends.The role of the human
experiencer which encounters reals in this way is agency. My point will be
that culture provides the conditions necessary for experiencing the world in
this way.That is, culture provides conditions necessary for perceiving, nego-
tiating, and understanding reality as an agent does. There are three such con-
ditions provided by culture: a normative environment, framing, and drama.
The Normative Environment
There is an affective and normative dimension to our experience and per-
ception of real things.“Real” is a normative and affective term as well as a
descriptive one. Real means not merely apparent, not merely phenomenal. It
means salient, resistant, intelligible, available for contemplation and/or
manipulation and/or enjoyment and/or suffering. It is a term, if you will, of
respect, of recognition.The recognition of the reality of a thing is a recog-
nition of its importance, its being something that must be dealt with, not
wished away. As noted, Dewey rightly argued against a reified stimulus-
response model of human behavior that stimuli are constructed, or prepared,
by motor activity, so that sensation-action is a circuit. Merleau-Ponty like-
wise saw the role of tactility and the “flesh,” the bodily surface, as a “subject-
object,” a spatial thing that feels by acting (Merleau-Ponty 1968). I would
add affectivity to this circuit. Sensation and action require as well affect, what
Heidegger called state of mind (Befindlichkeit) or feeling. Reality is as much
as an achievement of affectivity as of perception and motor activity.
We experience the affective and normative environment in our status as
agents. In a broad sense, agency is the status of a human being as a compre-
hending actor in the world, a particular being in a process we call living,
whose temporal sojourn is in some sense a unit, and whose surround is not
only tolerably regular or intelligible, but structured by significance. Agents
are personal, the peculiar owners of their experiences and history.They are
selves.Agency is not all about acting or doing, but the other modes of the
agent’s appropriation of the world—its undergoing or experiencing, its
physical subsistence, its arranging or constructing, and its cognition of the
world—are within the perspective of agency processed through a history of
and potentiality for action. It is as agent that I am, in Buchler’s terms,“born
in a state of natural debt, being antecedently committed to the execution
or the furtherance of acts that will largely determine [my] existence” (Buch-
ler 1955: 3). Likewise, the world for agency is a domain whose intelligibil-
ity, inertial force or resistance, and qualities are organized around meaning-
ful and valuable beings, beings that are ends, valued in themselves and not
merely as objects of, or means toward satisfying, desire or need. It not the
case that all objects and events must be ends or that ends must be devoid of
instrumental value or desired consequences, but some components of the
world must be ends to provide its significant structure. This notion of 
the world as a structure of significance bears the echoes of Heidegger’s con-
cept of Weltlichkeit (world-hood),Arendt’s world of artifacts, Johannes von
Uexküll’s Umwelt, or surrounding environment, and J. J. Gibson’s conception
of the “affordances” of things (Heidegger 1962;Arendt 1958; Gibson 1979;
von Uexküll 1926).
If “subject” means consciousness, or more generally, us, and objectivity is
what consciousness perceives outside itself as uncontrollable by thought,
then there is something about culture which falls between, which spans the
subjective and the objective. Pure phenomena can of course be salient and
compelling; I do not presume they are a desultory, passing array of qualia.
But clearly the infant brings something to experience besides sensory
capacity. It brings needs, or if you will, will. As Hans Jonas argued in The Phe-
nomenon of Life, wherever there is life, there is metabolism, and metabolism
is the first arising of autonomy, the homeostatic process by which an entity
maintains its existence as a particular identity throughout an exchange of
materials with environment (Jonas 1966). As soon as there is metabolism,
things start to matter in an experiential sense, to be relevant to the mainte-
134 CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS
PLAYING REALITY 135
nance of the organism. This is the beginning of agency, freedom, identity,
and affectivity; an entity does something, namely, modifies self and environ-
ment to remain in existence as itself, and so remaining is a crucial issue,
hence whatever impacts that likelihood matters. It is also correlated with a
more complex form of objectivity. Desire or will, as embodied in action,
discovers obstacles that must be negotiated, troubles that have to be faced.
One might say, life brings teleology into the world.
But as Winnicott argues, need-satisfaction does not grant the reality of
the need-satisfying object.While it prepares the experience of objectivity
by focusing attention, it undermines the independence of the object. For
the infant, the fact that when it cries the “object” magically appears—“I
want food and, poof, she’s there”—indicates the ontological continuity of
the object with its own needs and fantasies—“She is part of me.”As long
as the object obtains in a zone of experience flooded by desire, it is not real
in the sense of an independent object.There must evolve a zone of mild,
moderate or sublimated interest. Psychodynamic theory traditionally re-
garded frustration, and hence separation from the primary parent, as the
mechanism of realistic disappointment.“Reality” would thus be the name
for what withholds. Winnicott’s alternative is that such withholding could
not become the kind of reality with which mature agency could interact;
given the psychic environment described, it would be a “dead” reality, hence
in a very important sense not real. Play is the first working-out of the
experience of things independent from yet affectively related to the agent.
Nobody plays without emotion; if they do, they’re not playing. Enjoyment,
fascination, pleasure, delight, anger, fear, envy, and so forth, must be present
in play. It is in play that we work through the fact that thoughts can lead to
events, but only via the mediation of muscular movement, that reals can be
made by us, hence that “reality” is a phase or modality of being into which
our thoughts and feelings can enter and achieve form, that something can
be outside the magical continuity with self and yet at the same time be
affectively worthy, real in the sense of deserving the agent’s respect. Play is
the delimited environment for experiments in emerging agency in relation to mean-
ingful reals independent of the subject.
It arises, I suggest, out of repetition. At first this repetition is probably intro-
duced by others in the simplest forms of play, like moving an object, hiding
and revealing a face, repeating a song. Later the child will manipulate the
repetition and reappearance itself, and this will be the first self-produced
meaning. Repetition creates the fundamental experiential form of intelli-
gibility: the fulfillment of anticipation. Something in the world stimulates
anticipation, and then the world matches this anticipation, giving the expe-
rience of satisfaction, as the return to the tonic chord in music will later,
hence a primitive kind of control—the self is able to do something about
the world, and the world confirms the validity of its doing, even though
this will be interpreted initially as magical omnipotence. Eventually the
experience of the outside as genuinely outside yet in tune with the inside,
as matching the inchoate self ’s vitality, emerges as repetition ceases to be
the magical continuation of the self, becoming instead a dialogue with the
world.The imitation of series of actions comes to have the same satisfac-
tion, the fulfillment of anticipation, only now in the register of the cre-
ation of meaning by the “agent,” the child. Mimesis, imitation, hence what
we call representation, has its root here.Things are real in so far as they are
actually or potentially repetitive.
As the child matures, the role played by the received and selected objects
of play come to be taken by objects that are made, transformed by imagi-
native handling and construction. The made objects, which become for
Hanna Arendt the world of “work,” provide the primary instance of objec-
tive ends, things that matter, and matter not merely in their function as sat-
isfying needs, nor as means to such satisfaction, but as ends in themselves.
This is particularly important, as Winnicott argued. For the spaciotemporal
object that is in some significant sense made becomes the prime instance
of value-things, or to use a tired terminology, a subject-object. It is that of
which Winnicott says that we cannot ask whether it is subjective or objective,
a fancy of the mind or a material object whose “meaning” is extrinsic to it,
without undermining the special “transitional” role it plays in experience.
Now, my argument may seem to ignore an obvious alternative to play
and culture as precondition for a fully viable sense of reality. As several
branches of philosophy have learned in recent decades, knowledge or intel-
ligibility of the world is based in some crucial sense in intersubjectivity. Sim-
ply put, objectivity is social: the individual’s perception of things can only
be understood as objective through the confirmation, testing, and discon-
firmation that social communication brings. As Mead put it, to have an
objective view of the world is to view it from the perspective of the “gen-
eralized other,” the perspective of an open-ended community. Thus one
might say against my current claim,“Look, we’ve known for most of a cen-
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tury that, yes, society, social communication, or social action is necessary to
the experience and/or understanding of reality. Pragmatism, ordinary lan-
guage philosophy, hermeneutics, etc., have long since held this. And you
yourself have cited this work! So why make the extravagant claim that cul-
ture, not just society, is crucial to the sense of the real?”
I am arguing that beyond the admittedly social constitution of reality
for us, culture, as it supervenes on society, adds something to our objective
perception that social interaction devoid of culture cannot. It adds to the
socialized perception and intelligibility of things the organization of those
things around ends in themselves, that is, around things understood as valu-
able not merely because they serve organismic or social purpose.The suc-
cessfully socialized human of course has the capacity to test its experience
in terms of the perspective of others, and picks out of its environment
objects and events that speak to its socialized needs. But it can also cherish
objects, gaze at the beauty and profundity of natural things and events, revere
and wonder at things.When things are valued not for their role as need-
satisfiers, tools, or markers of social approbation, but as ends, culture is at
work. Culture thus provides normative objectivity over time; what is and has
been valid in itself. It is the school of real, objective value. It provides the
ontological basis of social norms. Without a cultural ontology, a cultural
description of existing things that are ends, there would be no “worldview,”
no understanding of a suprasocial world, that would justify social rules of
propriety and intelligibility. In effect, without the cultural ascription of value
to things, societies would have to accept the truth of conventionalism, that their
norms are humanly constructed, unreflective of the world beyond human
agreement.
Now, as suggested in the preceding chapter, postmodern society has
eviscerated the role of cultural ontologies. It is true that our era, as noted,
eschews most of the ontologies of gods and spirits, leaving for its “official”
ontology science, whose shifting and unperceivable metaphysics is uniquely
unsuited to a social role.That is indeed an important fact about our society.
But this does not mean all culturally posited entities are socially anachro-
nistic.We may take one crucial case: persons. Scientifically speaking there is
no clear line separating what we call humans from nonhumans. Humanity
is a matter of degree.We are made of roughly the same stuff as nonhuman
creatures, sharing with them the vast majority of our DNA. Ethology con-
tinues to shave away previously unquestioned human uniqueness, such as
language, whose use by gifted primates and dolphins under experimenters’
tutelage keeps advancing.The modeling of human thought by digital and
analogue devices shaves from the opposite side. Most of all, what we regard
as persons today is one of a large number of hominid species that have
populated the Earth in the past, at various levels of sophistication (that is to
say, similarity to us).Would a thawed-out Neanderthal be allowed to vote
in the next presidential election? What about Homo erectus? But despite the
continuum of current humans and other species, virtually all our social and
normative life depends on positing a discontinuity, a strict line between the
human and the nonhuman which must appear arbitrary from a scientific
perspective (a line even scientists must respect when deciding whom to
admit to their universities).This line is, as Elizabeth Baeten puts it, mythi-
cal, meaning not a traditional belief known to be false by contemporary
inquiry, but a normative belief unjustifiable by inquiry that nevertheless must
be presupposed by society, including by that inquiry itself (Baeten 1996).
Adapting a Heideggerian figure, we may represent the context of expe-
rience as a place, a background, a clearing, in which everything meaningful,
in the sense I have meant, “takes place.” Hence we can hazard a further
analysis of culture: culture holds open the clearing. That is, it holds open the
place from which subjective and objective emerge as symbiotically related
yet distinct phases of experience, of which, as Winnicott says of the child’s
experience, the question “Is it created or discovered?” must remain ambigu-
ous.This makes a place for the teleological meaning of human existence,
human society, and reality. Its absence is the death of meaning, which occurs
either when fact ceases to mean and so ceases to be fact, or when meaning
ceases to attach to being and so ceases to be. Culture maintains the context
in which the ends can be real, and reals can be ends, hence the self ’s feelings
are real and the real is felt by the self.
Framing
Culture does this in part by framing. Phenomena cannot be experienced or
understood as real except through frames, which is to say, appropriated
“under a description.” In this sense Kant was right, and Cassirer’s applica-
tion of Kantianism to cultural or “symbolic” forms was prescient.The art
object, the festival, the sporting event, the legal contest, not to mention
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perhaps the most crucial case, “plays” or staged dramas, have their frames,
dates, boundary lines, courtrooms, and prosceniums. Frames distinguish
inside and outside.What do they keep out? All other contexts, but in the
present case, primarily work, economic necessity, acquisition and produc-
tion, brute physical necessity, and history. Frames must cancel many of the
cognitive and social rules operative outside; so in the play I am not my
usual pauper self, but a king.Those who are social unequals in the outside
world are equal under the rules of a sport. This already means the play
frame must be constructed, artificial, partitioned. Play requires boundaries
that hold off the activities of the world outside.
Of course, all social contexts require frames of some kind. But play frames
are particularly opaque, since they must rule out so much.As Callois claimed,
“serious” activities progress in the sense of accumulating both products
and changes in technique or experience, so are historical.The unique status
of play is that in play we can see the framing, we are aware of the institution
of boundedness. Most of all, play situations are bounded as ends in themselves.
Play is perfectly circular; it is the epitome of the cyclical notion of time
familiar from Mircea Eliade’s analysis of segmentary societies (Eliade 1954).
If instrumentality in its normal form is ruled out, the rules and vicissitudes
must be played for their own sake. Play is thus not only sui generis: it is the
sui generis itself.
This character is inherited by cultural frames.Thus what Huizinga la-
mented in a modern or postmodern context is an undermining of frames
in which the bounded-ness of any social frame is regarded as mere appear-
ance, its “reality” being its place in a universal process of cause-effect, instru-
mental manipulation, and progress. As Arendt claimed about the modern
subordination of all social and political life to economics, modernity pro-
motes a dynamic, processural view of the world in which each item and
event is a point of receding intrinsic significance. Something about mod-
ern instrumental rationality or functionalization breaks down the cultural
frames of social life, spilling out their contents as fungible means toward
practical ends. Culture is then the unframed framing of social contexts with tele-
ological meaning, meaning irreducible to practical accumulation.
For culture is all about the reality of socially drawn distinctions. G. Spen-
cer Brown begins his provocative logic of distinctions with the stipulation,
“Draw a distinction” (Spencer Brown 1994). Well, culture does that. The
installation of distinctions, arranged in a system of orders, is the logic of
culture. Sneakers are proper in one context, leather shoes in another; what
can be said to my wife cannot be said to my neighbor; a religious belief
cannot be utilized by a liberal state; during the ceremony before the hunt
the buffalo’s horns make me a beast, but if I don them tomorrow during sup-
per, my children will laugh at me. Distinctions hold only within contexts,
and culture maintains the most important value-laden frames for social
contexts.Without framing, no normative distinction can hold up.A world
in which all is one cannot have culture in it. In Bateson’s language, culture
frames.What undermines culture is either the reduction of distinctions to
unity, or the reduction of all unities to what Jacques Derrida called différance
or sheer difference (Derrida 1973). Culture presents the meaningful reality
of the distinctions societies draw. Its teleological connections argue for the
necessity, validity, and reality of the key frames. If those are illusions, then
culture is an illusion.
And we know this because we also have the impulse to destroy all frames
and distinctions.That is the Dionysian impulse, which Nietzsche describes
in The Birth of Tragedy, to destroy the principium individuationis, the ego or
principle of individuation (Nietzsche 1956). It is not only the self and its
distinction from the world that are thereby eliminated, but all distinctions,
anything holding apart from anything else, all the frames that make it pos-
sible to preserve contextual integrities.The Dionysian impulse says, “No,
that’s the end! No more subtle rules and distinctions that force reflection
and refraction, that diminish by slowing energy. Enough foppery and dec-
oration. Enough of ‘each thing is what it is and not another thing,’ of ‘this
is not the time for that.’We shall roar through all portals and windows, all
limitations.” But Dionysus is outmatched. Unity loses to difference. For the
living make, and must make to keep living.Thus does Dionysus become a
moment in the dialectical development of culture, the destruction of mean-
ing and form takes its place in the history of meaning and form. Philo-
sophical skepticism and nihilism, explosively antistructural forms of art,
even violence itself, become part of the narration of contexts whose bound-
aries they deny. Hume and Nietzsche are studied in courses in modern
philosophy, Jackson Pollock hangs in the museum with Rembrandt, De
Sade becomes an historical precursor of Genet for students of comparative
literature. Culture is thus the socially shared framing of social contexts, the mak-
ing of contextual distinctions that allows the differentiation of value-spheres.
In culture these frames are literally made, since they are marked by activities
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and artifacts. The cultural products “hold up” the frames. Human beings
cannot stop understanding by making.That making is our medium, and its
name is culture.
Drama
In lamenting the failure to suspend disbelief that he found in contemporary
cultural experience, the American historian and social critic Christopher
Lasch wrote,“The illusion of reality dissolves, not in a heightened sense of
reality as we might expect, but in a remarkable indifference to reality. Our
sense of reality appears to rest, curiously enough, on our willingness to be
taken in by the staged illusion of reality. . . . [T]he very idea of reality [is]
dependent at every point on the distinction between nature and artifice,
reality and illusion” (Lasch 1979: 160). I think this is true. More particularly,
in our existence as agents our sense of the real is derivative of narrative.
With Alasdair MacIntyre, Samuel Fleischacker, Michael Oakeshott, Ken-
neth Burke, and Bernard Lonergan I am suggesting that the characteristic
form of intelligibility under which events are understood by cultural beings
is narrative.The cultural construction which provides the framed teleolog-
ical meanings available to human understanding is fundamentally dramatic.
This drama is the construction of human agents, metaphorically “clothing”
reality in an idiom that answers to the needs of those agents.We can live,
act, and know in a fully human way only in a world structured by our own
making.This construction is not a barrier to or shield from reality.To put it
simply, making is the way we know.
Narrative is the organization of events into a historical process that pro-
ceeds, as Aristotle formulated it, from a beginning, through a middle, to an
end, and in which the passage of events occurs at least partly through the
acts of agents. It is inherently teleological in that the narrative is drawn so
as to depict events in their meaning for the transition to a purposive end
(even if the end is tragic). It must both tie events together and set them off
from all other events. Narrative is the domain from which a series of fun-
damental human notions are drawn, like action, agent, role, character, moti-
vation, performance, and history, notions that in turn largely make freedom
and agency intelligible, and even serve as models of the possibility of causal
explanation.The very distinction of “doing” from “undergoing” seems to
require a teleological or dramatic element, just as apparently nondramatic
accounts of “events,” happenings, or “news” entail the division of processes
into bounded episodes characterized by the classical trinity of beginning,
middle, and end. As Mark Freeman suggests, “Narratives . . . rather than
being the mere fictions they are sometimes assumed to be, might instead
be in the service of attaining exactly those forms of truth that are unavail-
able in the flux of the immediate” (Freeman 1993: 224).Without this, reality
becomes phenomena without salience.The feeling of reality is gone.Absence
of connection to goals undoes the sense by which will is connected to real-
ity.As such, cultural things in the form of narration are the model of intel-
ligibility for humans, the form of reality for us being primarily dramatic.
It has been argued that consciousness itself is narrative. John Dewey incor-
porated a narrative theory of consciousness into his naturalistic account of
experience.
Thus the purport of past affairs is present in the momentary cross-
sectional idea in a way which is more intimate, direct and pervasive
than the way of recall. It is positively and integrally carried in and by
the incidents now happening: these incidents are, in the degree of
genuine dramatic quality, fulfillment of the meanings constituted by
past events. . . . Every case of consciousness is dramatic; drama is an
enhancement of the conditions of consciousness. (Dewey 1958: 306)
Remarkably, this conception has been echoed by contemporary cognitive
science.Antonio Damasio has argued that the structure of perception is nar-
rative.What he calls “core consciousness,” the “pulselike” rudimentary and
fleeting stimulations of feeling, is a constant constructive process of “non-
verbal story telling,” a prelinguistic narrative of “images” or patterns, which
is how the organism represents its own changing state to itself (Damasio
1999).This consciousness orders and appropriates the bodily responses to
physical influences as events “owned” by a self. Consciousness thus con-
structs a particular way of interacting with the world, one that enhances
perception of those objects whose presence induces feelings by patterning
them as being available from a character’s perspective.
It is useful to distinguish the narrative structure of experience as the
first-person intelligibility of experience from the second-and-third-person
telling of a story.The telling becomes the archetypal cultural event of ren-
dering life, experience, and world meaningful and intelligible. It is the
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experience of meaning/intelligibility made into art, whose illocutionary
function—what type of act the utterance performs, e.g., a reporting—is
cognitive or representative, even if its perlocutionary function—what con-
sequence is accomplished by the utterance, e.g., socialization—is practical.
As David Carr points out, the story “gathers” the otherwise lost moments
of experience into a meaningful, memorable whole (Carr 1986). Unlike
the character of the story, the narrator knows the end, hence the point, of
the action of the characters. Events and actions are selected that carry the
intimation of the dramatic end in themselves. As Carr explains, this is an
ideal of human intelligibility to which real-life agents aspire but can never
fulfill. I can carry into my experience the imagined perspective of a future
narrator, a temporalized version of Mead’s generalized other, through what
we could call, leavening Heidegger with Carr, anticipatory retrospection. Such
is a possible mode of my present experience.We seek this attitude of the
storyteller on our own lives because it alone renders life intelligible, that is,
understandable as the life, not of an organism or point in a social system or
an unconscious dynamism—all of which are legitimate and important
truths about me—but the life of an actor, agent, or character.
This does not mean everything cultural has a direct connection to, or
itself embodies, dramatic narrative. It means most of the cultural phenom-
ena of a particular society can be understood as grouping about such nar-
ratives, like data points around a mathematical line or curve. Neither does
it means there is only one story going on. Many stories, as MacIntyre sug-
gested, collect about key experiences, icons, and rituals.Arguably we are all
like those medieval commentators whose subplots were written into the
margins of their inherited scriptural stories.As Peirce said of signs, stories
multiply.The story of the founder, like a coral reef, accretes the tales of the
others who retell it, and the stories of subsequent leaders, as well as new
interpretations of all of these.
Consider a postmodern American poem.
“There must be some way out of here,”
said the joker to the thief,
“There’s too much confusion,
I can’t get no relief.
Businessmen, they drink my wine,
Plowmen dig my earth.
None of them along the line know what any of it is worth.”
“No reason to get excited,”
the thief, he kindly spoke,
“There are many here among us
who think that life is but a joke.
But you and I, we’ve been through that,
and this is not our fate.
So let us not talk falsely now, the hour is getting late.”
All along the watchtower,
princes kept the view.
While all the women came and went,
barefoot servants too.
Outside in the distance
a wildcat did growl.
Two riders were approaching, the wind began to howl.
(Bob Dylan, All Along the Watchtower)
A rather unjovial joker despairs over the lack of appreciation of worth
endemic to his instrumental social world, not unlike Job’s perception of
vanity or MacBeth’s lament of life as a tale told by an idiot. But Dylan’s
thief takes a different view. Offering no justification, he ascribes to fate his
own escape from nihilism.Yet he intimates that the joker is not speaking
truthfully.And his warning compels: there isn’t much time.There are things
to be done.What are they? Here, in a remarkably conceptual move, Dylan
conjures something so compelling yet generic that it is less a story than the
sheer idea of story, a story about story-ness, a figure for narrativity itself.
Something unknown but crucial is about to take place, as if we have been
thrown, as Heidegger would say, into a Gothic tale at its climax, knowing
neither what led us here nor what will happen, a present nestled between
suspense in two directions. It brings a shift in our perspective whereby a
mystery unfolds, a drama in time, perhaps a wildcat growling in the dark
night as, unbeknownst to the castle’s inhabitants, riders approach.The oscil-
lation of experience between meaningfulness and absence of meaning,which
is at the same time the oscillation between reality and unreality, hangs on
the susceptibility of the world to narrative explanation. Only in narrative is
the world meaningful for human agents. Our first question, upon discover-
ing ourselves in any new and confusing context, is in sense if not in so
many words,“What’s the story?”
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Now, there are obviously other ways of making the world intelligible.
Science is all about intelligibility, but not narrative intelligibility. Even if it
must insert beginnings-middles-and-endings into the physical register—
for example, the recounting of the origin of things in Steven Weinberg’s
The First Three Minutes—its “stories” hardly compare to the kind of narrative
we find in myth, history, or dramatic art.As noted, human beings function
and experience in plural registers, for example, as material objects in a phys-
ical environment, and not only as dramatic agents.The world can be under-
stood a variety of nondramatic ways, for example, as a single pantheistic
substance (in the works of philosophers from Parmenides to Spinoza), as 
a collection of subatomic particles (in the works of philosophers from
Democritus to Bohr), or as a realm of illusion (in the Hindu philosophy of
Advaita Vedanta). But one of the modes of human being is agency, the sta-
tus of a unitary potential actor with sensibility, will, and cognition, who
affects and is affected by the world over a limited life span.The world for
agency is a field of interaction open to human experience and manipula-
tion, success and failure, where something is always at stake, of which
William James wrote,“It feels like a fight.” It is in our status as agents that
culture provides an intelligible world. If culture is illusion, so is agency. Even
those metaphysical schemes that appear to deny drama, when employed in
life as orientation for conduct and imagination, typically embrace drama;
the Buddhist narrative of the heroic Gautama coming to understand that
the world of agency is ultimately unreal is itself a drama of the first order.
Conclusion
Culture is the mature, socially generalized domain of the telic organization
of reality, populated by practices, narratives, and artifacts that are cathected
as ends in themselves, but nevertheless as social, external, objective. It offers
repetition or re-presentation of the ends in terms of which the world and
society attain intelligible and meaningful order. Culture presents the world
as organized about those processes and things which speak to agency, hence
affectivity and intelligibility, and the agent as a thing in that world which
exists in continuity with that world’s nexus of value. Culture is the place of
a society’s public drama.As such, culture is the school of meaningful agency, hence
of the real world as it is intelligible to agents. For what we must come to
accept is the self as a source and proprietor of a cathected world, a world
construed as valuable and meaningful, who is nevertheless a thing within
that world.The world is ours, or more precisely, appears only in and through
our projection, and we are in that world, part of an objective cosmos inde-
pendent of us. Managing that paradoxical status is the business of culture.
146 CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS
Relativism is nothing new.Throughout the history of Western philosophy,
when we find skepticism, we often find relativism.The most extreme skep-
ticism of the ancient Greek world, created by Pyrrho but best described
for us by Sextus Empiricus, was explicitly based in the relativity of percep-
tion to the perceiver. Like them, skeptics have often counseled obedience
to local social convention, having eschewed any higher or more universal
principles. But cultural relativism is peculiarly modern. It is only since the
eighteenth century that we find thinkers espousing, or fighting, the claim
that the validity of acts and utterances is relative to cultures per se. Cultural
relativism would not exist as a concept but for the intellectual and
sociopolitical revolutions of the Enlightenment.The reason is not that the
new age brought international exchange and interaction among cultures;
there had always been such interaction. Nor is it a novel deflationary West-
ern self-consciousness as merely one among many civilizations; arguably
the modern West has never had such a consciousness, or only in very recent
bouts of ambiguous revisionism. Rather, it is due to a uniquely modern
collision of politics and philosophy and society whereby, for the first time,
all seemed inexorably to condition each other.
As we have seen, it is during the simultaneous demise of Western impe-
rialism and philosophical foundationalism in the second half of the twenti-
eth century that Western thought took a further cultural turn. Dewey, the
later Wittgenstein, J. L.Austin, Quine, Gadamer, Habermas, and Derrida all
made meaning public rather than transcendental or private, hence histori-
cally variable, thereby opening the door to relativism.Today few philoso-
phers endorse relativism but many court it. In reaction to this reaction some
think that “cultural relativism” is a bogeyman only anachronistic founda-
tionalists could fear. If we give up outmoded hopes of justifying knowl-
edge from the ground up, they say, then relativism loses its power to threaten.
Clifford Geertz’s “Anti Anti-Relativism” makes just this point (Geertz 1989).
7 WHY THERE IS  NO PROBLEM OF 
CULTURAL RELATIVISM
In supporting his “frank ethnocentrism” (Rorty 1991a: 168), which endorses
universal rights and rational critique as the culture of the modern West
rather than as valid in themselves, Richard Rorty has suggested that Hilary
Putnam and other philosophers should cease to conjure up the “relativist
menace” (Rorty 1998). For Geertz and Rorty the demise of objectivity is
unproblematic. They affect what we could call the Alfred E. Neumann
response to relativism:“What, me worry?”
It will turn out that, oddly enough, Geertz and Rorty are right but for
the wrong reasons.The point is not to stop worrying and love relativity.
Relativism is arguably incoherent, and its abandonment of realism, the belief
that the validity or truth of our utterances is determined by their fealty to
reality, would indeed have serious social consequences (Cahoone 2002b).
The point is rather that a properly conceived realism remains unthreatened
by a limited cultural relativity that, while undeniable, is not the last word
on human cognition.
Relativity and Rationality
The recent background of the relativism debate arose from a remarkable
convergence of four distinct strains of thought between 1958 and 1962.
The first, explicitly anthropological, was inspired by the 1958 publication
of Peter Winch’s The Idea of a Social Science, in which he applied the work
of the later Wittgenstein to anthropological interpretation. He was quickly
criticized by Alasdair MacIntyre and Ernest Gellner, initiating what came to
be called the rationality debate. Next, in “Translation and Meaning,” a chap-
ter in his Word and Object (1960),W.V.O. Quine argued for the “indeter-
minacy” of translation between natural languages that shared no expres-
sions. Donald Davidson would later make a major contribution to that line
of thought, arguing that “conceptual scheme relativism,” and with it global
skepticism, is nonsensical. Third, also in 1960, the hermeneutics of Hans
Georg-Gadamer’s Truth and Method argued, as we saw, that we must accept
the historically embedded nature of cognition as the source of, rather than
an obstacle to, truth. Last, in 1962 Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions claimed that scientific revolutions involve “paradigm” shifts so
deep and far-reaching that the meanings of terms from one paradigm to
the next may be “incommensurable,” making rational, noncircular evalua-
tion of the paradigms impossible. These formed the background for the
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philosophical debate over relativism in the late twentieth century. More
recently MacIntyre, Samuel Fleischacker, and Lorenzo Simpson have pro-
posed nuanced accounts of the logic of intercultural communication and
evaluation that open the way for a realist rejoinder to relativism.
While Winch’s 1958 book initiated the debate, his response to its critics
is most relevant for us. In the essay “Understanding a Primitive Society”
(1964) he criticized anthropologist Evans-Pritchard’s study of an East African
people, the Azande.Winch argued that while having improved on the Euro-
centric approach of Levy-Bruhl, Evans-Pritchard still assumed the irrational-
ity of those Zande beliefs that contradicted modern Western science (Wil-
son 1970). Winch’s critique is straight out of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations: norms of rationality have meaning only within a practical-social
situation of language use.The Azande are realistic, consistent, and rational,
but according to their own distinctive criteria. For “rationality is not just a
concept in a language like any other. . . . It is a concept necessary to the
existence of any language: to say of a society that it has a language is also to
say that it has a concept of rationality” (Wilson 1970: 99). It is also striking
to recall Winch’s motivation, made clear in his political conclusion:“What
Marx called the ‘alienation’ characteristic of man in industrial society. . . .
Our blindness to the point of primitive modes of life is a corollary of the
pointlessness of much of our own life” (Wilson 1970: 106).
As we noted in the preceding chapter, the most prominent twentieth-
century attempt to promote an account of what could be called cultural
knowing, comes from Gadamer’s Truth and Method. The first task of Gada-
mer’s work was to establish that there exists a tradition, or rather a family
of traditions, in Western thought which acknowledges forms of under-
standing that lie outside “method” or more precisely “scientific method,”
including phronēsis or practical wisdom, the theory of “judgment,” taste in
aesthetics, and rhetoric in politics. Focusing on aesthetic and historical
understanding, Gadamer argued that reason operates through history, tradi-
tion, and culture, not outside them. Rather than make objective knowledge
impossible, reason’s immanence is our sole means of access to truth.True
understanding, for example of a historical artifact, occurs not by doffing
one’s historical prejudices but by mobilizing them into a dialogue with the
other. But this means there is no rational understanding outside or in-
dependent of cultural tradition. Consequently, “truth” in interpretation
requires, for Gadamer, that dialogue achieve a fusion of the interpretive
horizons of interpreter and interpreted.
Quine denied the very possibility of such a fusion. As he famously
argued in Word and Object, when the native points at a rabbit hopping by
and shouts “gavagai!” an observant anthropologist may take gavagai to
mean “rabbit.” But the meaning of gavagai is in principle underdetermined
by the observable stimulus conditions of the speaker and any ostensive act
(pointing). No behavioral situation would allow the anthropologist to dis-
tinguishing the native’s foreign ontology, whether she meant by gavagai
“An individuated physical object we call rabbit!” or “The unfolding of a
process of rabbit-ing!” or “An instantiation of the ideal form of Rabbit-
hood!” Indeed, as a behaviorist who denies that meanings are mental enti-
ties, Quine claims that there is no uniquely right translation, since there is
no fact of the matter that could decide which is right, no hidden object in
the native’s mind for the anthropologist to be right or wrong about. Quine
extends the case to a general conclusion:“To the same degree that the rad-
ical translation of sentences is under-determined by the totality of disposi-
tions to verbal behavior, our own theories and beliefs in general are under-
determined by the totality of possible sensory evidence time without end”
(Quine 1960: 78). He thus endorses what he elsewhere calls ontological
relativity, the underdetermination of our own ontological schemes by
observations between which evidence can never decide (Quine 1969).
The most important attack on the very problem of relativism in post–
World War II Western philosophy arrived as an extension of Quine’s view
in Donald Davidson’s “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (David-
son 1984). In a criticism of the global relativism of the linguist Benjamin
Whorf, Davidson denied that relativism of a robust sort can make any
sense at all. He rests his argument on the recognition that a relativism of
meaning, which would be inevitable for a global cognitive relativism, would
undermine the relativism of validity. If the meanings of statements were
culturally relative in a strong sense, then we could not discover that two
cultures made contrary statements, since one culture’s translation of another
culture’s claims would be “deprived of things to go wrong about.”We can
never find enough evidence to assert a deep relativism of meaning; the
translation of another culture’s claims must employ the principle of “char-
ity,” by which the translator assumes a sizable background agreement of
beliefs in order to translate any claim in question.Without the assumption
of commonality we cannot even begin to interpret their statements. Else-
where Davidson presses this argument further. Just as we can never find
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evidence necessary to justify statements like,“That culture over there shares
none of our beliefs,” we can make no sense of the claimed possibility that
the preponderance of our system of beliefs could be false, that we might be
wrong about everything.Thus “most of our beliefs must be true” (David-
son 1986: 314).
Relativism and Culture
With the historical resources now developed we can now turn to our sys-
tematic task. Relativism, if it is to mean something philosophical and trou-
bling, hence worth discussing, must claim that the judgments we take to be
valid or true are so because of their relation to traits of judges or judg-
ments, rather than traits of what is judged. Of course, even realists admit
that the traits of judgments, theories, and languages matter, but deny that
they are decisive. As such, relativism is a form of epistemological antireal-
ism, denying that what is judged, as something independent of the judg-
ment, determines the validity of the judgment. Note that in what follows I
will be solely concerned with epistemic relativism, relativism about the
validity of knowledge-claims. In particular, nothing said here implies that
moral norms must all be universal; there may well be such thing as “moral
relativity” (Wong 1984). Also, I will not treat “objective relativism,” the
metaphysical claim that real things are constituted by their manifold roles
in diverse contexts. Last, nothing herein specifically rebuts more technical
forms of relativism, like Joseph Margolis’s relativistic attack on bivalence—
although I would reject such approaches for other reasons (Margolis 2000;
Cahoone 2002c).
What then does “cultural” add to “relativism”? Presumably it makes cul-
tures the things to which the validity of judgment is relative. So if culture
is a society’s network of practices, artifacts, and representations, and the
interpretive patterns embedded in them, cultural relativism must imply
that cognition of reality is social, mediated through and dependent on semi-
otic structures like language, gesture, and art, and that those social-semiotic
structures are particular and historical, different systems being inherited by
different human societies.
Now there are some versions of cultural relativism we can disqualify
with dispatch. First are any global hence self-undermining relativisms, such
as Davidson analyzed, relativisms which say,“There are cultures so different
from ours that we don’t agree on anything,” “Cultures are incommensu-
rable,” and so on.As David Wong has pointed out more recently, such claims
actually undercut the relativist’s ability to problematize Western judgments
of cultural superiority, for that ability requires the critic to understand the
subordinated culture and sympathize with its validity.The interesting forms
of relativism presume a significant degree of cross-cultural understanding
(Wong 1989). Second, and related, is what Bernard Williams calls vulgar
relativism (Williams 1981: 142).This is a moral position with which we are
all familiar. It holds that any culture’s attempt to judge another, or to demand
another culture’s conformity with its own judgments, is cognitively unsup-
portable and/or morally wrong. Upon reflection we can see that this posi-
tion in fact violates relativism. It asserts a universal morality of noninterfer-
ence or toleration. In fact, it is just a universal “democratic” or “liberal” or
“rights-based” morality, albeit one whose sole injunction is against inter-
ference in the self-determination of each cultural unit. A truly relativistic
notion of freedom, absent any constraining universal rules, would have to
say that whether a culture is morally justified in imposing its rules on others
is itself relative to that culture. If one culture thinks cultural imperialism is
fine, then it is fine, for that culture.Vulgar relativism is a universalist morality
that mistakes itself as relativism. Last, there is a lesson for cognitive rela-
tivism in the most common argument against moral relativism.That argu-
ment is a combination punch, a reductio ad absurdum argument followed by
a charge of inconsistency, namely, that those who assert relativism will even-
tually find themselves condemning evil (such as the Holocaust) nonrela-
tivistically. In effect this is to argue that there are no relativists in foxholes.
But the smart relativist will soon discover that the best tactical response to
this reductio is to adopt the passive voice, not to say “‘True’ means ‘true-in-
a-perspective” but merely to undermine any nonrelativist assertion. It is
when following this tactic that relativists like Richard Rorty are most suc-
cessful. I have argued that they are not in fact successful, but their reticence
certainly restricts their liability to charges of self-reflexive inconsistency
(Cahoone 2002b).We cannot assume a silent relativist herein, but the prin-
ciple holds that the less the relativist says, the better.
Thus, a genuine, consistent, and plausible relativism must be a third-
person view of the limits, and true meaning, of judgmental validity. By
itself it has no unmediated moral implications. For the intercultural com-
municator can always respond,“Yes, our principles, which assert universal
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validity, are valid only with respect to themselves (hence ourselves). But,
we are committed to them, and there being no contravening universally
valid principles, we will act on them, even in our relations with and judg-
ments of other cultures.” As stated, the recursive use of relativism by a
speaker need not derail any assertion or action based on his or her cultural
principles.At this point the nonvulgar job of the relativist is done, and she
must retire to her study, allowing the intercultural dialogue to unfold as it
will; any further intervention is vulgar, that is, the effect of a nonrelativist,
universal standard of noninterference. This is a bit like the existentialist
“ethics” of authenticity: observing an attempted murder, the existentialist can
admonish the agent to give up bad faith and sociocultural programming,
to recognize fully his absolute freedom and total responsibility, and the
true meaning, in the light of finitude, of his reasons for this act. If the pro-
spective murderer, now fully conscious of the weight of his actions, gets
back to the business of slaughter, the existentialist can only say, “Well, I
tried . . .” In this sense the only effect of relativism is to modify the type of
validity claimed by the agent, not to deny that validity.Trying to be more
definitive and effectual leads to trouble for the relativist.
So, in what follows, let us assume a relatively powerful, troublesome yet
not obviously incompetent cultural relativism that will avoid the David-
sonian and Williamsian traps and make no extravagant positive claims.To
avoid cumbersome locutions I will generally refer to judgments or beliefs
normed by truth as the things whose relativity must be determined, mean-
ing these to represent as well cognitions, perspectives, theories, and even
practices (where the validity of the last hangs on the truth of the beliefs
they presuppose). My approach will be double-jointed, to unpack the “prob-
lem” of cultural relativism and in the process to examine what a robust
cultural relativism must presuppose about culture. In effect I will be asking,
Are cultures really the kind of things they would have to be for the rela-
tivity of the validity of our cognitions to them to constitute a philosophi-
cal problem?
The Problems of Cultural Relativism
“The” problem of cultural relativism is not one but three distinct, albeit
related, troubles which arise in three situations, given three beliefs about
what cultures are like. One arises when a policy is proposed within a
polity, and some object that the policy is itself “cultural.” “That’s cultural”
implies that the belief in question is “culture-bound” and thereby not poten-
tially universal, presumably because determined by local prejudice rather
than by free choice or agreement based on evidence and reasons.This epis-
temic debility would hold only if cultures are sufficiently unified belief
systems that the objective truth of each cultural judgment is dependent on
cultural presuppositions whose truth is unsupportable.The second, perhaps
most famous, situation is one of intercultural evaluation. Not to put too
fine a point on it, the question is: “Are they wrong? Are they evil?” More
soberly, can we validly judge that their cultural practice or belief is wrong,
morally or cognitively? This can only be possible if cultures overlap, if they
share beliefs that make intercultural evaluation possible on a shared basis.
The third situation will sound strange, since people rarely ask it in the fol-
lowing form, but it is nevertheless crucially bound up with the appeal, and
fear, of cultural relativism. It is: “Is my culture right?” More completely, does
the fact of my being embedded in a culture mean that I have no noncircular
way to judge the validity of my own practices and beliefs? Cultural mem-
bership would present such a problem only if it were epistemological. I will
argue that the first of these problems is what Carnap called a pseudo-
problem, hence can be dissolved by rejecting the presupposition about cul-
ture on which it is based.The second, once we see that there is no support
for its presupposition about culture, will be recognized as a contingent
problem of interpretive practice, in effect a political and not a philosophi-
cal problem at all, hence one that may be practically resolved. And the third
is a social retelling of a philosophical problem that may indeed by unsolvable,
but has nothing particular to do with culture at all.
Can Cultural Judgments Be Valid?
The first problem is, can cultural beliefs be validly judged to be right or
true? This may seem odd; certainly cultural beliefs are generally regarded as
right or true by cultural members. But for that very reason we normally
defer applying to such beliefs the tests we would force upon beliefs in the
professions, in science, in our daily pragmatic dealings with social institu-
tions.Are cultural beliefs beyond normative judgment, incapable of rational
adjudication or universal validity, hence merely cultural?
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The threat that the trait of “being cultural” might make a belief un-
justifiable hangs on its claimed dependence on a broadly effective epis-
temic context whose holistic relation to objects either cannot be validated
or cannot be validated in a noncircular way. It hangs on what being “cul-
turally embedded” does to a belief ’s chances for justification. My answer is:
sometimes very little.
Suppose two women are seated at a lunch counter discussing meta-
physics. One is a panpsychist, insisting that everything is a mind or a prop-
erty of mind, while the other is a reductive physicalist. The panpsychist,
perhaps unsure in handling solids, drops her spoon, while the physicalist,
leaping to her strong suit, catches it in midair.We might imagine that on
any logical reconstruction, metaphysical beliefs would be sufficiently basic
and central to their respective “belief systems” that their beliefs about and
dealings with the spoon ought to be significantly different. But that is not
so. Despite their utterly opposed metaphysical beliefs, their interaction shows
that they in fact share an uncountable list of beliefs (uncountable if for no
other reason than that we have no reliable way of counting beliefs); neither
tries to pass a hand through the spoon, eat it, or move it telekinetically.
The same can be applied to lunchers from different cultures. In Quine’s
example, the tree encountered by the native on the day before the first
Western anthropologist arrives is the same tree the anthropologist hides
behind the next day.Whatever the metaphysical differences between native
and anthropologist, however the former may understand gavagai as a
“moment-in-rabbit-becoming” or a “part-of-the-collective-mega-rabbit,”
while the latter sees an individuated physical object, they both include ref-
erence to the same cuddly, pet-able, edible target. The alternative meta-
physical schemes cannot be behaviorally discerned in this case, as Quine
says. But other things can be discerned while metaphysics varies in the
background.The meaningful tie between rabbit and metaphysics may be
quite loose and pose little problem for the anthropologist and native in
making rabbit stew. For the two can disagree, even fail to understand each
other, on metaphysics, while understanding and agreeing on everything
else. In fact, Quine’s argument showed not the indeterminacy but the mere
underdeterminacy of translation, the absence of complete epistemic constraint.
Complete constraint would narrow the possible translations to one. Quine
is right that such is unavailable. But some meanings are ruled out even in
the one present speech act: by “gavagai” the pointing native cannot mean
“Don’t look, nothing is happening over there.”And his observed linguistic
behavior over time will rule out far more possible meanings, even in the
situation of “radical” translation.
For as we know, the degree of unity or coherence within the beliefs of
a culture, as within any group or individual belief “system,” need not be
particularly high. A culture’s beliefs about marriage, its death rituals, its
engineering practices, and its cuisine need not express or subtend one sin-
gle set of ideas, values, or images.The degree of coherence among spheres
of life, institutions, practices, and so on, is itself variable among cultures.
And this means that the dependence of any particular agent’s act or asser-
tion on a framework of culture prejudgments is highly variable.We must
conceive of what an individual brings to the act of judgment or interaction
as a loose web with many nexuses of connected interpretive patterns,
memories, motivations, and so on, and not assume that every response
equally implicates the entire web, or what is the same thing, a set of prin-
ciples presupposed by the entire web.
The notion that there is a controlling subset within a person’s or a cul-
ture’s “system” of beliefs has of course a more familiar name. Since the
publication of Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in 1979,
philosophers have become sensitive to the extent to which the metaphor
of “foundations” is operative in their work.The foundationalist imagina-
tion, since Descartes, not only pictures that philosophy can demonstrate
the truth of deep claims, but that we can arrange beliefs into a hierarchical
system with one finite set of foundational beliefs on whose truth the truth
of all others depends.This set the stage for Rorty to deny the possibility 
of justifying our beliefs at all, since if all depend on the foundational set of
beliefs, and the latter really are foundational, then there are no beliefs that
can be noncircularly used to compare the foundational set to reality. Rorty
mainly aimed to show that the traditionally realist theory of truth as the
“correspondence” of belief to world could never be established, but the
foundationalist picture was equally entangled with another metaphor, less
infamous but equally misleading, that truth is coherence of belief and thus
exists within enclosures. If we ought not regard a finite set of beliefs held by
a believer to be “founded” on deeper presuppositions, we ought to see that,
absent that vertical relationship, we can no longer say what is “inside” and
what is “outside” an enclosure that has been defined by that relation of
dependence. For in either case what matters is that any given belief of a
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person or culture must be dependent upon—vertically or horizontally,
founded on or enclosed in—one set of “ultimate” beliefs.
Thus I grant that “final vocabularies,” as Rorty once called them, can-
not be compared to reality (Rorty 1989). But my question is, are there any?
If final vocabularies, foundations, and enclosures are bad epistemology—
that is to say, unjustifiable—they are also bad logic, bad as a description of
how our beliefs relate to each other and to the world.They are cases of what
Karl Popper called the myth of the framework (Popper 1996). Popper ob-
jected that rational justification cannot be regarded as the discovery of an
ultimate set of asserted truths that positively justify belief (although for
him the underlying reason was that “justification” can only mean “not yet
falsified”).The horizontal metaphor of enclosure is indeed no better than
the vertical metaphor of foundations, because either way we can find no
“framework” in our beliefs.We cannot identify, let along articulate, a deep
structure presupposed by or implicated in every judgment made by an
agent, or group of agents, even if the group is our own.This imputes too
much unity to minds, judgments, and cultures, and too much dependency
to the beliefs and practices we evince from day to day. Note that I do not
mean we can never identify any of our beliefs, or regarding cultures, iden-
tify any of the beliefs that are “in” or characteristic of a culture.That would
be absurd. I am claiming we cannot specify the boundaries, hence general
criteria for deciding whether beliefs are in or out. And if cultures do not pro-
vide boundaries, judgments cannot be culture-bound. Each culture, like each mind,
is a continuum in which discrete first and last elements, either temporally
or logically, cannot be identified.As Charles Peirce might put it, in minds
and cultures nothing is first or last, nothing founds all beliefs or compre-
hends all beliefs. If no perceptual content is identifiable as an uninterpreted
datum logically prior to linguistic shaping, there are also no identifiable
first principles that underlie or justify any of my beliefs (Peirce 1931b). If
we have no foundations, we also have no frameworks or containers. We
may put it simply: no human being, and no culture, has a belief system at all.
If a metaphor is required for thinking about the relations among our
beliefs or meanings, then better than foundations or enclosures would be
crystals. Our beliefs and meanings are collected in irregularly shaped and
structured clumps capable of growth from any point. As in a child’s con-
struction of tinker toys, every judgment is connected to, made in reference
to, some clump, none of them ever stands alone. But this does not mean
each is related to every other judgment of the agent’s mind; some hang in
mid-air with only one connection to the rest. What philosophers do,
among other things, is articulate the logical relations holding within and
among these clumps. If you prefer, our beliefs cohere like rhizomatic plants,
in Deleuze’s metaphor, as in a series of mesquite bushes each member of
which shares some roots with some other member of the family (Deleuze
and Guattari 1987). Or, conflating two Peircean metaphors, knowledge is
like seaweed. Parts of the seaweed are indeed linearly or hierarchically
related, but the growth of the seaweed as a whole is not. What happens
rather is the more or less simultaneous growth of each clump and the grow-
ing together of some clumps, forming a greater expanse more intricately
interrelated. Regarding cultures, an indefinitely large number of clumps of
my interpretive-practical repertoire can be shared with members of another
culture, always open to growth or atrophy. Some of the components of
some of my clumps are far from yours, and their difference is clear, but
other parts are near and ill-differentiated.
Every judgment of reality by a cultural agent is culturally funded, but is
no more hermetic, or more mediated, than any other human judgment.
Cultures have arguments, they are not arguments.The relationship of a sub-
sidiary belief or practice to a more “fundamental” belief or practice is not
the relation of a conclusion to a premise.The “problem” of cultural rela-
tivism is one of the costs of treating cultures as if they were philosophical
systems, sets of beliefs having hierarchical, logical relations, an approach the
Enlightenment made possible. In this sense cultural relativism is the child
of the misguided philosophy of universalism it seeks to oppose.
Is Their Culture Wrong?
The existence of intercultural comparison and judgment is not at issue.We
judge and compare all the time.The issue is rather, can such judgments be
interculturally valid, legitimate, true, or rational, which implies, can they satisfy
a criterion that does not, by being internal to one of the compared cul-
tures and not the other, beg the question of their validity? This is perhaps
the most typically compelling issue raised by those who accept that cul-
tural relativism is a problem. For there is indeed no such thing as a justifi-
cation across ultimate or absolute difference, meaning difference that is
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foundational, logically prior to all other beliefs, subtended by no common-
ality, just as we cannot make sense of a demand that we know things while
abstracting from our entire way of knowing. But this formulation already
hints at the path to, if not a solution, then a resolution of this problem.
At the most mundane level, in the interpretation and judgment of fel-
low humans we always presuppose a common species and natural environ-
ment.We dwell on the same earth, have similar biological needs, presuppose
a common set of cognitive and perceptual abilities revealing a commonly
available physical reality, and exhibit a rather small set of overlapping prac-
tices and techniques for social organization and the acquisition of the
necessities of life. Geography varies, but none of the humanly habitable
environs on earth fail to exhibit climate, causality, sky above, and earth
below. Food, water, shelter, clothing, sexual reproduction, care of young,
communication, and group decision-making must be secured, however
they are secured. Cultures thus concern a metaphysically common set of
objects on the same planet and a common set of human processes. Not
that all their objects were, or are, common.A polytheist and animist society
believes in the existence of things that a secular society does not; writing
exists in literate but not illiterate societies. Nevertheless, we respond to and
express the rudimentary universal pragmatic demands of the human species
(food, water, etc.), including some virtually universal social institutions
(family, property, status, warfare, religion, and so on). All this, of course,
underdetermines the constitution of any surviving culture.
Further, internal diversity of all larger cultures is such that external diver-
sity is not of a wholly different order.As noted, we should never overestimate
the internal uniformity of preindustrial cultures.There uniformity existed
only at the most local of levels. In agrarian civilizations internal caste dif-
ferences have far greater importance than many intercultural differences.
Minimally put, there is no reason to think cultural group differences are nec-
essarily the greatest of all group differences.And if individuals are familiar
with greater differences that must be negotiated within their own cultures
or societies, this means cross-cultural differences are not the “most different”
differences. Historical consciousness also has a place here, for the present
generation’s awareness of its temporal distinction from ancestors likewise
brings an awareness of how to negotiate difference. Certainly we have record
of the fact that cultures have interacted.Wherever this interaction implied
some sort of mutual intelligibility, there was something in common.This
does not mean that interaction cannot increase difference; it can. But it
must simultaneously increase mutual understanding, even if it also increases
misunderstanding.
Indeed, among what cultures pass from generation to generation is
knowledge of other cultures. In some cases this knowledge emerged in
response to episodic interactions. In other cases, it was continuous, as in the
great imperial trading cities of the premodern world, whose knowledge of
other cultures could be very sophisticated. In that sense multiculturalism
and cosmopolitanism are not new. Add to this the various forms of
“duplex” cultural housing that resulted from migration and conquest, in
which communities that regarded themselves as culturally distinct lived side
by side, perhaps rarely interacting but nevertheless acquiring the knowl-
edge of, and skills for dealing with, the other. One must imagine that such
knowledge alters the understanding of one’s own folkways as well. Cul-
tures need not regard themselves as superior to other cultures in every way;
they can decide that a foreign culture is in some respects superior. If post-
Wittgenstein philosophy has recognized that a solipsistic individual, that is,
one with a private language, is logically impossible, how much less plausible
is a solipsistic culture, given that any culture already contains far more diver-
sity, as well as the communicative resources for negotiating differences,
than any individual? The notion that cultures cannot understand each other
in principle is no more plausible than the skeptical claim that persons who
seem to be understanding each other might in fact be using their terms in
systematically different hence undiscoverable ways.
Certainly the diversity within cultures makes the relation to outer diver-
sity more intelligible. But that aside, any sophisticated culture is itself aware
of cultural difference and seeks ways to deal with it. For example, cultures
often make their own internal distinction between the universally valid
and the culturally particular.Any historical culture that is used to welcom-
ing strangers (for example, in its trading centers) must distinguish among
its own beliefs and practices a subset to which visitors or resident aliens are
not to be held to account, and other beliefs and practices which they regard
as universally binding or anthropine, normative for human beings per se. A
culture that cannot bracket the former cannot tolerate visitors at all.That
bracketing indicates an awareness not only of its members’ own peculiari-
ties, but of levels of validity or normative necessity. Modern cultures have
no monopoly on the ability to imagine the perspective of the stranger or
the visitor, or on the ability to distinguish one’s countrymen from human
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beings per se. And this distinction is common to different cultures, although
of course each may construe the anthropine norms differently.
More conceptually, it is often possible to ascribe second-order com-
monalities to peoples as a way of rendering their differences intelligible. In
The Silent Language Edward Hall tells the story of a Southwestern Ameri-
can town, predominantly Mexican, where the local motorcycle policeman
was in the habit of enforcing the 15 mph speed limit on Anglos traveling
through town with precise efficiency, handing out fines for anyone exceed-
ing the speed limit by so much as one mile per hour (Hall 1973). Among
the Spanish population, Hall suggests, the habit was for the policeman to
enforce the law to the smallest technicality, then judges would negate or
reduce the fine in the court system, often based on personal and familial
ties. The Anglos were accustomed to the opposite, lax enforcement but
stringent and bureaucratic legal processing. Frustrated, they responded by
repeatedly beating the policeman. Hall’s account relies on the homeostatic
notion that in both Anglo and Mexican culture a balance is struck in a zero-
sum game between the extremes of rigid conformity and chaotic loose-
ness, but in different places.The Anglos could not, for example, alter their
ways by abandoning laxity in enforcement while retaining technical legal
process; there would be too much pressure with no safety value, no room
for judgment and exceptions.The Mexicans could not abandon strict en-
forcement while retaining informal adjudication, for there would be vehic-
ular chaos.Thus Hall renders the distinctive practices intelligible by assum-
ing that each must attain a balance—restraining speeders without fining
too many people too much money—but they do so through different dis-
tributions of laxity and discipline.
Now, the point of these observations is not to sing a few stanzas of “We
are the world . . .” in celebration of universal understanding. It is that a vis-
itor from an alien planet would be as taken by the sameness among cul-
tures as by the differences.The burden of proof is on those who claim that
the differences “go all the way down,” which is to say, are so fundamental
that they prevent the sharing required for communication and mutual
understanding, that each culture is so holistic, so highly integrated that
none of its practices, beliefs, or signs can function similarly outside its
whole. Still, we may wonder how to conceive of valid comparative evalu-
ation,“rational” evaluation if you will, across cultures? For this we can turn
to three contemporary writers who ply a common theme, that the answer
to cross-cultural rationality lies not in going around culture to a noncultural
rationality, but in going through cultures to discover ways that rational debate
can flourish through these very differences.
We begin with the most long-standing contributor to this discussion
among living philosophers. In his books After Virtue:A Study in Moral Theory
(1981) and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) Alasdair MacIntyre
claimed that all argument, and rationality itself, is tradition- or culture-
specific; rationality is literally “rationality-in-a-tradition” (MacIntyre 1988).
There is no reasoning outside a culture with its “canonical texts,” ultimate
ends, and inherited practices. This would appear to dive right into rela-
tivism of the worst sort. But MacIntyre argues that except in a very nar-
row range of circumstances, no social actor is ever justified in asserting, as
relativism does, the identity of “is true” and “seems true to us.”
MacIntyre limits relativism by arguing along two tracks. On the one
hand, he provides an immanent criterion of rationality universally applica-
ble to each tradition. Within a tradition there are inherited vocabularies
and problems; progress occurs whenever recognized problems are resolved,
usually through a reinterpretation of canonical texts and practices.A ration-
ally superior view is able to solve problems earlier versions could not solve,
and to explain why they could not, in the sense that Einsteinian physics
solves problems that Newtonian physics could not but incorporates the lat-
ter as a special case, explaining where Newton was right and wrong (Mac-
Intyre 1989).The rationally superior view thus writes a superior history of
the tradition and its problems. Now, within such “living” (meaning plural-
istic and contested) traditions, there can never be a reason to fuse “true”
and “seems true to x” as long as there remain such immanent rational cri-
teria for cognitive progress. Even in radical moments of “epistemological
crisis” when cultures exhaust their resources, they can judge the resources
of another tradition to be superior according to their own criteria and
import the former. In the process MacIntyre makes the important point
that untranslatability does not entail incomprehensibility. Indeed, it is only
the truly bilingual individual who can say comprehendingly,“That phrase
is untranslatable.”
Now, it is the bilingual person and this person alone who can, under
special circumstances, face a situation in which there is no rational alterna-
tive to relativism (MacIntyre 1989). This arises in what MacIntyre calls
“boundary situations,” where two “incommensurable” traditions compete.
For example, after a conquest by a culturally incommensurable power, con-
quered individuals may be confronted with two competing languages and
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cultures. Simply saying the name of a town can then be a political act. Most
will identify with their historical or descent culture. Only those who are
bicultural and bilingual, who can understand each competing tradition on
its own terms, will face a dilemma. In some of these cases bilinguals may
have access to a third language, one which is rich enough to produce a
description of each and that does not presuppose the validity of the essen-
tial resources of either of the competing traditions. But absent a third lan-
guage the bilinguals will indeed be in a relativistic position, forced to
make a criterion-less choice between incommensurables. Otherwise, there
is never a reason to assert relativism.
Samuel Fleishacker’s The Ethics of Culture (1994) argues that while ethi-
cal universalism is bankrupt, ethics has little to fear from culture, for a form
of cultural relativism can be accommodated to ethics. Culture he defines as
authoritative tradition, where authority is allegiance-deserving judgment, and
tradition is a set of unquestionably compelling texts, practices, and standards
presented to each new generation by a particular society. Deep ethical
choices, he asserts, occur in situations of risk where reason by itself cannot
decide. Hence moral reasoning needs cultural traditions, which are based
in faith and not reason. These posit ultimate goods which cannot be
reduced to rational rules; traditions are “incarnations” of the ultimate good
in a “specific way of life.” Fleischacker asserts that to speak of tradition is to
speak of “submission” (Fleischacker 1994: 78).Authority without tradition
is dangerous, since then there is no canonical good to which the authority
is beholden, before which he/she must be humble. But when ensconced
in tradition, authority embodies phronēsis, practical wisdom, whose judg-
ments apply a canonical narrative about the ultimate and obscure good to
a particular case. Regarding the problem of normatively judging other cul-
tures, Fleischacker argues for cross-cultural understanding through the inter-
action of each culture’s narratives without reverting to a non- or supracul-
tural standpoint.
The upshot of this approach is that the proof is in the pudding. The
demonstration of the plausibility of intercultural communication and eval-
uation can only be established in actual cases where the participants in
intercultural dialogue find an interpretive modus vivendi. Fleischacker
rightly recognizes that theoretical reason cannot establish these paths; they
are the product of judgment.Thus he writes, “Between universalism and
relativism, between authority and reason, between a culture as a unified
moral self and cultures as impermanent nodes in the flux of universal human
interaction, between the specific way of life that we know we should not
impose on anyone else and the general conditions which that way of life
and all others ought to meet, there lies nothing but judgment” (Fleischacker
1994: 150). Only in judgment, practical wisdom, which applies generals to
individual cases and hence cannot itself be reconstructed as rule-governed,
can reasoning across cultures occur. Fleischacker presents fascinating exam-
ples of how cultures in seemingly fundamental disagreements may find
points of commonality in their traditions’ unofficial, sometimes recessive,
narratives. In this he mirrors the work of Bhikhu Parekh in political theory.
We may add to MacIntyre’s and Fleischacker’s approaches other resources,
in particular Martha Nussbaum’s notion of “thick but vague” universal
norms and Michael Walzer’s notion of a “thin” layer of a culture’s values
(Nussbaum 1990; Walzer 1994). There are moral notions, which, if inter-
preted minimally or vaguely, in Nussbaum’s sense, are shared by many cul-
tures. David Wong and Lawrence Becker have separately claimed this for
reciprocity, and one could make similar arguments for notions like justice,
indebtedness, humanity-compassion-generosity, virtue, and reasoning (Wong
1995; Becker 1986). Now, no one is sufficiently polycultural to say with
confidence that all existing cultures share those, or other, crucial notions,
not to mention all past cultures. But strong arguments can be made that a
number of large, complex, very different civilizations have shared these
concepts. Walzer argues that in order to deal with and understand other
cultures, traditions “thin” some of their concepts and norms to be capable
of more universal employment and so to inform their interaction with for-
eigners.That the full, thick, or precise versions of a culture’s practices, arti-
facts, and narratives fail to overlap with another culture does not prevent
employment of thinned versions.
Following MacIntyre’s lead, a generalized version of his narrative crite-
rion of an explanation’s rational superiority, which bears comparison both to
W.W. Hartley’s “comprehensive critical rationality” and to Popper’s falsifi-
cationism, might be accepted as normative for a variety of cultures in some
contexts. If we say that validity means comparative cognitive superiority,
then the theory that is valid or superior at this moment is one that can
explain or consistently account for everything competitor theories account
for while avoiding or answering the problems of those competitors, and
can explain why those competitors seemed under various conditions to be
right.The standard of validity here is essentially progressive (we accept the
account that improves our understanding), falsificationist (the winning
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account is superior because it has not been shown inferior yet), and ab-
ductive (the point of any account is to best give reasons why things are the
way they are). Other things being equal, the criterion of rationality claims
that theories which explain something are superior to theories that don’t.
The question would then be whether this criterion, where sufficiently thin,
can be accepted by otherwise recalcitrant cultures.
Last, even where cultures do not already contain, or have not had to
evolve, procedures of justification or thin/vague normative terms that bear
easy comparison to those of other cultures, two cultures that face each
other may be able to evolve a bilateral comparative language. How they can
do so is addressed by Lorenzo Simpson in his Unfinished Project:Toward a
Postmetaphysical Humanism (2001). In this work Simpson presents a Gadamer-
ian account of intercultural understanding, which he labels situated cos-
mopolitanism, a cosmopolitanism nevertheless characterized by communal
identification. Simpson wants to explain the possibility of a non-“invidious”
appreciation of the perspective of the other that still avoids adopting the
other’s perspective, hence maintains the resources for “critical rejoinders.”
He rightly points out that even to say that “your culture is not mine” pre-
sumes an ability to represent each as a perspective on a common object.
He writes, “Identifying contrasts presupposes the identification of a Sache
(fact), an ‘X’, a fundamental concern.A contrast can only be properly under-
stood as the condition of there being two (or more) ways of addressing X”
(Simpson 2001: 84). Simpson recognizes that this identification, not the
importation of “foreign” standards, is the core difficulty of intercultural
dialogue. For identifying what X they are talking about is tantamount to
deciding in what register, under what description, the X in question func-
tions in their sociocultural life, hence in what kind of “game” it is located.
We must ascertain “In what game of theirs is X an intelligible move?”To
do this is in effect to open the question,“What would I be doing/saying in
doing/saying what they are doing/saying?” Hence understanding them
makes a claim on us. This presumes a “second-order” principle of charity,
analogically “modeling [their doing/saying] upon what can be logical spaces
or dimensions of experience for us” (Simpson 2001: 90).
We may add to Simpson’s analysis that one major axis of comparison in
deciding what they are doing is the distinction, or lack thereof, they make
between cognitive and aesthetic-practical projects, which is to say, the degree
of multifunctionality in Gellner’s sense—and how this relates to the same
question about what we are doing. Wong suggests that for non-Western,
and especially Chinese, ways of inquiry and advanced thought, the goal is
less often knowledge of the world per se than “attunement” to the world,
which leads him to distinguish the “epistemic warrant” of a belief from the
“rationality of holding” it (Wong 1989). Attunement is multifunctional,
including cognitive, practical, and aesthetic elements; and rationality, if
understood broadly as reason-giving, can be as well. Multifunctionality, I
may hasten to add, does not by itself imply primitivism or underdevelop-
ment. The West has its own multifunctional norms, “wisdom” being the
most prominent for philosophers. But different cultures have given multi-
functional norms different roles in their activities.Today’s Western philoso-
pher, carrying with her our utter divorce of cognitive from other values, in
the end often finds the non-Western philosopher naive, while the non-
Westerner wonders why the Westerner, if the results of her work are so
irrelevant to the conduct of life or the improvement of society, bothers at all.
Simpson accepts that rationality is universal, but very thin.As he writes,
“Every form of life can be understood to make the following validity
claim: its practices are the best way for it to flourish; that is to say, they rep-
resent the best way for it to address the Sachen” (Simpson 2001: 94). Con-
sequently, in determining whether a belief or practice enhances or is con-
sistent with such flourishing, cultural members must occasionally debate
the former.
The form or rationality that I have implicitly referred to here is a
form of rationality that I take to have transcultural, or cross-cultural,
or culturally invariant standing. It is what I would call a “second-
order rationality” that we are entitled to impute to everyone—
that is, an inclination to reforms one’s practices in the direction of
more rationality when one’s lack of rationality is pointed out to
one in terms with which one is conversant. (Simpson 2001: 96)
Consequently, we may discover that their practices of justification—as
they may discover about ours—are “arbitrary and/or untrustworthy,” that
is, “not . . . truth-tracking or truth-sensitive in the way that members of a
given community thought they were.” The result of this interpretation-
that-inevitably-becomes-dialogue is “a newly forged common language”
which transforms both agent and alter. Each language is transformed,
stretched, by the addition of the dialogically formed metalanguage it must
evolve.The metalanguage permits a shared noninvidious representation of
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each position in which the explicit or implicit contest between the two is
reframed through “redescriptions” acceptable to each. Echoing but modify-
ing Richard Rorty’s ethnocentrism, Simpson’s interpreters become “her-
meneutically self-aware ethnocentrists.”The point is that cultures change,
can rise to occasions of interaction, and develop the resources for mutual
understanding.There is at least as much evidence of that in the human past
as ethnic cleansing or uncomprehending slaughter of the other.
In summary, the denial of the possibility of the intercultural validity of
cross-cultural claims bears a very high burden that it cannot meet. It must
presume a cultural unity, rigidity, and obstinacy that is hard to find in the
real world. It must ignore intracultural diversity, change, and procedures of
rational adjudication. The relativist may respond that shifting the burden 
of proof onto her shoulders does little to prove intercultural validity.That
is true, but it is a truth that indicates a more basic point, suggested earlier:
not around but through. We can only establish intercultural validity through
the hermeneutic work of exploring and relating cultures, not by third-
person philosophical arguments. But this means that the problem of the
validity of cross-cultural judgment, while a real problem, is not a philosophical
one. It is a contingent, imaginative problem of practical wisdom, of finding
resources internal to cultures that make mutual judgment valid. It is no
more a philosophical problem than a contract negotiation between union
and management, research into the relation of Old English words to Ger-
man, or the interpretation of the Qur’an. It is a political problem open to
neither conceptual dissolution nor philosophical solution, but case-by-case
hermeneutic-practical resolution.
Is My Culture Right?
This question may seem an odd one. People rarely ask it out loud, unless
they have advanced degrees in the social sciences. One may argue that this
very doubt is itself characteristic of some contemporary cultures, namely
the postmodern West. But it can arise in a variety of cultures and contexts.
Concerns about avoiding cross-cultural judgment, both characteristic of
multiculturalism and, one might say, political correctness are, while not
ubiquitous, a common enough phenomenon. At any rate, “Is my culture
right?” does seem to be an at least implicitly postmodern question.Where
does it come from historically?
We have seen that culture as a problem emerged in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries in the West.The Enlightenment, in a remarkably
productive fit of ambivalence, on the one hand, eschewed cultural particu-
larity, declaring that truth is universal and cognized only when tradition is
loosened, making culture important as something to be rooted out, sur-
passed, cleansed from the “mirror of nature” or experience or cognition.
On the other hand, the Enlightenment recognized the importance and
distinctiveness of cultures as equal, fundamental, Leibnizian monads of
apperception. In each case it made culture deep, the collection of concepts,
beliefs, and assumptions shared by a society. Notice the modern egalitari-
anism implied: in the ancient and medieval traditions the philosopher
rarely assumes that he or she shares concepts with nonphilosophers, that the
prejudices of the uneducated may well skew her own inquiry. For the first
time, Enlightenment philosophers begin to understand cultures as philo-
sophically important, as collective foundational premises. So, if we are to follow
Socrates in the examined life, we must reflect on our own culture and its
validity, since that culture underlies our philosophical beliefs. In other
words, the “problem of cultural relativism” assumes that cultures are to be
identified and questioned much like philosophies, as if they were articula-
ble systems of belief striving to be true, or at least cognitively founded and
dependent on certain basic propositions. Cultural relativism presupposes a
social-political problem become philosophical. It only arises where philosophy
invades our naive life in the world, where we assume that the everyday,
shared life of our people (whoever they are) hangs on a system of concepts
and propositions open to philosophical evaluation. Once this happens, the
educated class within a people may get to wondering if its own culture is
“just another culture,” a strange enough thought-event, which may get at-
tached not only to any dealings with other cultures but also to internal mat-
ters of iconoclasm, liberty, and minority cultures.The philosophical discov-
ery of culture is the philosophicization of culture.
Under this interpretation, to ask if my culture is right is to ask if my
fundamental way of understanding the world is right.“Is my culture right?”
is no more or less than the question with which Descartes started modern
philosophy: “Are all my beliefs, especially my most fundamental beliefs,
true? What if they are all wrong? How can I know they aren’t?”The only
difference is its intersubjective character: rather than a solitary Descartes
doubting his beliefs in his study, it is now our shared beliefs that are sus-
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pended in disbelief.We then become social Cartesians. Thus this third prob-
lem of cultural relativism is not merely a philosophical problem, it is the
philosophical problem par excellence, the problem of knowledge, the prob-
lem of whether human judgment can be known to be valid or not, albeit
here collectivized. The problem of cultural relativism is what the problem of knowl-
edge sounds like once you accept that human cognition is social and historical. As
such, “Is my culture right?” has no solution if the problem of knowledge
has no solution. Some antirealists, postmodernists, and evolutionary episte-
mologists, of course, think that there is no philosophical problem of knowl-
edge at all, that to imagine such a problem is to assume foundationalism.
Whether they are right or not is a story for another time, but certainly
their rightness would only further undermine any epistemic problem posed
by culture.The problem is the philosophical one of answering skepticism, a
problem neither created nor exacerbated by embedding cognition in culture.
Cultural Knowing
Even if the foregoing negative argument against relativism holds, without a
positive account of knowledge that is both cultural and realist its claim
may still seem dubious. Now, by no means can we afford a major foray into
epistemology here.Time, energy, and wood pulp are limited. But a sugges-
tion such as what follows does, I think, at least render plausible as an avenue
for further inquiry the proposition that an epistemology which accepts the
cultural embedded-ness of cognition need not break with a chastened,
minimal realism.
Twentieth-century epistemology is a series of footnotes to Hume, in
spirit even when the footnotes serve to correct Hume’s letter.A long list of
critiques from Wittgenstein to Derrida have wakened us from any dog-
matic slumbering we might have hoped to do.With much of this revision-
ism we can agree.Yes, all judgments have mediated relations to their objects,
hence cannot claim “privilege” or “immediacy” or a grasp of “presence”;
are fallible and open to revision, hence devoid of certainty; never cognize
an objectivity devoid of traces of the cognizer, leaving no “immaculate per-
ception”; are perspectival, linguistified, historicized products of particular
cultures, not grasped in a “view from nowhere”; always presuppose unana-
lyzed conceptual and political commitments open to deconstruction and
genealogical critique; and cannot hope to be given a noncircular philo-
sophical justification, whether by foundationalism, coherentism, or as Susan
Haack puts it, “foundherentism.” All this is, if not true, at least presump-
tively valid.We must accept the burden that these critiques place squarely
on the shoulders of any would-be realism.
But these shoulders, if not broad, are yet strong enough. Realism mini-
mally requires that the validity of our judgments be constituted by their
validity with respect to what they judge, that the truth of the assertion is
decisively constituted by a relation to what is judged rather than to charac-
teristics of the judge or the act of judgment. Such is unavoidably impli-
cated by three homely facts that, I would argue, can hardly be dismissed.
First,“true” implies true of something.That is, assertive judgment is inten-
tional, and truth is an object-relational property of such judgment. Second,
what is truly judged, as a what, cannot be truly judged by judgments that
contradict each other. Something, call it A, cannot be q and ~q at the same
time in the same respect and remain A.This holds whether A is a physical
object, a phenomenal quality, a process, a network of signs, or a thought.
Last, the relevant character of that what, of which the judgment is true, must
obtain independently of our judgment of it.The judging cannot make it
true. Saying shares with making and doing the status of being human judg-
ments, but unlike making and doing, assertive judgment is in a crucial sense
reactive or representative. That is inherent in the desire to be “true of.”
Whether we parse this through the metaphor of correspondence or fit or
being “made true” by objects is an important but derivative question, as is
the issue of what cognitive unit the realistically judged object must be
independent (such as proposition, perspective, theory, or culture).As I have
argued elsewhere, we cannot make sense of any notion of “knowledge” or
“truth,” or of judgments being “true” that rejects these three homely param-
eters, nor can we identify a society whose repertoire of semiotic practices
can consistently dispense with the quoted terms (Cahoone 2002b). Not
that all judgments, or all uses of signs, are assertive hence normed by truth.
They are not. But those that are are indispensable.The deflationary attempt
to disavow truth always contradicts itself, as where postmodernists and
antirealists claim to avoid truth as if their claim were true. Whether philoso-
phy can prove my realist parameters, can justify realism, is another question.
Failure to reach the bar does not by itself invalidate where the bar is set.
If this account seems anachronistic, well, things will now get far worse,
for with minimal realism go two other doctrines.
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First, we cannot give up the unity of truth. As said, the rules by which we
methodically investigate truth cannot accept that contrary judgments be
true of the same thing at the same time. But this only means that all truth-
claims must be consistent. If that were false, then contradiction in truth-
governed inquiry should not motivate further inquiry, should not be a
problem, any more than you and I singing different songs or marrying dif-
ferent persons is a problem. In inquiry, however, whether in a laboratory, a
Senate subcommittee, or an Easter-egg hunt, contradictory truth-claims
are a problem. Relativism, then, as a theory about what is true, cannot
make sense of our actual behavior.We cannot give up the logic of realism
and the unity of truth without, at the very least, giving up inquiry as we
understand it.
Second, along with realism and the unity of truth goes the notion that
cognitive advance implies a linear relation of objects-as-judged across dif-
fering or changed but intertranslatable semiotic nets, hence the rejection
of incommensurability. This rejection is justified every day by bilingual
individuals, whether fluent in Armenian and Russian or Newtonian and
Einsteinian.That is, if we accept a realist interpretation of inquiry, then we
have no choice but to deny that incommensurability is ever more than an
artifact of contingently chosen incompatible languages, to be resolved
through translation via a more comprehensive or “neutral” language.“Neu-
tral” here means, of course, locally neutral, neutral with respect to the lan-
guages in question. No language is neutral universally or per se. But none is
needed.
Thus we are led to an admittedly Neanderthal epistemology.What lies
behind my insouciance are two convictions. One is that many contempo-
rary revisionists are in the habit of conflating a long series of alleged buga-
boos—foundationalism, the “view from nowhere,” essentialism, logocen-
trism, a “God’s eye view,” the imperialism of reason, and so on—which
need a careful analysis. Some of the things listed, or some of the things
those terms connote, are indeed indefensible, wrong, or even bad. But
they are different, and between those differences lie narrow trails we can
realistically walk. Second, nobody can do without truth as understood in a
realist sense in their aesthetic and practical activity. For quite some time
after September 11, 2001, many in the Arab world believed that the World
Trade Center was bombed by Zionists—Jews having been warned, it was
claimed, not to go to work in the towers on that day—in order to dis-
credit Muslims.This belief is either true or false, not both (I pray the reader
does not wonder which). It is valid either everywhere or nowhere, not
invalid in Manhattan but valid in Cairo.Without an at least minimal realism
we are left in a moral, legal, and political never-never land of alternate uni-
verses, in some of which African slavery never happened, the Holocaust was
a clerical error, and Stalin the Russian George Washington. Saying this does
not justify realism’s truth, of course. It merely indicates the price of reject-
ing it.
How then are we to understand a realist yet culturally embedded, medi-
ated, historical, interested, fallible, decidedly nonimmaculate human know-
ing? Our cognition first has parameters dictated by the perceptual-affective-
cognitive-motor capacities liberally distributed among modern Homo sapiens.
Following Joseph Margolis we can accept that, contra Aristotle, these capac-
ities evolved and are perhaps evolving, and that, contra Kant, no complete or
a priori inventory of them is available (Margolis 2000).An indeterminately
large module of that cognitive medium is historical, cultural, linguistic, or
most broadly, semiotic. Our perception, interpretation, and knowledge are
thus biocultural.The experiences, or better, saliences that cognition must
explain are limited and structured, even if we cannot say completely what
those limits are. Perception, as a biologically prepared receptive appropria-
tion whose modality at some level is uncontrollable and unconscious, is
both passive and mediated, intertwined with motor activity, affectivity, and
semiosis. Margolis is certainly right to summarize much epistemic revision-
ism with the claim that language and world are symbiotic (Margolis 2000).
We never face an un-languaged world or an un-worlded language, never
confront objectivity uncolored by our cognitive means nor a perfect syn-
opsis of our cognitive means uncluttered by reference to bits of the world.
But I claim that symbiosis is graded. That the adverbial means of judg-
ment and what is judged are ultimately inseparable does not mean they are
not incrementally separable. Experienced and judged objects are tied to
background perspectives, methods, worldviews, and cultures, but are they
all tied to all those media in the same way and to the same degree? It would be
rather serendipitous if they were. On the contrary, not every fact or belief
is as embedded as every other; degree of entanglement varies with degree
of control of our own terms of judgment.That we can abstract from par-
ticulars of each makes cognitive advance and communication across nets 
of beliefs possible. It is not true, as some holists imply, that given dis-
confirmatory evidence any component of our worldview is equally up for
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rejection. Neither scientist nor cabbie behaves that way.The mind being at
least as complex as sneakers, regarding theory- or culture- or perspective-
embeddedness there is no reason to assume that one size fits all. A mini-
mally realist notion of truth, knowledge, and the world is entirely coherent
with the adverbial nature of the “media” of knowing (judgments, concepts,
worldviews, cultures, and so on), the denial of “presence” or “privilege”
(the claim that we have cognitions that are immediate to their objects,
hence irrefragable), and the assertion of objective indeterminacy (that not
every possible proposition is or must be either true or false of real things,
because the latter, like our propositions, vary in their determinateness, no
object being either utterly determinate or utterly indeterminate).
None of this is tantamount to that view which is arguably the dominant
theme of recent revisionist epistemology, namely constructivism. Con-
structivism is untenable. It is far too simplistic a metaphor. Constructing is
building, which implies making and control. If it were true that we cogni-
tively make the world, we would presumably have done a better job, for
example, have left out pain, misery, and death.The idea of a self-creating
human sphere, unconstrained by anything real outside its sculpturing, fails.
For while it is plausible that our perceptual-affective-cognitive-motor
apparatus, with its historico-cultural variants, shapes the world-as-we-know-
it, it is equally true that such shaping, like all other processes, has constraints.
If it did not, then it would be a creation ex nihilo; presumably not even
constructivists wish to deify themselves.The world, even the world-for-us,
is not simply the product of our construction; indeed, to claim that it is the
product of a single process of any kind is a metaphysical assertion of a high
order. Rather than constructed it is shaped, refracted, or selected, or any other
of a host of less than Promethean figures.And it should be noted that con-
structivism’s inadequacy does not hang on the now-anachronistic notion of
an agent of construction, which has been discredited by post-Wittgensteinian
and post-Heideggerian philosophy. Construction without an agent or sub-
ject doing the constructing is still construction, and still untenable.Wher-
ever the agent-less construction of postmodernism has its strongest innings,
the materiality of the world and the manifold constraints on the process of
“construction,” which are doubted by almost no one, go strangely unmen-
tioned. Constructivism’s apparent tenability is maintained only where it
implicitly accepts a distinction between “meaning” and “being,” denying
that it has to answer questions about the latter, about what is independent
of human appropriation. Like many intellectual movements, its success
depends on allowing it to make up the exam it then has to pass.
At any rate, from perception of the object through description to con-
ceptualization and theorization runs a continuum from largely universal-
thin-uncontrollable-minimally informed to historically particular-thick-
controllable-maximally informed levels of appropriation. Realism and the
unity of knowledge do not then imply a “God’s eye” view; we cannot
claim to have the true representation of the one real world. But we can
claim a true representation of the one real world in our cognitive medium,
other media of representation being possibly possible (that is, how “possi-
ble” as in plausible, how adequate and free from troubles, remains to be
seen).What we know is the one and only real world as it systematically affects
and is interpreted through the human perceptual-affective-cognitive-motor
apparatus in its historical, cultural modalities.True representations in dif-
ferent media must then have a systematic, lawful relation, just as the com-
mon sense or brute fact must have a linear relation to the scientific fact,
the earlier cognized fact must have to the cognized fact subsequent to cog-
nitive progress, and the fact as known by one culture must have to the fact
as known by another.And the account of those linear relations must itself
be internal to the description of reality thereby achieved.
The relation of any particular act of knowing and its object is best pic-
tured as a kind of genetically deformed daisy in which the center of the
flower is simultaneously encircled by nested elliptically shaped petals of
different sizes. Each ellipsis contains, or “knows,” the center, which is the
object. But the ellipses vary in how large they are, hence how much of 
the center and how much else they include. Our judgments each reveal the
object in their own ways.We must just remember one misleading feature
of the picture: we can never discern the precise difference in enclosed area
between the target and the ellipse that targets it, since all we have to make
such a discernment is the set of elliptical petals that are the known object
for us. Borrowing from earlier discussions, we can use the distinction
between “thick,” hence particular, and “thin,” hence common or universal
but vague, components of any society’s moral code (Walzer 1994; Nuss-
baum 1990). When particular, historically laden societies deal with each
other, they employ a “thinned” version of their values and rules. So, mem-
bers of different cultures can agree on the importance of “Justice” or
“Democracy” or “Rights.” Of course, when they do so they must be vague;
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how to apply or specify justice or rights can only occur in their own thick
particular moral worldview.
Applying these metaphors to our epistemic question, we can say that
our networks of judgments overlap around portions of our perception that
are least controllable, hence most thin and universal, albeit subject to diverse
subsequent interpretation.That they overlap means that some portions of
our world are minimally interpreted, least embedded, least open to cultural
or other cognitive reformulation.The thicker and more particular, the more
the judged or known object is colored by interconnections with diverse
other judgments.The thinner and more universal, the more the judgment
of the object abstracts from the particularities of other cultural judgments.
For we can now see that “thinning” means first of all the abandonment of
multifunctional judgment. In the case of assertive judgment or propositional
knowledge, modern science is the thinnest form of cultural cognition yet
created. It is not utterly thin; that would imply presuppositionless-ness or
complete transparency, which is unattainable. But it is, as Cassirer argued,
the most transparent of our symbolic forms, the most unconstrained in its
handling of its symbols, the most fully differentiated from other modes of
judgment (Cassirer 1965, vol. 3).The good news is that science is thus most
capable of cross-cultural travel; the bad news is that it must fail to support
the thicker needs and narratives of any culture, including the cultures that
birthed it.
Nevertheless, the antifoundationalists, postmodernists, and constructivists
are right about one thing: there is no possibility of a noncircular justification of
all I have just said. Realism and the unity of truth are indispensable but
cannot be ultimately shown to be true. Once we have gone down the
open-ended road of validating propositions via inquiry rather than faith,
social and pragmatic demands, aesthetic appeal, or private intuition, we are
stuck both with realism and with the search for realism’s validation, knowl-
edge’s “foundations,” a search that cannot be consummated. Inquiry has its
own constitutive features which inevitably exclude other modes of han-
dling the world.What lies within these borders cannot justify itself by its
own rules, any more than it can lift itself by its own beard.As I have argued
elsewhere, we cannot maximize the methodological sophistication of our
individual modes of appropriating the world—like inquiry—while at the
same time integrating them (Cahoone 2002c). Nevertheless, we are not at
liberty to reject progress. In short, once we have eaten of the fruit of the
Tree of Knowledge, there can be for us no cognitive Paradise of certainty,
rest, or completion, only the endless toil of inquiry to which we have been
condemned. Such, at any rate, is the legacy of realism.
Conclusion
There is then no specific epistemological problem attached to the recogni-
tion that human cognition is cultural.That is, there is no philosophical problem
of cultural relativism. There might be if it made sense to say that human
belief occurs in systems, that all our beliefs are founded on identifiable
subsets of beliefs or enclosed in conceptual containers, and that cultures are
such containers. But it doesn’t and they aren’t.There might be, if cultures
did not overlap, exhibit commonalities, or have the resources for compari-
son. But they do.There might be if there were no such thing as the prob-
lem of knowledge, if the philosophical justification of human knowing
independent of culture were apparent. But it isn’t. None of this implies that
culture is not a cognitive problem, that a culture’s beliefs or values can be
definitively and noncircularly justified. It only means that the fact of the
location of beliefs and values in culture adds no additional barrier that 
the subject must escape to contact objectivity.The philosophical problem
is the same, with or without culture.
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As if in a horror film where some greedy developer, heedless of warnings,
breeches ancient burial sites thereby releasing underworld ghosts bent on
vengeance, our postmodern polities, hell-bent on the global explosion of
new technology, seem to have awakened threatening primordial spirits
from the past. But unlike the usually lumbering cinematic ghouls, the real
spirits are very clever and move very fast. Religious fundamentalism, nation-
alism, ethnocentrism, nativism—whatever their differences, a seemingly
very old set of foes are back.To this point ethnic nationalism, especially in
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, has extracted the most hideous human
cost, although the worldwide rise of fundamentalism has not shirked before
violence, most famously in its Islamic version. But fundamentalism is an
equal-opportunity killer; Hindu extremists have matched their Muslim
counterparts in blood, while Sikh, Jewish, and even Buddhist militants
have assassinated heads of state (respectively, India’s Indira Gandhi, Israel’s
Rabin, and Sri Lanka’s Bandaranaike, the last killed by a monk).The Cold
War confrontation of communism versus capitalism has been replaced by
the battle Benjamin Barber called Jihad vs. McWorld. In response to the
steady international gale of postmodern, capitalist, service-knowledge-and-
entertainment-oriented economies, “infotainment telesectors,” devoid of
communal identity and metanarrative, blowing Baywatch and burgers
through the Earth’s globalized villages, retribalized polities erect primordial
walls of identity while their nonstate brothers try to blow up the wind
machine (Barber 1995). Certainly liberal modernity has had bigger problems;
from 1933 (Hitler’s chancellorship) to 1953 (the death of Stalin) it was fight-
ing for its life, and for almost forty more years it lived under a nuclear guil-
lotine. But the widespread collectivist movements in the names of ethnicity
and religion raise the possibility that the battle with ideological communism
was a momentary aberration in a longer-term struggle between civic-liberal
rule and more primordial and transcendental sources of community. Can
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the current revivalisms successfully challenge a liberal capitalist modernity
that overcame fascism and communism? Are jihadis and ethnic cleansers
merely the last gasp of a revanche or harbingers of an enduring geopolitical
split? And what does their current resurgence say about our postmodern
version of Western modernity?
As plausible, and inevitable, as our question is, we must be wary of lump-
ing revivalist phenomena together into an undifferentiated wave of anti-
Western antimodernism.The revivalists are younger than they look, often
modernist youngsters sporting antique fashions.They are part of the mod-
ern world’s confrontation with its own novel realities.And their ethnic and
religious variants are distinct. To be sure, they sometimes fuse; as Mark
Juergensmeyer has argued, there is such a thing as “religious nationalism”
(Juergensmeyer 1993). Nevertheless, philosophically and politically they
pull in different directions. Intellectually, most of the religions in question
are intrinsically supranational, transcending all ethnicities and political units
(the exceptions being militant Judaism and Hinduism). In political terms
there is a continuum of religious-nationalist interweaving. In some conflicts
religion is simply a defining characteristic of cultural communities at war
over nonreligious issues (Northern Ireland until recently, and Beirut in the
1980s civil war). In others religion is the principled basis for criticism and
reform of a state seen as corrupt and immoral (perhaps Turkey in recent
years). Sometimes an irreligious state is the enemy, the imagined solution
being establishment and protection of a majority religion that still tolerates
minority religions (as in Iran—except for its treatment of Baha’is—and
the stated goals of the Bharatiya Janata Party in India). For others secular
nationalism is the hated doctrine; their goal is to remake their national
state along theocentric lines. In the most extreme cases, they seek a reli-
gious suprastate (for example, the Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb). Structurally,
it makes sense to regard religious revivalism and nationalism, ethnic or not,
as providing a basis of legitimacy, and a source of solidarity, for postcolonial
peoples seeking to order their affairs under a centralized government left
behind by colonial powers (Geertz 1961). Each is a way to organize power
in the transition from local, clan-dominated communities to modern, cen-
tralized societies.
Last, we must be wary of narrating revivalist movements as reactionary.
As the story goes, the global advance of liberal capitalism and its mostly
American mass culture puts people through an introductory course of
dislocation, poverty, and culture shock, a misery addressed by advanced
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seminars in the madrassas (Islamic schools for high-school through college-
age students) from which pupils matriculate to al-Qaeda for graduate study.
This is indeed partly true. But, as Samuel Huntington and Giles Keppel
separately point out, it is the educated, middle-class youth of developing
countries, especially students of science and engineering, not the disenfran-
chised poor, who seem most drawn to religious revival (Huntington 1996;
Keppel 1994).As Roxanne Euben has argued, the reactionary theory implies
that Western modernization is the only proactive force in the world, as if
no other civilization were motivated by internal developments (Euben
1999). Now, all the movements in question are indeed partially reactions—
as are a number of countermodernizing movements inside Western coun-
tries and Japan—but what constitutes the motivation and character of
each reaction is a question that can be answered only from their side, in
terms of their internal dynamics.
Islam and Modernity
The conflict of Islam with the West is not new.The intensity of the current
phase has arguably revolved around the issue of Palestine, hence can be
dated to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the
Suez Crisis of 1956, or the establishment of Israel in 1948. But this phase is
part of more than a century of response both to Western imperialism and
Western support for corrupt regimes in the Islamic world. It is during this
period, since the late nineteenth century, that Islamic revivalism emerged,
both in its “modernist” and fundamentalist forms.And of course one could
go further back to the Crusades and a millennium of Christian-Islamic
competition in the Iberian peninsula, the Balkans, and the holy land. But we
ought not be slaves to history; Euro-American countries today enjoy rela-
tively pacific relations with a variety of former colonies and bloody enemies.
The current animosity between the West and Islam is not explained by his-
torical interactions alone, but by a present which keeps that past alive. So
we must understand the historical impulses internal to Islamic civilization
that feed the moment. Certainly there can be no question here of summa-
rizing a family of cultures that cover one-fifth of the Earth’s population and
have played a pivotal role in world history for fourteen centuries. But we
must have some background in that tradition of which Islamic militancy
claims to be a revival.
If we were to return to the early caliphate, after the death of Muham-
mad in 632 c.e. (all dates will be in the Christian calendar), and visit the
center of the Abbasid empire at Baghdad at its height, then drop in on
Cordoba in the early twelfth century, and finally travel to Ottoman Istan-
bul in the fifteenth century, it would be hard to escape the conclusion that
Islam constitutes one of the three great, still living, largely sovereign old
world civilizations over the last millennium, the others being India and
China (the Byzantine and West European, however deserving of mention,
having been conquered too early or arisen too late to qualify). In learning,
trade, law, military prowess, theology, political justice, architecture, and other
areas Islam represents a large part of what the human race has accomplished.
Islamic civilization absorbed ancient civilizations along a front from Gibral-
tar to Western China, digesting, altering, and transmitting ancient Greek,
Hebrew, Persian, and Hindu traditions to late medieval and modern soci-
eties. One can argue that Islam for the most part avoided some of the aspects
of Christianity of which contemporary Christians are not so proud.Thus
in Islam knowledge and reason have almost never been seen as enemies of
religion. Islam did not regard nature or material life or the body as evil or
dangerous.While militant Islamists may obsess over sex and fear pollution-
by-woman, unlike Christianity traditional Islam counseled restraint, not
avoidance; mainstream Islam has no monastic tradition, conceiving the
spiritual as fully embodied in familial and social life (the Prophet himself
having been both husband and father). Philosophically Islam is what it has
always claimed to be: the most purified form of monotheism, with a strict
but minimal set of basic beliefs, whose concerns were the individual’s sub-
mission to God, followed by prayer and moral righteousness, as well as a
commitment to charity and social equality.This is not to say that its con-
fessors were always consistent practitioners.They certainly were not, which
is to say, they were certainly human.
Some in the West complain that Islam never had a “Reformation,”
never replaced its medieval authoritarian tradition (in the Western analogy,
Roman Catholicism), with an individualistic, rationalist version (like Protes-
tantism) that promoted tolerance.This argument has little to recommend it.
First, the motivating idea is suspect. Remember that the birth of Protes-
tantism led to a century and a half of continuous religious warfare in Europe.
Western religious toleration emerged less from the rise of Protestantism
than from the defeat of its militant form, English Puritanism. So early
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Protestantism in itself was not particularly tolerant. Second, far from being
“Catholic” we must say that Islam is remarkably reformed. Sunni Islam is a
scriptural, scribal, rational religion, devoid of miracles, magic, sacrament,
saints, and clergy. Its religious elites are prayer-leading imams and Qur’anic
scholars, not vehicles of divine grace. It is a religion of the cities, of the
educated, however much it historically fed off the purifying simplicity of
warlike nomads and the country-dwellers they rule, as Ibn Khaldun argued
long ago (Ibn Khaldun 1967). Indeed, Islam’s virtual raison d’être was the
destruction of local polytheism and magic in Arabia, in contrast to Southern
Europe and the Americas where Catholicism made continual, if unofficial,
hybrids with “pagan” rites. In this sense, regarding mainstream Islam, we
might say that Islam was Protestant long before Luther. Turning to the
extreme, both Islam and Protestantism have tended periodically to produce
evangelical and other “purifying” revivals. In this sense as well, radical Islam
has been compared to radical Protestantism; M. J. Gohari refers to the
eighteenth-century protofundamentalist sect, the Wahhabis, as “Muslim
Calvinists” (Gohari 1999: 40).
A more plausible charge is that the militant Islam evident since the
1970s is caused by a yet unmodernized Islam’s confrontation with Western
modernity. And as noted, such a reaction is evident almost everywhere to
some degree. But the Islamic world is not just now confronting modernity.
Industrial, political, and cultural modernization have been occurring at
many points along the Islamic world since the nineteenth century. Indeed,
some Muslim writers have referred to the current revival as postmodern:
Fazlur Rahman characterizes recent developments as “postmodernist fun-
damentalism,” and Akbar Ahmed sees hope in the “postmodern” condition
of the Islamic world (Rahman 1982: 136;Ahmed 1992). Such claims are less
intriguing than they sound, hanging as they do on defining modernism as
Western imperialism, so that “postmodern” here simply means postcolo-
nial. Nevertheless, the point is that Islam is remarkably modern.As Hodg-
son puts it, the Islamic project is “one of the most thoroughgoing attempts
in history to build a world-wide human community as if from scratch on
the basis of an explicitly worked out idea,” its early form having borrowed
little from either local Arab culture or from Greco-Latin or Persian civi-
lizations (Hodgson 1974, 1:98). In the West, the notion of building a soci-
ety “as if from scratch” is characteristic of the political revolutions of the
eighteenth through twentieth centuries and their “natural rights” and “state
of nature.” Just as the modern West rooted republicanism in a “rational” or
“natural” theology, Islam sees its final revelation as providing the natural,
rational, cosmopolitan, postethnic, and antinationalist religion of all mankind.
Four major roads have been trod by intellectuals in the Islamic world
during the past hundred years. It was in the late nineteenth century that
Islamic “modernism,” the attempt to reconcile Islam with modern Western
thought, emerged among intellectuals as a way to revitalize the Islamic
world in response to imperialism and perceived decay. Modernism encour-
aged a tolerant, cosmopolitan approach. Later fundamentalism, hostile not
only to the West but to homegrown secular nationalism, insisted on its ver-
sion of original and literal scriptural meaning, and throughout the twenti-
eth century became increasingly intolerant and violent.Traditionalism is an
attempt, in response to modernism and fundamentalism, to reassert the
complex Islamic tradition and its scriptural hermeneutics (e.g., Seyyed
Hossein Nasr 1987). Last is the nonreligious option of nationalism. Our
focus will be fundamentalism, although its relation to modernism and
nationalism will be relevant as well
We should remember that “fundamentalism” is an American term that
emerged in early twentieth-century Protestantism Evangelism. For Evan-
gelicals the individual’s salvation was assured, not by baptism or maturation
as part of an established church, but by an adult act of renewal, of being
“born again.”The label “fundamentalist” came to be used for a subset of
the Evangelicals opposed to modern “degradations” of Christianity, the
term deriving from a series of religious essays edited and published by 
A. C. Dixon in 1910–15 under the title “The Fundamentals.” Fundamental-
ists accepted the utter “inerrancy” of scripture and a premillennialist escha-
tology as tests of faith. Inerrancy forced fundamentalist thinkers, like A.A.
Hodge and B. B.Warfield, to reject the doctrine of the merely “spiritual”
truth of scripture as distinct from “rational” or “empirical” truth (Ammer-
man 1991).Truth is one, therefore scripture is not only spiritually but also
empirically true. Their refusal to compromise with social vicissitudes led
them to separate their communities not only from secular America but
from the mainstream Protestant churches. However much fundamentalists
oppose and threaten those outside the faith, their primary conflict is with
the “official,” mainstream churches and their traditional compromises with
the state.
Westerners must keep in mind that Islamic fundamentalism is not related
to mainstream Islam as Christian fundamentalism is to mainstream Chris-
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tianity.The analogy fails. First, unlike the Bible the Qur’an is understood
to be literally the word of God, dictated by Allah and merely transcribed
by the Prophet Muhammad. Even moderate Muslims accept the truth or
inerrancy of all statements in the Qur’an.Their meaning is, of course, sub-
ject to interpretation, but scriptural hermeneutics in Islam cannot, as in
Jewish and Christian exegesis, exploit the alleged imperfections, motiva-
tions, and historical contingencies of a human writer. Second, we cannot
distinguish militant from mainstream Islam by referring to the former as
“political Islam.” For mainstream Islam is already political. Some use the
term “Islamism” for Islamic fundamentalism.This is plausible if “ism” is sup-
posed to indicate a political ideology comparable to nationalism, capital-
ism, or communism. But then its opposite, Islam without the “ism,” is not
an apolitical religion divorced from law and social management.“Islamism”
is better used for any attempt to base a political program on Islam.The best
terms for violent Muslim radicalism are militant and fundamentalist Islam,
the former emphasizing the political radicalism and violence, the latter the
uncompromising dogma that shuns traditionalist Islam.
Dār al-Islām and Dār Al-Harb
Some Muslims and their supporters have argued that Islam is not an inher-
ently intolerant or expansionist religion, that its track record on women’s
rights and social justice is far better than most non-Muslims believe, that
terrorism is the perversion of Islam by the few. If the jingoist haters of
Islam are utterly wrong (and they are), if the paranoids who call the FBI
whenever a middle-aged man kneels to pray in a Detroit Walmart are wrong
(and they are), so are those who claim there is nothing unique to Islam that
makes it a likely opponent of liberal modernity. For Islam in principle repu-
diates the distinction that has been the modern West’s most crucial bulwark
of tolerance and civility with respect to religion, namely, the distinction
between public political authority and “private” religious-cultural life.
Now, some may object to this sweeping generalization. First, as in all
great civilizations, the realities of managing Islamic states and empires gen-
erated prudential compromises throughout its history. By no means have
predominantly Muslim states conducted themselves consistently as Islamist
states. Clearly Muslims living in predominantly non-Muslim countries
accept a divorce between religion and ultimate public authority, in practice
and perhaps in belief. Second, Muslim states have often been tolerant of
minority religious communities, following Qur’an 2.256: “There shall be
no coercion in matters of faith.”* The tradition holds that forced conver-
sion makes no sense, true religion being an internal matter.This is precisely
John Locke’s argument in his 1689 Letter Concerning Toleration; on this issue
Islam preceded the godfather of Western liberalism by a thousand years.
Third, as the revivalists emphasize, Islam makes no distinction among peo-
ples. Anyone who asserts the oneness of God (the tawhid), submits to Him,
and accepts the prophecy of Muhammed is a Muslim (indeed, as we will
see, some Muslim thinkers dispense with the last requirement). Islam is
explicit in subordinating questions of group membership and identity to
the universal demands of God, hence its opposition to nationalism. As
Said Halim Pasha, the Ottoman prime minister, declared: “As there is no
English Mathematics, German Astronomy or French chemistry, so there is
no Turkish,Arabian, Persian or Indian Islam” (Iqbāl 1998: 259).This extends
even to religious differences.The Qur’an upbraids Jews and Christians for
their sectarianism:“And they claim: ‘None shall ever enter Paradise unless
he be a Jew’—or,‘a Christian.’ Such are their wishful beliefs! . . . Yea, indeed:
everyone who surrenders his whole being unto God, and is a doer of
Good withal, shall have his reward with his Sustainer” (Qur’an 2.111–12).
Thus,“Say:‘We believe in God . . . and that which has been bestowed upon
Abraham and Isma’il and Isaac and Jacob and their descendants, and that
which has been vouchsafed to Moses and Jesus. . . . we make no distinction
between any of them” (Qur’an 2.136). Last, contrary to common judgment,
Islam does not endorse theocracy. Theocracy, government by clerics, is a
very rare condition. Even today’s Iran is not literally a theocracy, since the
clerics do not constitute the administration but a juridical trump to state
actions that—in their view—violate Islamic law within an otherwise repub-
lican constitution (Juergensmeyer 1993: 176–77). Islam does reject sectarian
power or any worldly church. Davutoglu argues that this is a direct conse-
quence of Islam’s utter separation of the divine from the worldly: only
shari’a is divine, not governmental authority (Davutoglu 1994). In tradi-
tional Islamic states the caliph has, according to the late Malcolm Kerr,“no
special religious inspiration or powers of interpretation,” his only religious
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responsibility being the “protection of the generally recognized tenets of
the faith,” not their legal administration (Kerr 1966: 150–51).The caliphate’s
responsibility to protect Islam no more makes it an ecclesiastical office than
the responsibility to protect the Church of England so makes the British
Crown (Kerr 1966: 27).
Nevertheless, the sticking point remains that Islamic civilization has
never undergone a Western-style secularization of political authority or
law. From the very beginning, with the Prophet’s migration to Medina,
Islam has understood itself as a political community (umma) of believers, as a
space or territory of righteous belief.The early Islamic state saw expansion
as its religious duty.As we shall see, even the nineteenth-century modernists
who sought reconciliation with modern Western thought rejected secular-
ization. The Christian distinction from Matthew 22:21, give to Caesar’s
what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s, cannot apply to Islam. Islam has
never allowed itself to be privatized, as did Christianity in the West. Cer-
tainly political realities led Islam to evolve compromise measures to live
with other states. But the early fervor, to which some revivalists wish to
return, aimed to reform the entire world.To this day, in Islam all legitimacy
is religious legitimacy.
Regarding that concept most fearsome to non-Muslims, believers are
quick to point out that jihad does not primarily refer to warfare.The term
means “exertion” or “struggle,” in the sense of the believer’s struggle to fol-
low the path of God. Classically, there are four kinds of jihad, that of the
heart, hand, tongue, and sword. Jihad means, above all, the moral struggle of
righting one’s own heart, expressed in works and speech, and only lastly
the willingness to risk one’s life in combat. In the hadith (sayings of the
Prophet) Muhammad tells followers returning from battle that they must
now turn from the “lesser” to the “greater” jihad, from fighting to the strug-
gle against one’s base impulses (Johnson 2001: 35). Even in international
relations the jihad of the sword has been understood by some Muslim
writers as statecraft and just governance, not as war against non-Muslims.
Nevertheless, as Khadduri makes clear, the “classical” doctrine in Islamic
history dictated a normal state of war with non-Muslim states. As John
Kelsay notes, in the history of warfare involving Muslim countries it is secu-
lar war that is dubious and needful of special justification. The only pat-
ently legitimate reason for war is defense of Islamic rule (Kelsay 1993: 48).
Islamic fighters accepted as well that to die in battle for Islam guaranteed
entrance to Paradise.The Islamic law of international relations “was designed
for temporary purposes, on the assumption that the Islamic state was capa-
ble of absorbing the whole of mankind” (Khadduri 2002: 5).The aim was
not forced conversion, however. Early Muslims aimed to extend the dār al-
islām, the territory of peace, justice, and moral order under submission to
God.The outer world is the dār al-hārb, the territory of “war.” Harbis live in a
Hobbesian state of nature. Extending Islam was thus a war to establish peace.
For the polytheists unwilling to abandon their ways, the Qur’an counsels,
“Slay those who ascribe divinity to aught beside God wherever you may
come upon them” (9.5). Dhimmis, Jews and Christians, fellow “People of
the Book,” were exempt from such treatment as long as they accepted
Islamic authority.All communities were “invited” to acknowledge Islamic
rule and law by paying tribute (jizyah), which would permit their local
religious practices, so long as those were not offensive to God (in other
words, idolatrous or immoral).This made the gap between defensive and
offensive war easy to cross, for the offensive war that followed a refusal to
accept Islamic rule could be understood as a willful rejection of God’s law,
a rejection taken to imply that acts abominable to God would continue in
the others’ territory.Thus, as Khadduri notes,“the classical doctrine of the
jihad made no distinction between defensive and offensive war.” Certainly
such wars did have to be authorized by the caliph. Hence in Shia Islam since
the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam—the absence of an heir upon Hasan
al-‘Askarı̄’s death in 873 c.e.—there was no recognized leader capable of
such authorization, so only defensive, not offensive jihad, is accepted.
After the initial period of expansion, the dominant view softened.The
Hanaf ı̄ juristic school held that although the non-Muslim world is a world
of unrighteousness and conflict, war against it is justified only if it threat-
ens Islamic territory. Others, like the Shāfi’ı̄ school, maintained the stricter
view of jihad as the duty of every believer to war on all unbelievers simply
because of their unbelief. But subsequently the Shāfi’ı̄ argued for a mid-
dling possibility, the dār al-sulh or sphere of “peaceful arrangements” or
coexistence with non-Muslim states, territories which the Hanafi regarded
as simply part of the dār al-islām (Khadduri 1966: 12–13). But contracts and
treaties were recognized to be temporary, not to exceed ten years. This
softening made sense in a Muslim world that was already huge, and for
which, as its power declined and it was threatened by fragmentation from
within and Christian crusaders and Asian nomads from without, mainte-
nance became a more sensible aim than expansion (in this sense resem-
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bling the doctrine of “socialism in one country” that the Soviets were
forced to accept after the revolution failed to spread).The great medieval
jurist Ibn Taymı̄ya interpreted jihad of the sword as a binding duty only in
defense, denying that war on unbelievers merely because of their unbelief
was legitimate (Khadduri 1966: 59). Thus did the Muslim world accom-
modate itself to the exigencies of power, forming what we can call tradi-
tional Islam.
From Modernism to Fundamentalism
The intellectual roots and historical precedents of today’s Islamic revival
arguably go far back in time. Said Amir Arjomand suggests that the funda-
mentalist form of “violent purity” harkens back to the Khārijı̄s (seceders),
who left Ali ibn Abi Talib’s camp during the First Civil War (656–61 c.e.)
over the issue of succession to the murdered third caliph. The Khārijı̄s
killed Ali in 661, initiating the split between what would become Sunni
and Shia Islam. More directly, modern fundamentalism can be traced to
two groups, the Wahhabis and the Deoband movement.
Muhammed Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) opposed the encroachment
of un-Islamic folk practices, like shrines for saints, ultimately aiming to
excise all “innovations” allowed by Islamic teachers and jurists, and return
to guidance by the Qur’an and the hadith. He emphasized the importance
of ijtihad, independent rational judgment, as a counterweight to established
authority. Having converted the head of the ruling Saud clan, his views
have remained strong in Saudi Arabia ever since. Similarly, the Deoband
movement emerged from central India in the wake of the ill-fated Muslim-
led revolt against the British in 1857. Founded by Mohammed Zasim
Nanautawi (1833–77) and Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829–1905), it set up
madrassas in India,Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Maulana Abdul Haw, a move-
ment leader, the most prominent at Deoband, formed the hugely popular
Haqqania madrassa in Pakistan in 1947. Indefatigable regulators of personal
conduct, in the twentieth century alone the Deobandis “issued almost a
quarter of a million fatwa on the minutiae of every life” (Griffith 2001: 60).
Simultaneous with the founding of the Deobandis, the Islamic revival
against imperialism began in earnest with the late nineteenth-century mod-
ernists. Most famous among them was Sayyid Jamāl al-Din (1833–97), called
“al-Afghāni.” Probably of Iranian origin, and certainly influenced by the
Persian intellectual climate—in which, unlike the Sunni countries, Sufism
and medieval Arabic falsafa (Greek-inspired philosophy) continued to play
a role—he was a charismatic, complex figure of intrigue who practiced
taqiyya or “precautionary dissimulation,” sometimes speaking as a Western-
izing promoter of science and reason, sometimes as a revivalist of Islam.This
ambiguity is particularly evident in the juxtaposition of his famously reli-
gious “Refutation of the Materialists” and his secular “Response to Renan”
(Keddie 1968).What we can say is that al-Afghāni began the process of mak-
ing Islam the core idea of a modern political and anti-imperial movement,
an alternative to secularism, nationalism, and communism. His most promi-
nent disciple, Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), crafted a more straightfor-
ward message in service of the same aim. ‘Abduh’s Theology of Unity is
founded on the tawhı̄d, the unity of God, from which he derives a remark-
able set of conclusions, most prominently that Islam is utterly compatible
with modern science and technology. ‘Abduh insists that reason is the
heart of Islam. He argued not only that the Qur’an permits minority reli-
gious freedom, but that Islam is never spread by the sword. Islamic expan-
sion is achieved only by example (‘Abduh 1966: 147).
While the modernists have had great intellectual impact, with the excep-
tion of their descendent Muhammad Iqbāl, who played an important role
in Pakistan, their legacy was politically ineffectual.The twentieth century
would see two other movements vying to lead Islamic revival: fundamen-
talism and nationalism. Nationalism emerged in Egypt after the First World
War, led by the Wafd party of Sa’d Zaghloul, which had unsuccessfully
sought to overturn British rule. But each time nationalism failed to pro-
duce results, progressively more militant forms of Islam asserted themselves.
As Giles Keppel points out, re-Islamization proceeded along two tracks,
“from below” and “from above.” The former refers to local groups that
would “honeycomb” civil society, working in hospitals, schools, and various
charitable organizations. Perhaps the most prominent was the Jama’at al
Tabligh (Society for the Propagation of Islam), founded in India in 1927 by
Muhammad Ilyas. Promoting a “scrupulous mimicry” of the Prophet’s life in
every detail, the Tabligh became a widespread international movement re-
cruiting mostly from pools of disappointed rural immigrants to the cities. In
contrast, re-Islamization “from above” refers to intellectual-political move-
ments designed to reform or take over dominant social institutions.These
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typically drew from the modernizing, educated sectors of society, especially
technocrats and scientists in training.The most famous of these was Egypt’s
Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hasan al-Bannā (1906–49) in 1929.
Al-Bannā followed many of modernism’s themes. Islam is the source of
reason and the pinnacle of civilization, but its recent decadence makes it
easy prey for Western colonialism.The way back is through scripture, not
the “blind traditionalism” of the ulama or community of scholars (al-Bannā
1978: 88). But unlike the modernists al-Bannā starkly defends military
jihad. It is not merely struggle, but fighting, not merely defensive, but offen-
sive too. All Muslims must “prepare their equipment” and get ready until
the “time is ripe.” He writes,“The men of learning . . . agree unanimously
that jihad is a communal obligation imposed upon the Islamic umma in
order to broadcast the summons . . . and that it is an individual obligation
to repulse the attack of unbelievers upon it” (al-Bannā 1978: 150). The
“stigma” of Islam as a militaristic religion is false, he argues, because the
aim of jihad is the universal peace that will reign when Islam is unchal-
lenged.Those who consider violence the “lesser jihad” are defying original
Islam.“Some of them try,” he continues,“to divert people from the impor-
tance of fighting,” but “nothing . . . confers on the advocate the supreme
martyrdom and the reward of the strivers in Jihad, unless he slays or is slain
in the way of God” (al-Bannā 1978: 155). Despite this view al-Bannā’s
political method of choice remained da’wa, the calling to social activism,
hence his establishment of mosques, schools, hospitals, and sporting clubs.
Within the movement his discipline was authoritarian, but aimed at build-
ing Islamist community from the ground up.
Two midcentury thinkers then provided the ideological basis for com-
pleting the turn of revivalism from modernism to militancy. First was
Maulana Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903–79), who in 1941 founded
Jamaat-i-Islami, which was to become Pakistan’s most prominent funda-
mentalist group. Like the modernists Mawdudi remained a defender of
reason and science. He explicitly criticized those whose opposition to the
culture of the West led them to reject scientific or material progress.They
are merely “safeguarding the antiques” (Mawdudi 1980: 35). Likewise, he
declared that “to cover the books of the writers of the early ages with new
coatings of commentaries and footnotes” serves no purpose. Science is com-
mon to all mankind, so the Muslim may without heterodoxy learn from
Western science. Indeed, Islam is the ultimate source of scientific rationality,
not to mention justice, equality, freedom, and hence true civilization; its
current status is due to imperialism from without and decay from within.
Unlike all other religions, Islam is nonsectarian and devoid of national or
geographical ties; the very meaning of islām is simple submission to God.
Thus for Mawdudi even those who submitted to God before the revela-
tion to Muhammad were Muslims! Sivan reports the “Maudoodi dictum,
often quoted by Arab fundamentalists,” that “instead of claiming that Islam
is truly reasonable, one should hold that the true reason is Islamic” (Sivan
1985: 67).A follower of the true cosmopolitan religion, the Muslim “does
not regard anything in the world as a stranger to himself. He looks upon
everything in the universe as belonging to the same Lord Whom he him-
self belongs to. He is not partisan in his thinking and behaviour. His sym-
pathy, love and service do not remain confined to any particular sphere or
group. His vision is enlarged, his intellectual horizon widens” (Mawdudi
1974: 98). Indeed, sounding remarkably like John Stuart Mill, Mawdudi
argues that as long as one’s interpretation of the Qur’an is not self-serving,
disagreement over its meaning “is a stimulus to improvement and the very
soul of a healthy society. Differences of this kind are found in every society
whose members are endowed with intelligence and reason.Their existence
is a sign of life” (Mawdudi 1990: 46).
At the same time, Mawdudi makes Islam a totalistic, universally valid,
and utopian way of life. Islam is a complete system; the task of the Muslim
is “to try to make the whole of Islam supreme over the whole of life”
(Marty and Appleby 1995, 1:487).While he continues the older tradition of
understanding jihad as primarily defensive, he promotes it to the status of
the Five Pillars: “Jihad is as much a primary duty of the Muslims as are
prayer and fasting” (Mawdudi 1974: 141). Every Muslim is obligated to
engage in violent struggle against “those who perpetrate oppression as ene-
mies of Islam.”As Mawdudi repeats again and again, the tawhı̄d implies that
no person should bow to anyone but God. Sovereignty belongs to God
alone. Recognition of that fact, and the rejection of any other authority,
guarantees human equality and freedom. Clan elders, tribal leaders, nation-
alist presidents, priests, popes—all are usurpers of God’s authority and
violators of human justice.The “root of all evil” is “acceptance of supremacy
and overlordship other then [sic] that of Allah” (Mawdudi 1980: 93). Geo-
politically, communism is evil, liberal capitalism is cruel and licentious,
nationalism is contrary to God’s will.The communist and Western powers
threaten to blow up the world. Only Islam can save it. Likewise the eco-
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nomic problems of humanity can only be solved by “Islamic economics.”
The rejection of usury and conspicuous accumulation of wealth, along
with the zakat or obligatory donation to the poor, will produce collective
prosperity without the evils of Western inequality or communist oppres-
sion. Echoing the utopianism of Marx, the morally ideal society will simul-
taneously achieve the highest prosperity, the greatest quantity of leisure,
and complete economic justice and equality. Under Islam,
every branch of economic activity will expand and flourish. Islam
roots out all these evils through the institution of Zakat and the
agency of the public exchequer is always available to you as a
helper.You need not take thought for the morrow.Whenever you
are in need you can go to the public exchequer and obtain your
rightful due. There is no necessity of keeping deposits in banks
and of having insurance policies.You can leave this world without
any anxiety for the future of your children, the exchequer of the
community will be responsible for them afterwards. (Mawdudi
1992: 40)
The ideal world will result.Thus,“The objective of Islamic Jihad is to put
an end to the dominance of the un-Islamic systems of government and
replace them with Islamic rule. Islam intends to bring about this revolu-
tion not in one country or in a few countries but in the entire world”
(Mawdudi 1980: 142).
While Muslim fundamentalist groups multiplied in Arab countries dur-
ing midcentury, they were briefly outshone by secular nationalism, which
reached its high point in the 1950s and 1960s during the reign of Egyptian
president Gamal Abdel Nasser. Following the Nasserite model, fundamen-
talism was commonly suppressed in the Islamic world by newly postcolo-
nial states.Thus the jails became the new madrassas for a growing extrem-
ism.The fundamentalism of the 1970s was then an explicit reaction against
the perceived corruption, and the very real repression, of Nasser’s regime.
But the humiliation of Arab governments by Israel in the 1967 Six Day
War, and their less devastating defeat in 1973, tarred nationalism beyond
redemption. Then came OPEC and the rise in oil prices which flooded
the oil-rich states with cash, in particular, Saudi Arabia, the home both of
Islam’s most sacred sites and Wahhabism.
One of those imprisoned Egyptian Islamists, Sayyid Qutb, laid the intel-
lectual foundations for the most militant form of fundamentalism.Arrested
three years after a personal conversion that led him to join the Muslim
Brotherhood, he sat in prison for a decade, was released in 1964, then
arrested again and hanged in 1966. Qutb followed much of Mawdudi’s
line. Islam is the natural human religion, recognizing no differences of rit-
ual, ethnicity, race, or tribe. All people who have faithfully submitted to
God are Muslims. Islam can absorb modern science, since “the experimental
method” was invented by Islam and copied by the West (Qutb 1990: 94).
Civilized society is one in which the laws of God are the law of the land,
hence Allah alone is sovereign, human authorities being mere “viceregents.”
The only truly human community is a “community of belief.” In an almost
Rousseauian turn, human governance is slavery of one man to another, but
in submitting to God one submits to no man, hence remains free.
Chastened by his prison experience, Qutb took the radical step of explic-
itly branding all existing Islamic societies as part of jahiliyya. Literally unbelief
or ignorance, the term originally referred to those unaware of the Prophet’s
message, who lived before Islam or outside its spread, thus carrying as well
the sense of “barbarism.” Qutb regarded contemporary jahiliyya as “rebel-
lion” against God, insisting that Muslims must identify, judge, and overcome
unbelievers. Jahiliyya is for Qutb the entire world; current Islamic states are
no better than Western ones. Only the Qur’an and the hadith are legitimate
sources of social and political guidance; traditional jurists, priests, and men
of theory are not to be trusted. But Qutb approved of ijtihad, thinking for
oneself, since he believed it discredited traditional Islamic authorities and
supported militancy. His attention turned from the community-building of
al-Bannā to revolution; society must be remade now by direct attack on
the state.This was an implicit critique of the Muslim Brotherhood; as the
Sudanese Islamist Hassan al-Turabi later put it,“Look at the Brotherhood;
they don’t change society at all, they never detribalize society, they promote
a traditional, sectarian Islam against a progressive Islam” (Shadid 2001: 62).
Giles Keppel remarks,“Qutb’s wish to break with the world was very sin-
gular. It was contrary to the position adopted by. . . even most of the Mus-
lim Brothers—during the 1960s.They held that there could be no break-
ing with a society which was, however imperfectly, Islamic. . . . Qutb, on
the other hand, thought that Nasser’s ‘barbarism’ had reached a point of no
return” (Keppel 1994: 20).
When Nasser’s successor Anwar Sadat lifted the ban on fundamentalism,
the children of Qutb emerged from jail with radicalized views. Some called
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for an internal withdrawal of believers into separatist Islamic communities,
given the utter unacceptability of existing majority-Muslim societies. But
Muhammed ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, a member of the militant group al-Jihād,
rejected that approach. Like Qutb he insisted that “the Rulers of this age . . .
were raised at the tables of imperialism, be it Crusaderism, or Commu-
nism, or Zionism.They carry nothing from Islam but their names” (Jansen
1986: 169). Faraj took the logically final step toward holy war in his Al-
Farı̄dah al-Ghā’ibah (The Neglected Duty). For centuries corrupt rulers and
traditional scholars have purposely suppressed the Islamic duty of offensive
jihad espoused by the Prophet and the early caliphate:“Neglecting jihad is
the cause of the lowness, humiliation, division and fragmentation in which
Muslims live today” (Jansen 1986: 205).True Islam is a violent transforma-
tion of the real by the ideal, the takeover of all Islamic states by force of
arms, an Islam “spread by the sword” (Jansen 1986: 193). Faraj makes jihad the
essence of Islamic commitment.This militancy achieved its greatest success
when on October 6, 1981, one of Faraj’s associates assassinated President
Sadat, stating afterward,“I have killed Pharaoh.”
Islamic militancy thus reached the historical plateau from which Sep-
tember 11, 2001, can be understood. But in the almost exactly twenty years
that intervened, we must also recognize the unique role of Afghanistan.
After the Soviet invasion of 1979 the Afghan war became, as Anthony
Shadid insightfully puts it, the Spanish Civil War for Islamists, generating
an “Islamic International” of mostly Arab fighters available to travel to vir-
tually any Islamic conflict (Shadid 2001: 79ff.). These itinerant warriors
have been, however, largely devoid of a detailed ideology or political pro-
gram, their purely military, pan-Islamic militancy largely unconnected to the
regional and local Islamist movements they join.As Olivier Roy described
the new breed of Islamic terrorists, referring to the man who would later
mastermind the September 11 attacks,
Their distinctive feature is their internationalism and lack of terri-
torial base. . . . They are thus disconnected not only from existing
states . . . but also from the large Islamist movements, which have
disowned their offspring. [Those] movements, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, the FIS [Algeria], Refah in Turkey and Hamas in
Palestine, place their struggles in a national framework and claim full
recognition as protagonists in the political process.This approach,
which is shared by Iran, might appropriately be described as Islamic
nationalism. It is a far cry from the imaginary umma which Bin
Ladin and his associates invoke . . . without a genuine political proj-
ect. (Roy 1998: 8)
According to Shadid even Hassan al-Turabi regarded bin Laden as “noth-
ing but a foot soldier,” a heroic mujahı̄d but without a political program.
We will turn to an overall evaluation of Islamic fundamentalism presently.
First, let us draw some tentative conclusions from our brief survey.
Islamic fundamentalism is not, or not primarily, antimodernist, primi-
tive, primordial, or irrational.We may say that fundamentalism is antimod-
ernist, if we understand “modernism” in the Western sense as the attempt
of mainstream denominations to relax standards and to interpret scripture
more loosely and metaphorically in order to make religion workable in
the modern world. In the Islamic world that relaxed interpretive style is
characteristic of traditionalism (although the modernism of Afghani and
‘Abduh produced its own version).The crucial point is that from the first
emergence of fundamentalism by name in Protestant America, to its Islamist
version, fundamentalists have been highly rationalist, concerned to apply a
careful, if stilted, analysis of scripture as consistently as possible across all
social areas of life, refusing to accept ad hoc pragmatic trade-offs that cannot
be justified on scriptural grounds. Neither is it right to say that fundamen-
talists are “traditionalists.” While they regard themselves as returning to
original teachings, they reject all more recent traditions of interpretation,
the accumulated practices of the era intervening between the time of revela-
tion and the present.Their opposition to the elite authorities of the main-
stream makes them, in their eyes, anti-authoritarian, alone training a harsh,
critical light on mainstream scriptural hermeneutics. Fundamentalism is
not what sociologist Edward Shils called “primordial,” even if it trades on
primordial feelings. It is not determined by history, it is not ethnic or
nationalist. Fundamentalists of all kinds worship The Book, not ancestors.
Most important, as we shall see, the fundamentalisms that we are familiar
with are almost by definition political.They accept the modern politicization
of culture. As Geertz argued regarding the ethnic nationalism of the post-
colonial states that emerged after World War II, fundamentalism is moti-
vated by the presence of a modern, centralized state, a “valuable new prize
over which to fight and a frightening new force with which to contend”
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(Geertz 1961: 22). Like nationalists, fundamentalists want to capture the
state and its mass culture, not dismantle them.
Here the relationship between the fundamentalist and modernist wings
of the Islamic revival is instructive.While the modernists are often consid-
ered synthesizers who sought to bridge Western and Islamic thought, hence
a pole away from the militants, this is a bit misleading. Mawdudi is no less
ardent in his defense of science and reason than is ‘Abduh.The modernists
were not suggesting a secular, non-Islamic society (although al-Afghani
suggested almost everything at one time or another), and they specifically
rejected the Western division of religion and politics. It was not for noth-
ing that ‘Abduh’s followers called themselves Salafiyyah, devotees of the
salaf or “pious ancestors.” Certainly the fundamentalists invoke a militant
understanding of jihad, justifying a violence that the modernists rejected.
But the key difference, I think, hence the sine qua non of fundamentalism,
goes beyond this specific doctrine.What makes militant Islam militant is
not merely the doctrine of jihad, nor heightened intolerance, nor violence,
nor traditionalism, nor fear of modernity, nor an angry response to imperi-
alism. Its novelty is more profound than that.
Anticulture, Taliban-style
Taliban means student, and was used in southern Afghanistan in the late
twentieth century to refer to religious students at a madrassa who, after sev-
eral years of instruction, could be qualified as village mullah or scriptural
authority. During the war against the Soviet occupation Mohammad Nabi
Mohammadi’s Islamist group, Harakat-I Inquilab-I Islami, drew many of its
soldiers from such taliban. In 1994 two teenage girls near the Khandahari
village of Sang Hesar were kidnapped and raped by a group of mujahedin.
Mohammad Omar, who had been a Harakat commander but retired to
study in the madrassa, recruited thirty students and rescued the girls. As
Omar later said,“We were fighting against Muslims who had gone wrong”
(Griffin 2001: 35).This was the beginning of the transformation of taliban,
students, into the Taliban, revolutionary party. By late in the year Omar had
fifteen hundred men.
Upon taking power the Taliban had the reputation of restraint and
decency, refusing the temptations of theft and rape.This reputation was not
long in losing its luster.The Taliban’s religious orientation is a Deobandi
radicalization of the Wahhabi line. M. J. Gohari reports that on a trip to
Saudi Arabia in the 1980s he had seen what he assumed were Saudi guards
preventing some elderly Iranians from kissing the Prophet’s tomb, a folk-
polytheist departure from tawhı̄d. He was surprised by the guards’ vehe-
mence in making an issue of this minor sign of fealty, but was more sur-
prised to discover that they were not Saudis but Afghans. One said he was
delighted to be studying “true Islam,” which must have meant Wahhabism.
It is this perspective that the Taliban, after ten years of brutal warfare, were
now able to impose on a diverse but largely Persianate Afghanistan. Once
in power they “made it clear they proposed to rewrite Afghan history”
(Sinha 1997: 45).Their ideological radicalism, reminiscent of the style if not
the genocidal results of the Khmer Rouge, is by now well known: virtually
no music, no nonreligious books or bookstores, no visual representation,
no uncontrolled television or radio, and of course no non-Islamic statuary,
as seen in their gratuitous destruction of the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan, an
ancient religious site posing no threat to the dominance of Islam in the
region.The restriction of women reached a crescendo, barring their public
education as well as travel in public alone, even though covered from toe
to scalp. Sex was clearly a special concern. But Taliban doctrine evidently
still permitted some forms of humor: regarding adultery, Mullah Moham-
mad Hassan of Khandahar quipped,“We have a dilemma on this. One group
of scholars believes you should take these people to the highest building in
the city and hurl them to their deaths. [The other] recommends you dig a
pit near a wall somewhere, put these people in it, then topple the wall so
that they are buried alive” (Griffin 2001: 61).
We may note two brief portraits by John Sifton, a humanitarian aid
worker in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan during 2000–2001. In Jozjan
province, at a Soviet-era hotel used by the Taliban to house foreigners, he
came across a landscape painting that included several animals.The heads
of the animals had been carefully cut out by Taliban police. “This left a
decapitated deer standing by a pond and a headless beaver sitting on a tree
stump. . . . A terrible painting . . . done entirely with two shades of green
and one shade of brown and then vandalized by the Taliban police trying
to ensure its innocence before God without destroying it altogether. In its
own way, I thought, it is a post-postmodern masterpiece.” Later, in sum-
ming up his experience, he writes, “We are off the grid. . . . There are no
196 CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS
WHAT IS THE OPPOSITE OF JIHAD? 197
telephones outside the cities.There is no television reception.We have no
access to ‘entertainment.’There are no theaters, films, galleries or circuses.
The Taliban has even banned music. . . . Sometimes it feels as if we have
been brought back not just to a time before modern entertainment but 
to a time before art . . . a time without images and ideas and representa-
tions, only actual events” (Sifton 2001). Here the Taliban form the best, if
most extreme, example of a virtually anticultural religious practice. Most of
Afghan culture was literally eliminated or suppressed—artifacts, music,
narratives, styles of dress. It is not that they eliminated decadent Western
culture or secular Afghan culture.They eliminated culture per se. This may
seem an odd formulation, since religion is itself a part of culture. But we
already know that one part of culture—for example, political ideology—
can tyrannize the rest. So can Church,Temple, or Mosque. In the Taliban
and the post-Qutb forms of Islamic militancy generally, we see the com-
plete condemnation of existing society, the requirement for a wholesale
reconstruction of culture in strict accordance with a single dogma by a
revolutionary vanguard who alone can tell its literal meaning.The enemy
here is historical culture itself.
As this implies, and as Roxanne Euben notes of Islamic fundamentalism
in general, the Taliban exhibited a Marxist-Leninist analogy (Euben 1999).
For the militants the crumbling of extant world systems—capitalism, com-
munism, nationalism—is inevitable.The ideal social order is possible, if the
right ideology is accepted, and all can accept it, because it is the final
fulfillment of human civilization, transcending any of the older human
divisions of nation, caste, or class. Once accomplished, all of life, economic,
social, political, intellectual, and cultural, will be different. Only truly Islamic
rule, either by making all humanity Muslims or forcing other monotheists
to accept Muslim authority, will allow humanity to be truly human. And
the key to this transformation is held by an educated elite who understand
the inner truths. Mawdudi even called for a “permanent jihad,” echoing
Trotsky’s notion of permanent revolution. But not only is leftist utopi-
anism thereby invoked.The Taliban scoured the semiotic landscape of all
other religious and cultural inheritances, an obsession not unlike the Nazi
determination to root out that last shopkeeper hiding in an attic, to render
the homeland judenrein. Of course Islamic fundamentalism has a very long
way to go to complete that analogy. In terms of totalitarian slaughter the
West remains unchallenged, its ideological children, fascist-nationalism and
Russian communism, being hard to beat (even if Chinese and Cambodian
communists made a strong showing). Militant Islam will undoubtedly never
catch up. But it will not be for lack of the right spirit.
How Many Modernities?
What marks the special nature of Islamic fundamentalism, as other com-
mentators have noted, is its modernism. It entails a closeted form of the
Western modernism that it so publicly claims to oppose. If Islam was always
political in the sense that it sought to establish a righteous monotheistic
community, for Islamists the whole point and method of Islam becomes
political. Personal confession and virtue matter less than the inauguration
of a new order.As Arjomand points out,
The Principle of Qutb’s neo-Kharijite sectarianism is this: the
profession of faith according to the canonical formula and the belief
in the Five Pillars are not the defining mark of a Muslim believer.
The believer must in addition reject all man-made laws and gov-
ernments, which are the foundations of the new paganism. The
true believers, the elect, must organize themselves into vanguard
groups apart from the new society of ignorance and repeat the
original pattern of the establishment of Islam through withdrawal/
migration, jihad, and conquest of power. (Marty and Appleby 1995,
5:184)
As Olivier Roy explains of twentieth-century Islamists, “Far from having
emerged from the clergy or traditional circles, they are to be found within
the modern institutions of society (colleges, faculties of science, and in
general in the urban environment)” (Roy 1986: 6). Islamist leaders discov-
ered themselves as modern people in barely modernized societies suffering
from economic underdevelopment, geopolitical inferiority, and political
infantilization under autocratic leaders. Exposed to the West, often edu-
cated in it, they sought the source of their home society’s inadequacy with
Western tools. Knowing the modern West better than their own religious
tradition, Hamid Dabashi argues, “They recognize a heightened state of
ideological self-awareness on the part of ‘the West’ that they identify as the
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source and cause of its achievements.”They bend Islam to fill the role of an
ideological alternative to secularism, capitalism, nationalism, and commu-
nism, “to create from Islam a political model capable of competing with
the great ideologies of the Western world” (Roy 1986: 6). Repulsed by
“backward and superstitious” Islam, the traditional Islam of their birth
communities, the militant seeks “ ‘the True Islam,’ which he imagines as
socially active and politically progressive,” that is, as fulfilling the function
of ideology in the postreligious West (Dabashi 1993: 326–27).The accep-
tance of the modern state left behind by retreating Western imperialists as
the ultimate prize, the free decision to break with given social norms to
join an elite vanguard, the rationalist planning that hopes, through novel
methods and technologies, to win the prize, and the utopian reconstruc-
tion according to intellectual principles it hopes to carry out—these are
the fruit of modern secularism, not the religious tradition.
In this, militant Islam is neither orthodox nor traditional. Its heterodoxy
lies not only in the use of violence by terrorists, which when it kills
women and children, violates the hadith.The ideologically hidden violation
of tradition is deeper and more essential. For society can only be remade
by militants if they organize as a modern,Western-style political party and
seize control of a modern,Western-style, centralized state:“Instead of wish-
ing, like the ‘ulama, to manage civil society, their ambition is to reconstruct
society, starting with the state” (Roy 1986: 6). In doing so they must elim-
inate the power of traditional Islamic authorities. As Ann Mayer explains,
“Islamic law was applied for over a millennium without there having been
recourse to legislative measures by governments to bring it into force,”
rather merely by local juristic interpretation and application (Mayer 1990:
182).To be legislated, Islamic law had to be, for the first time, codified.The
Ayatollah Khomeini himself ordered in 1988 that the Iranian government
be free to “prevent any matter, be it spiritual or material, that poses a threat
to its interests,” hence that “for Islam, the requirements of government
supersede every tenet, including even those of prayer, fasting and pilgrim-
age to Mecca”! (Pipes 2002: 82). Last and most blatant, the very idea of
constructing a worldly utopia, as called for by Mawdudi and Qutb, is
heterodox, for like Christianity, Islam posits paradise in the next world, not
this one.
The militants’ merger of government and legal administration is remi-
niscent of that nadir of modern Western legal practice, totalitarianism.And
this is precisely the conclusion of S. N. Eisenstadt: militant Islam is the reli-
gious version of twentieth-century totalitarianism, thus a kind of religious
Jacobinism (Eisenstadt 1999). The Jacobins, utopian radicals of the French
Revolution, were certainly not antimodernist, nor premodern.Their move-
ment was a kind of modernism, a perennial option within modernity, a col-
lectivist, rationalist, utopian reorganization of society by a centralized state
claiming to represent a democratic egalitarian social order, in which civil
society, individualism, and pluralism are repressed. Such reorganization was
attempted in the past century by a mythic-primordialist nationalism in Italy,
Germany, and Japan, and by a mythic-progressive communism in Russia,
China, and elsewhere.The Islamic militants have devised their own version.
How then can we understand the differences between contemporary
Islamic civilization, with its revivalism, and Western modernity? First, the
Islamic world never nationalized in any thorough way. In the West nation-
alism provided the supralocal, culturally unified context for moderniza-
tion, breaking traditional hierarchy, localism, and clan politics. But in the
Islamic world, while nationalism has been the slogan for various secular
anti-imperialists, most famously Nasser, it never remade social loyalty among
the masses.With rare exceptions, in terms of political identification, Islamic
peoples have gone from local, tribal, ethnic identity directly to pan-Islamic
identity with little in between. In the Islamic world it is religion, not nation,
that has provided the modernist trump to community and locale. Second,
this suggests that majority Islamic societies find themselves to be based in
Islam in a way that Western societies are not based in Christianity. The
relation of Western civilization to Christianity now appears to have been
more mediated, enabling the West to culturalize Christianity, to sublimate its
otherworldly, doctrinal, and liturgical aims into cultural ideas. In contrast, a
call to Islam in Islamic societies is a call to identity and ideality, to the true
self and the righteous social order. However much they may reject the
intolerance and violence tied to it, even mainstream Muslims seem ill at
ease with the prospect of rejecting such revivalism.Third, in the West-Islam
conflict we may witness the unique historical confrontation of the two
most aggressive forms of moral universalism the world has yet seen. Islam’s
belief in its own natural, rational, universal, transethnic validity, coupled
with its expansionist past, mirrors the modern West’s secular universalism,
embodied in imperialism and its current geopolitical primacy. No other
civilization of the past two millennia has coupled its belief that it repre-
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sented the best of humanity—a common enough view—with the claim
that all others can and ought accept its uniquely culture-transcending ways.*
Fourth and most basically, Islam and even Islamism are not less rational
than Western modernism or postmodernism, they are more rational. Islam’s
refusal to draw a hard line between religion and political authority is
more, not less, intellectually and normatively consistent than the Western
duality. If the ultimate truth is what is given by religion in the form of dis-
cursively available norms that citizens endorse, why should the polis oper-
ate on any other basis? The modern West’s largely instrumentalist rational-
ity cannot answer that question. It refuses to rationalize all the way down,
to make all contexts of life consistent. Ernest Gellner’s unappealing term
for the necessary mental substructure of modern Western civil society is
hypocritization.That society does not require that we be agnostics or atheists,
as the Marxist version of modern secularism did. Liberal secularism allows,
even encourages, people to have religious worldviews, but requires that
they abandon them at key points in public life with only a pragmatic
explanation of why that should be (namely, to avoid social conflict). Strik-
ingly, in her unique definition of liberalism, Ordinary Vices, the late political
theorist Judith Sklar makes Gellner’s point: in order to restrict power and re-
spect rights—hence to make cruelty the worst vice—liberalism had to
invoke a rigid private-public distinction that in effect permitted and even
encouraged hypocrisy. Liberal toleration is not that of a philosophical system
that justifies toleration as one of its theorems; it is the toleration of one
who is willing to doff his or her philosophical system because of contex-
tual judgments, later to don it again.What I have called the differentiation
of spheres and modes of judgment, and the powerful advantages it gives us,
are more dear than the attempt at a synthetic, integrative metanarrative.
Islamic consistency need not, however, be incompatible with other fea-
tures of liberal republican politics. Democracy is not difficult to imagine in
Islam. It exists in fact in today’s Turkey, more or less in Pakistan, and in
another sense in Iran. Muhammad Khalaf-Allah in fact argues that Islam
requires democracy (Kurzman 1998). Here one can invoke the concept of
shura, or consultation; the Muslim community is described as one “whose
rule [in all matters of common concern] is consultation among themselves”
(Qur’an 42:38). Further, as noted, Islamic rule does have a tradition of tol-
*As was suggested to me by Mark Ryan.
eration of minority religious communities. Michael Walzer has shown that
the American style of largely culturally neutral government permitting
maximum individual liberty is only one “regime of toleration” among sev-
eral (Walzer 1997). In particular, the “millet” system, most recently embod-
ied in the Ottoman Empire, traditionally allowed local religious or national
autonomy under an imperial government. Davutoglu argues that the mil-
let system is characteristically Islamic (Davutoglu 1994).The bigger prob-
lem is domestic liberalism, the restriction of governmental and majoritar-
ian power to respect individual liberties. Nevertheless, even here a number
of Islamic writers have argued for a “liberal Islam” that employs Islamic
sources to justify toleration. As Kurzman recounts, this has come in three
distinct but overlapping forms: the argument that the Qur’an and shari’a
themselves demand toleration of other groups, most famously proposed 
by Ali Bulaç; the claim of ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq and Muhammad Sa’id al-
‘Ashmawi that the shari’a is a religious code not meant to be codified into
a positive legal system; and a hermeneutic toleration of varieties of inter-
pretation of Islam based in the notion of ijtihad, that believers are to use their
own reasoning to understand the word of God, as suggested by Muham-
mad Asad,Yusef al-Qaradawi, and Mohammed Arkoun (Kurzman 1998).
Whatever option is exercised, we must imagine that the continued mod-
ernization of majority Islamic societies will presumably bar any return to a
“customary” Islamic world informally tolerant of local deviations. For that
is just what modernization cannot abide. If toleration is to be reliably
practiced in Islamic countries, it must become an explicit policy. Nor can
we imagine a literal return to the millet system of the Ottomans.Absent a
sheer resort to empire, we are not going to see every land from Algiers to
Jakarta ruled by a single sovereign entity. But multiple Islamist sovereignties
embodying a variety of traditionalist, capacious interpretations of the shari’a
might well be plausible.
In all this we must be careful not to impose our black-and-white West-
ern, and especially American, choice between a putatively modern “wall”
of separation of church and state and a “theocratic” merger. For we must
acknowledge that there are many ways of managing the relation of the sacred
and the profane. One mode is secularization simpliciter, a sheer demise of
religious fervor, commitment, and institutional significance.Another is the
segregation of religious feeling to nonpublic, nonpolitical life, except in its
vaguest, most ecumenical form. A third would be the presence or evolu-
tion of a form of religion that can endorse, or even redirect spiritual enthu-
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siasm into, modernity. A fourth, resembling but distinct from the second
and third, is the presence or evolution of a religious tradition valid across
all spheres of life but for which modern activities are either spiritually
irrelevant or, what amounts to the same thing, pose no special problem of
religious vetting.
Arguably the level of religious intensity, focused on properly religious
aims and objects, was indeed lessened in the West by modernity. But the
remarkable fact about the West is the unique combination of the second
and third strategies.While the West achieved a privatization of religion, at
the same time, as Weber argued, it evolved a form of Christianity that
endorsed and even fueled key parts of the modernist project, namely, Protes-
tantism. Its radical, militant form (Puritanism), after its political defeat, helped
to inspire a modern economy, especially the—in Weber’s term—“this-
worldly asceticism” of profit accumulation, while its private-public distinc-
tion made possible modern liberal democratic politics.The fourth strategy
seems to have been the case in East Asia, both in Japan and in the Confu-
cian societies of Hong Kong,Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea, allow-
ing them to evolve a more communitarian but still pragmatic capitalism in
league with gradually increasing democratization, without any showdown
with religious tradition at all. In the case of Islamic societies it would also
seem the fourth is the most promising, perhaps helped by a dollop of the
third, that is, some combination of a scientific-economic-bureaucratic mod-
ernization that has no anti-Islamic implications, with a yet-to-evolve strain
of Islamic interpretation that finds scriptural justification for endorsing con-
stitutional democratic politics.At any rate, the achievement of political sta-
bility and tolerant democracy in the Islamic world will likely hang on the
internal development of moderate Islamism, that is, a revivalist Islam which
accepts the non-neutrality of government toward Islam (versus the West-
ern model), but nevertheless finds within itself the resources for tolerating
minority communities, allowing a scope for individual intellectual and
political expression (if still lesser than the Western model), and which gen-
erates loyalty to, and legitimacy of, normalized, legalistic states, without
either secular nationalism or autocrats whose pretense of Islamism serves
only to bolster their power by deflecting criticism.
In conclusion, while some think liberalization and democratization would
eventually lead Islamic societies to a more Western-looking modernization
path, just as some—perhaps the same “some”—assume that China’s attempt
to modernize economically but not politically must fail, leading, again, to a
more Westerly route, most of the evidence points in the opposite direction.
More Islamic democracy probably means more Islamism.And there is little
reason to believe this is merely a short-term phenomenon. It may well be
that today’s Islamic revivalism represents yet another form of modernism,
one that largely abandons the Western liberal independence of state from
religion. It may be that a sizable chunk of the great swath of humanity living
from Morocco to Indonesia may modernize not through secularizing or
developing a strong public/private distinction or abandoning official meta-
narratives, but by being economically and technologically sophisticated
Wahhabis. In twenty years the present spate of militant Islamic violence
might end if tolerable solutions are reached in Kashmir and the West Bank,
with stable moderate Islamist regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq (as well as
Turkey), allowing the U.S. military presence on Arab land and Afghanistan
to be reduced to a minimum. Many ifs to be sure, but a viable status quo
that isolates the militants is not inconceivable. My point is that even such a
pacific future would not mean Islamic imitation of the West, or the dis-
continuation of its own inner struggles with modernity, or a future devoid
of ever more clashes around the borders of modernization.What we see in
the Islamic world, not the terrorism of the extremists but widespread
official and public endorsement of Islam with a strong pan-Islamic
identification, may well be what a modernized Islamic civilization looks like.
Pan-Islamic revival may be a late analogue of Western nationalism, the
centralization and politicization of high culture as the idiom of social life.
But unlike earlier Western nationalism, the high culture in question is far
more cosmopolitan and may be capable of long-term economic, techno-
logical, and even democratic progress. If so, we may have to admit a new, if
not long-term then at least middling-term option for modernization, just
as scholars have recognized a non-individualistic, more communitarian or
corporate modernization in the vibrant East Asian economies. If we in the
West, familiar with our own individualist, capitalist, agonistic or competitive
modernity, have watched the failure of communist modernity, and recog-
nized the apparent success of communitarian modernity, we may now have
to admit as well the viability of a congregational modernity.
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From one perspective, the central philosophical problem raised by locating
human being in culture is the autonomy of reason. Is our faculty and method
of inquiry and deliberation self-grounding, does it provide its own justifi-
cation? The dominant modern Western tradition thinks reason is indeed
autonomous, not dependent upon or justified by anything outside itself.
This is a normative statement, of course, not descriptive. No contemporary
philosophers believe that there is a metaphysical Reason subsisting in itself,
that if there were no neurons and no signs in the world, Reason would yet
persist. Reason is something about the mind, or something about the way
signs and concepts are ordered in human speech and writing. Nevertheless,
we commonly conceive reason as something whose validity is not drawn
from pragmatic consequences, divine utterances, emotional cathexes, sur-
vival probabilities, or social conventions, but from itself.
Already in the Enlightenment, however, that autonomy was in question,
particularly among thinkers on the periphery of the eighteenth-century
English flame, simultaneously drawn to the most advanced country on earth
and a bit wary of being burned. For the Scotsmen Thomas Reid, Adam
Smith, and David Hume and the Irishman Edmund Burke, the realm of
legitimate belief extended beyond what reason can ground.They held that
reason per se is inadequate to life, in particular to practical-ethical (hence
political) life, there being beliefs we inevitably or legitimately hold which
reason nevertheless cannot know to be true. Hume did this most negatively,
implying that such beliefs are irrational, but dictated by our natural consti-
tution.The others agreed that reason is limited and grounded in something
outside itself, either common sense (Reid), social tradition (Burke), or social
identification (Smith). But for them, that-on-which reason is founded is
not irrational or contradictory to reason: reason is continuous with practical-
ethical life and its necessary commitments.Thus they prefigured many rad-
ical twentieth-century critiques of reason, although in a nonapocalyptic way.
CONCLUSION:  CULTURE’S REASONS
That reason is not autonomous implies no collapse into chaos or barbarism,
just a demystifying acceptance of its sociocultural location.
It will come as no surprise to the reader if, with the thinkers mentioned,
I deny the autonomy of reason. Reason is emergent from or supervenient upon
culture. It is culture operating at a sufficiently complex and responsible level
of interrogation. Reason can be defined as methodical metajudgment, the
methodical adjudication of conflict among human judgments. Given a range
of multiple or competing judgments of any kind, reason is the capacity to
decide among them validly, that is, validly by contemporary criteria. It is thus
an intrinsically normative and interrogative concept.We must imagine that
humans have engaged in reason at least since the development of “sym-
bolic culture” in the Upper Paleolithic age, and perhaps earlier, since the
maturation of relatively complex natural languages. Perhaps we could follow
Bateson in saying that once humans could reflexively refer to discursive-
practical contexts, situations of linguistically mediated shared activity, rea-
son was present. But what matters here is less its lineage than its common-
ality to segmentary, agroliterate, and modern societies. Implicit in this claim
is that it makes little sense to restrict reason to naturalistic, nonreligious,
postmythical cultural forms, to claim that reason somehow was born in
ancient Greek natural philosophy, fell asleep for a millennium or two, then
awakened for good in Europe’s “Age of Reason.” Modernity is not more
rational than other eras. It is differently rational.
The Three Reasons
Gellner distinguished what he called “Durkheimian” from “Weberian”
rationality. The former was for him the rationality of embodiment and
instantiation, the participation of instances in socially shared ideal forms.
The latter, which emerges only in modernity, is the piecemeal logical and
instrumental rationality by which acts or claims are shown to be impli-
cated by, or consistent with, each other. Oddly enough, this bivalent notion
of reason does not correspond to Gellner’s own tripartite historical scheme.
Nevertheless, his instinct was, I think, sound.We do not find in history and
prehistory a transition from the non- or prerational to the rational. Lucien
Levy-Bruhl’s notion of the prelogical mentality has been rightly criticized.
Rather, we find a transition among different modes of rationality or reason.
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This becomes plausible once we accept a broad notion of reason as method-
ical metajudgment. Segmentary societies engage in such adjudication, just
as agrarian and industrial societies do.The absence of reason would mean
the absence of the articulation of reasons, of social validation or justification.
But such is barely conceivable, given complex natural languages and cul-
tures.We do not know of societies in which fully competent members do
not steer among values in polynormative and novel situations, weighing
competing rules and giving reasons for their decisions. We know of no
societies in which members do not explain themselves.
But we need to expand Gellner’s scheme by separating out two modes
of rationality he conflated under the “Durkheimian.” I suggest that ritual-
segmentary, stratified-axial, and modern-industrial society each have their
own characteristic mode of reason.Thus there are three “reasons,” Durk-
heimian, Jasperian, and Weberian. No argument will be mounted here to
show that reason is historically divided into only these three types.The claim
is rather that what we refer to as reason or methodical metajudgment is a
complex notion that can abide division, and that at least three types of rea-
son can be distinguished across history and prehistory.Which is to say that,
all told, the attribution of variant forms of reason to historical and pre-
historical periods is preferable to asserting the sameness of reason, hence
the unreasonableness or irrationality of the earlier periods. Last, this devel-
opmental scheme does not mean that the earlier forms are unavailable in
the later, that Durkheimian and Jasperian rationality are absent in modern
society. In this as in many other cases, development implies the emergence
of a new capacity having priority over retained but demoted older capaci-
ties.The leading form of rationality, as embodied not only in speech but in
practices and institutions, is characteristic of an age’s dealings with what it
regards as its chief interests and problems, the others playing subaltern roles,
but available either to challenge the dominant form or fill in its gaps.
For Durkheimian rationality meaning is embodied in the structures of
social life, to which there can be no rational objection. One may, of course,
object to a way of interpreting those structures, or a way of dealing with
their conflict. Simply put, in segmentary life society is everything, a condi-
tion made easier by the fact that society exists in harmony with its natural
environment, with a minimum of artifice and manipulation, divine charac-
ters multiplying along the border between the two. Signs and referents are
not systematically distinguished; they are commonly distinguished—none
of the Narragansetts whose folkways Roger Williams chronicled in the
seventeenth-century ever believed that ewáchim-neash, their word for corn,
could make a good meal—but there are cases where the word is efficacious,
has physical power (Williams 1971: 100). Beliefs and words are indiscrimi-
nately events or things, following the same social norms as actions and con-
structions.To be a “wise” man or woman is then to interpret narrative tradi-
tion, to reason from a variety of validities expressed in practices, usually via
analogy to paradigmatic cases, in order to adjudicate current disagreements
or problems. It is to understand the function of reason as handling com-
munal problems against the background of a tradition that exhausts intelli-
gibility and normativity.
While the agroliterate age is roughly ten thousand years old, cities only
emerged around 3,000 b.c.e.Thus the new mentality of the age may well
have taken a long time in developing. Its full expression is certainly on dis-
play by the time of Jaspers’s Axial revolution. Starting then, and through the
history of Agraria, rationality came to be understood as the embodiment
of or participation in a transcendent ideal, or the attempt to demonstrate
such participation, verbally expressed in a logical hierarchy of principles.
Socrates’ attempt at universal definition of each norm, with his Pythagorean-
Orphic belief in the soul, the Hebrew Prophets’ condemnation of contem-
porary society by transcendent standards, the Upanishads’ turn from Vedic
ritual to contemplation, and Gautama’s assertion of the unreality of the
world—or, equivalently, the superiority of logic to common experience—
all express the new view.Validation is participation in, emulation, embodi-
ment, or instantiation of what is beyond sensory experience and social
convention. One might say in a Derridean vein that this Jasperian or Axial
rationality is the full exploitation of the implicit possibilities of writing,
itself definitive of the agroliterate age. For now, just as ancient writings can
be used to show that contemporary society has declined, that it fails to be
true to its normative documents, the religious genius and the philosopher
can announce that the real is not ideal. Society is no longer everything; it is
now merely almost everything.The dualism of ideal and real matches the
cosmic, metaphysical dualism of God and world, or truth and appearance,
and the hierarchy of elite (almost always two-headed, warrior-aristocracy and
literate scribes) versus commoners (peasants plus merchants). Gellner is right
to see Plato’s Republic as a marvelous expression of this world, with its per-
fectly coordinated hierarchy of classes (philosophers-guardians-moneymakers),
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levels of education, modes of cognition, the cardinal virtues, and types of
political regimes.
Weberian rationality is but a couple of centuries old, which is to say
that only in the last two centuries has its implicit form been made explicit
and differentiated from the Durkheimian and Jasperian. It is the functional or
instrumental rationality by which practices and claims achieve justification
in the context of aims and explicit premises. Hence efficiency in achieve-
ment or logicality of procedure rationalizes any particular act or claim. It is
highly differentiated, or as Gellner says,“modular.”Truth, goodness, beauty,
salvation, and pragmatic norms like efficiency are utterly separable. Incom-
mensurability of norms then permits commensurable judgments within
the discourse of each norm.As Weber saw, this makes it impossible to pro-
ject an integrated factual-moral world. But since in most respects human
historical development combines rather than replaces earlier forms, it would
make sense to say that Jasperian rationality retains the Durkheimian, and we
modern Weberians retain the other two.Thus we move among the three.
While our leading form of rationality cannot project an omnivalent whole,
our vestigial, subaltern, contextually employed Jasperian and Durkheimian
rationalities can continue to do so.This is not to suggest that we integrate,
reconcile, or unify the three reasons. We cannot. For the Weberian the
third moment is not a Hegelian sublimation of the other two, but as Peirce
claimed of his Thirdness, or Relation, it is merely a more complex dimen-
sion of a totality it does not exhaust (Peirce 1955: 266–67).
Each of these modes of reason has a distinct relation to culture. Durk-
heimian reason is reason undifferentiated from culture, or more precisely, the
capacity to judge other judgments in an environment where modes of judg-
mental validity are not distinguished from cultural norms. It takes the form
of weighing a variety of considerations regarding which we moderns would
accuse the reasoner of continual category mistakes. It is the reason of the
implicit or unarticulated whole. I am tempted to say that, to this very day,
this is what constitutes being “reasonable” in our everyday English sense of
the word. Reasonableness, as opposed to reason or rationality, implies that
no one consideration is either foundational or overwhelming, no one part
of the whole determines all others, that one must take plural saliences into
consideration, rather than appeal to a logical hierarchy of principles. It may
sound odd to connect a modern person’s “reasonableness” with ritualistic,
segmentary versions of “reason,” but that is because we reject other com-
ponents of segmentary thinking, for example, the ontological continuity of
signs and things. Still for us today, Bernard Shaw’s quip holds, that the rea-
sonable man [sic] adapts to society while the unreasonable man demands
that society adapt to himself, hence history is made by the unreasonable
man. Reasonableness takes pluralistic current considerations as its guide,
while the unreasonable refer to some narrower norm that trumps all others.
“Be reasonable” is a plea to honor the normal pluralism, hence balanced
inconsistency, of social criteria rather than force one criterion above all.
This socially pluralistic form of reason was the human form of reason for
the vast majority of human existence.
Jasperian reason is the capacity to evaluate judgments in terms of society-
and-culture-transcending norms. The model of validity is Platonic or
Alexandrian or mathematical.The particular, the decision, or the action in
question is valid because it embodies or participates in an ideal or tran-
scendent model. Reasoning must operate by relating worldly events and
possibilities to rules independent of the processes or events in question.This
is the reason of the explicit or articulated whole. The normative models
can only be known by those with special knowledge, that is, literacy.They
carry high culture, now distinct for the first time from low or folk culture.
This form of reason is always dogged by the need to debate and clarify
what those transcendent rules are, hence the sticky problem of what can
justify a transcendent rule. But wherever this problem is ignored or solved,
the hierarchy of reason can nicely match the hierarchy of caste, virtue, and
power.
Weberian reason is the reason of a culture split into progressive spheres.
Each context is made rational by formulating its premises, or goals, which
then dictate what means are rational.The task of understanding the world
is distinguished from social fealty, status, moral duty, aesthetic satisfaction,
and salvation. Certainly one might, having completed a bout of research,
then evaluate that research in terms of these other values. But no one can
claim cognitive legitimacy, truth, for a result because it would be good to
believe it, will make society operate better, or is more beautiful.As Weber
rightly said in his classic essay “Science as a Vocation,” we modernists are
“polytheists,” our version of reason having discovered that the connective
tissue linking goodness, truth, and beauty—which Jasperian rationality
had no trouble finding in God—is unavailable (Weber 1972). Reason can
only move among given concepts, premises, and rules within the norma-
tive contexts they define. One might say that while modernity saw the rise
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of Weberian or instrumental reason, our current period of modernity, the
postmodern, is defined by the discovery of the incompatibility of Weber-
ian and Jasperian reason, the gradual disentangling of Weberian reasoning
from its anachronistic Axial parentage.
Given this, what did the notion of the autonomy of Reason, floated by
the ancient Greeks but actualized only in the Enlightenment, mean? I sug-
gest it was nothing more than the differentiation of inquiry into truth from
other forms of human judgment, speech, activity, and production. Moder-
nity is based in the rejection of omnivalence, which is to say, the rejection
of the Durkheimian or “natural” condition of humankind.The inability to
project a whole is precisely the deep modern problem of the relation of
human values or norms to the material, putatively value-less, undesigned
universe achieved by modern, truth-governed science. Modernity is then,
as Weberian, radically contextual; each social endeavor generates its own
norms and “constructs” its own environment. Niklas Luhmann would say
that this is a permanent condition, in which modern or postmodern soci-
ety has worked out alternative modes of social and intellectual organiza-
tion which cannot tolerate and do not need Durkheimian or omnivalent
unity (Luhmann 1982). Postmodern society is, as he says, “a whole that is
less than the sum of its parts.” Ominivalence remains of course in the
supracontextual zones of decision in which we variously abandon Weberian
rationality, going by our “instincts,” “sensibility,” “experience,” “practical
wisdom,” and so on.
Now certainly these disentangled spheres are still the constructions of a
culture and characteristic of the people that employ them.They serve the
ends of the culture.They do so, however, through this disentanglement and
unifunctionality. Carried far away by the wind, the seed better serves its
parent plant. But in doing so it takes the species to unanticipated realms,
opening it to novel changes.The progress of the unifunctional spheres devel-
ops unimaginable cultural resources but in the process reconstitutes the
culture, again and again.
The Bend of History
At the outset of our study we noted Francis Fukuyama’s famous argument
that global politics in a postcommunist era experiences “the end of history”
(Fukuyama 1989).That thesis is at odds with, on the one hand, Benjamin
Barber’s claim that the world is dividing along a new bipolarity between
premodern jihad and postmodern “McWorld” (Barber 1992) and on the
other, Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis, which anticipates
a pluralistic world of permanently conflicted cultural units (Huntington
1993). Certainly the plausibility of Fukuyama’s thesis has suffered in the last
decade; most of the phenomena treated by the present study have added
fuel to the polycultural thesis.
But Fukuyama’s view is not all wrong.What we mean by modernity is
an environment based in certain kinds of progress, which, once achieved,
are relatively self-sustaining and hard to do without.Whatever else is true
of the contemporary world, it has created a direction, a cognitive, technolog-
ical, economic, and—at least in terms of the public control of the modern
state through democracy and universal education—political standard for
the rest of the world to meet. Virtually all societies and major parties
acknowledge these goals, hence everyone accepts a roughly equivalent
meaning of “development.” Disapproval of Western modernization con-
cerns the cost of these achievements or what may accompany them, but
no peoples or national elites are today in favor of less science, worse health
care, and fewer economic opportunities. If we can say that there is no such
thing as complete modernization—since every society and culture retains
elements that are relatively unreformed by progress, including the United
States—we can also say that today there is no such thing as complete or
full antimodernism, no true attempts to return to the premodern era sim-
pliciter. For such a return would have to mean abandonment of social and
legal equality, a return to caste distinctions, aristocratic or royal ownership
of land or the means of production, abandonment of modern science and
technological progress, the social primacy of kin and locale, and hence the
weakness of central government.There are no such movements in the world
today, for a “movement” requires centralization, politicization, rationalist
organization, and modern technology. Or if there are such, they occur only
in situations of crisis that fulfill no culture’s normative criteria, during the
collapse of the state into warlord-ism or a reversion to tribal and clan
social organization. Modernization rules out some forms of cognition,
culture, and social organization.
Nevertheless, there is nothing in the impressive recent spread of global
capitalism, the information revolution, and liberal republicanism which
together spell the end of ethnic, religious, or nationalistic modes of social
organization, either now or soon or ever. Reports of identity’s demise have
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been greatly exaggerated.The reason for the persistence of primordial ver-
sions of identity and affiliation is not only the enduring need for them, but
as well the very flexibility of modernity and its technologies, which can be
exploited and channeled in different ways by all sorts of polities.We do not
know what aspects of human culture will be dispensed with by the various
experiments in modernization now under way.
Thus it appears that expansion of the modernized areas of the globe will
mean more and more different ways to be modern. We face not one but many
globalizations (Berger and Huntington 2002).An earlier round of modern-
ization and its discontents produced fascism and communism, direct threats
against liberal capitalist modernity.The first was destroyed, the second, in
its own phrase, “withered away.” But the newer round of discontents is
more amorphous and arguably more creative. One does not have to accept
former Singapore president Lee Kuan Yew’s promotion of “Asian values”
against Western-style individual rights to recognize that the modernized
Pacific Rim nations have their own model of capitalism, a communitarian
rather than individualist model.Will South Africa and Nigeria lead a novel
African modernity in the next half century? What kind of society will China
become by the time it takes the lead in East Asia? And how different will
the least modernized countries look from those countries exhibiting the least
Western forms of modernization? What we see as a failure to modernize
may in fact be a novel non-Western form of modernization. I think it
likely that this spiral goes on indefinitely, with convergence not on a single
model but around certain constraints that the various extant models must
share, such as, for example, mastery of the technological-scientific develop-
ments of the day. For if there is a lesson of postmodern society, it is not that
things fall apart when the center does not hold, but that some things can
function quite well without a center.
That is what is really disturbing to the fundamentalist mind, not secular-
ization, but the combination of claimed religious identity with seculariza-
tion, embodied most of all by the United States. For we can now say that
the Islamic revival is Axial or Jasperian.That is its distinction. Even in its fun-
damentalist expressions it is a highly rational form of moral-Platonic think-
ing, divorced from ultimately segmentary-ethnic-kin-local ties, thing the
particular always in terms of the transcendent universal. Militants elevate
this into a utopian scheme through a politicized modernity that accepts
modern science, technological innovation, industrialism, and commercialism
(not full capitalism, given the Islamic rejection of usury).This is instructive.
Islam today represents unambiguous Axial reason, particularly as the mili-
tants seek to denude Islamic society of its Durkheimian substructures, its
social traditionalism. It is its Axial nature that makes the Islamic revival most
frustrating to the West, in that it exhibits what is, for the postmodern West,
a hyperrational (which is to say, modernized) version of its own Axial past.
Regarding those postmodern societies we can offer a tentative and sur-
prising suggestion: as Jaspers recedes, Durkheim returns. To say that Reason is
not autonomous is to say that it remains irreducibly Durkheimian, hence
social.That form of reason has been present for as long as human beings
could adjudicate disagreement. Axial or Jasperian reason discovered the
advantages of a detour away from social life for social life, and Weberian rea-
son did it one better, bestowing massive power and prosperity on societies
that renounced the substantive dependence of cognition and production
on culture. But the Rortyan resocialization of reason is a return to Durk-
heimian reason after the withdrawal of Jaspers.The Axial age metanarra-
tives cease to be central to the human societies that have evolved moder-
nity on the terms described herein, however they ornament our discourse.
Still, in the central societal processes of the most advanced societies the social-
ized cognition and segmentary rationality that is forever the fallback posi-
tion of human beings remain. For oddly enough, if Durkheim’s notion of
collective consciousness fits any society, it fits contemporary postmodern
mass culture.Thus Weber and Durkheim ambiguously join hands.That is
our unique situation. Our culture is fragmented, ironic, open, volatile, hence
unlike any earlier culture. That is its Weberian content. But that content
functions as a formidable social whole bearing the echoes of centralized
nationalism, subtended by a common context-free culture that is inculcated
by electronic mass media, all to form a very powerful We-World. Our
behavior is composed of piecemeal but serviceable Weberian roles, contexts,
and calculations, which nevertheless grow and spread into Durkheimian
functions, strategically retaining Jasperian fig leaves. Flanking the great
agroliterate period of 5,000 b.c.e. to 1900 c.e., the source of our norma-
tive civilizations, the modern Weberian and the segmentary Durkheimian
forms of reason meet in our postmodern era.To what end, or to what new
beginning, remains to be seen.
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Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Barber, Benjamin. 1992.“Jihad vs. McWorld.” Atlantic Monthly, March.
———. 1995. Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World. New
York: Ballantine Books.
Barry, Brian. 1990. “How Not to Defend Liberal Institutions.” In Liberalism and the Good,
ed. R. Bruce Douglass et al. New York: Routledge.
R E F E R E N C E S
———. 2001. Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Barth, Fredrick. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little, Brown.
Bartley,W.W., III. 1987. “Theories of Rationality.” In Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality,
and the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Gerrard Radnitzky and W.W. Bartley III. LaSalle,
Ill.: Open Court.
Bateson, Gregory. 2000.“A Theory of Play and Fantasy.” In Steps Toward an Ecology of Mind:
Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Becker, Lawrence C. 1986. Reciprocity. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Bell, Daniel. 1976. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books.
Berger, Peter, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner. 1973. The Homeless Mind: Moderniza-
tion and Consciousness. New York: Random House.
Berger, Peter, and Samuel Huntington. 2002. Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the
Contemporary World. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Trans. Richard Nice. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
Braudel, Ferdinand. 1993. A History of Civilizations. Trans. Richard Mayne. New York: Pen-
guin Books.
Brightman, Robert. 1995. “Forget Culture: Replacement,Transcendence, Relexification.”
Cultural Anthropology 10, no. 4.
Brooks, David. 2001. Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There.
Thorndike, Maine:Thorndike Press.
Buchanan,Allen. 1995.“The Morality of Secession.” In The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed.
Will Kymlicka. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buchler, Justus. 1955. Nature and Judgment. New York: Columbia University Press.
Burke,William. 1987. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Cahoone, Lawrence. 1988. The Dilemma of Modernity: Philosophy, Culture, and Anticulture.
Albany: SUNY Press.
———. 1989.“Buchler on Habermas on Modernity.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 4
(winter).
———. 2002a. Civil Society:The Conservative Meanings of Liberal Politics. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
———. 2002b. The Ends of Philosophy: Pragmatism, Foundationalism, and Postmodernism.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
———. 2002c.“Margoline Relativism.” Idealistic Studies 32, no. 1.
———. 2003. From Modernism to Postmodernism:An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Callois, Roger. 2001. Man, Play and Games. Trans. Meyer Barash. Urbana: University of Illi-
nois Press.
Carr, David. 1986. Time, Narrative and History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Casey, Edward. 1995. Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place
World. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
———. 1999. The Fate of Place:A Philosophical History. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press.
Cassirer, Ernst. 1944. An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture.
Trans. Charles Hendel. New Haven:Yale University Press.
———. 1965. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Three volumes. Trans. Ralph Mannheim.
New Haven:Yale University Press.
216 REFERENCES
REFERENCES 217
Chase, Philip. 1999.“Symbolism as Reference and Symbolism as Culture.” In The Evolution
of Culture, ed. Robin Dunbar, Chris Knight, and Camilla Power. New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press.
Cohen, Jean L., and Andrew Arato. 1997. Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Dabashi, Hamid. 1993. Theology of Discontent:The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolu-
tion in Iran. New York: New York University Press.
Damasio,Antonio R. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of
Consciousness. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Davidson, Donald. 1984.“On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” In Inquiries into Truth
and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1986.“A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.” In Truth and Interpretation:
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Ernest Lepore. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Davutoglu,Ahmet. 1994. Alternative Paradigms:The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs
on Political Theory. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.
Deleuze, Giles, and Félix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus. Trans. Brian Massumi. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Derrida, Jacques. 1973. “Differance.” Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s
Theory of Signs. Trans. David Allison. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Dewey, John. 1944. Democracy and Education. New York:The Free Press.
———. 1958. Experience and Nature. New York: Dover Books.
———. 1979. Freedom and Culture. New York: Paragon Books.
Dixon,A. C. 1910–15. The Fundamentals. Chicago:Testimony Publishing.
Douglass, R. Bruce, Gerald Mara, and Henry Richardson, eds. 1990. Liberalism and the
Good. New York: Routledge.
Drucker, Peter. 1995. The End of Economic Man:The Origins of Totalitarianism. New Brunswick,
N.J.:Transaction Publishers.
Dunbar, Robin, Chris Knight, and Camilla Power, ed. 1999. The Evolution of Culture. New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Durkheim, Emile. 2001. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Trans. Carol Cosman. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Dylan, Bob. 1967. All Along the Watchtower. Columbia Records.
Eisenstadt, S. N. 1999. Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution:The Jacobin Dimension of
Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eliade, Mircea. 1954. The Myth of the Eternal Return, Or, Cosmos and History. Trans.Willard
Trask. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Elias, Norbert. 1994. The Civilizing Process:The History of Manners and State Formation and
Civilization. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1995. Democracy on Trial. New York: Basic Books.
Euben, Roxanne. 1999. The Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of
Modern Rationalism:A Work of Comparative Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Fichte, Johann G. 1979. Addresses to the German Nation. Trans. R. F. Jones and G. H.Turnbull.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Fleischacker, Samuel. 1994. The Ethics of Culture. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Fraser, Sir James. 1994. The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Freeman, Mark. 1993. Rewriting the Self: History, Memory, Narrative. New York: Routledge.
Friedman, Thomas. 1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New
York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1989.“The End of History.” The National Interest, no.16 (summer).
———. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York:The Free Press.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1994. Truth and Method. Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Mar-
shall. New York: Continuum.
Galston,William. 1989. “Civic Education in the Liberal State.” In Liberalism and the Moral
Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
———. 1991. Liberal Purposes: Goods,Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Geertz, Clifford. 1961. The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the
New States. Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago. Reprinted as Old Societies and New
States (New York:The Free Press, 1963).
———. 1989. “Anti Anti-Relativism.” In Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation, ed.
Michael Krausz. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Gellner, Ernest. 1981. Muslim Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
———. 1988. Plough, Sword, and Book:The Structure of Human History. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
———. 1992. Reason and Culture:The Historic Role of Rationality and Rationalism. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers.
Gibson, James J. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Giddens,Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Gohari, M. J. 1999. The Taliban:Ascent to Power. Oxford: Oxford Logos Society.
Gouldner, Alvin. 1979. The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class. New York:
Seabury Press.
Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Griffin, Michael. 2001. Reaping the Whirlwind:The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan. London:
Pluto Press.
Gutmann,Amy, ed. 1994. Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton
University Press. Originally Multiculturalism: Examining The Politics of Recognition
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume One: Reason and the
Rationalization of Society. Trans.Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press.
———. 1987. The Theory of Communicative Action.Volume Two: Lifeworld and System: A Cri-
tique of Functionalist Reason. Trans.Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press.
———. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society. Trans. Thomas Burger, with Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
———. 1990. “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification.” In
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry
Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hall, Edward T. 1973. The Silent Language. New York:Anchor Books.
Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson.
New York: Harper & Row.
218 REFERENCES
REFERENCES 219
Herder, Johann G. 1968. Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind. Trans. Frank
Manuel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hodgson, Marshall. 1974. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization.
Two volumes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hollinger, David A. 1995. Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism. New York: Basic Books.
Holmes, Stephen. 1993. The Anatomy of Antiliberalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor Adorno. 1972. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans. John Cum-
ming. New York: Seabury Press.
Huizinga, Johan. 1980. Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture. New York:
Routledge.
Huntington, Samuel. 1993.“The Clash of Civilizations.” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 (summer).
———. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Ibn Khaldûn. 1967. The Muqqaddimah:An Introduction to History. Abridged by N. J. Dawood.
Trans. Franz Rosenthal. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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